ENGAGING SNOW LION AND A DRAGON

EARTHQUAKE IN TIBET

2010-04-15T01:06:00.001+05:30

BLESSED ARE WE

2010-01-21T19:37:00.000+05:30

Blessed are we, the sons of great ranges
and the wish fulfilling turquoise lakes,
stretch across the distant horizon of snow clapped mountains
descend into a realms of south asian seas.

Blessed are we, the sons of great kings
and the sages of wisdoms and intellects,
who conquered and ruled to the furthest of its reach
accumulated prodigious knowledge adhere to Buddhism.

Blessed are we, the sons of Chenrezi, lord of compassion
and the boddhisatvas of all manifestations,
giving birth to MevuDhondrug, an ancestral blood of Tibetan
strived to protect Tibetans for centuries and hereafter.

Blessed are we, the sons of Cholkasum (three provinces of Tibet)
and the warriors of fearless and undying spirit,
blossomed with tranquility, clear and vastness
endeavor to safeguard the territory from any evil forces.

Blessed are we, the sons of Yeshi Norbu (His Holiness the Dalai Lama)
and the chosen one with much affinities and cares,
remain faithful to the words of non violence
awaken to rise up for the freedom of Tibet.

Blessed are we, the sons of all countrymen
languishing in cells with cries of bloods and tears
call upon justice and freedom to my fatherland (phayul)
shall break the chains of tyranny once and for all.

Blessed are we, the sons of new generation
Tibet, our country, so dear to our hearts,
Shall pledge to crumple the challenges we face
till the sun of freedom spread across all over Tibet.

Wake Up! Wake Up! Wake Up!

India must take a ‘free Tibet’ stand

2009-10-22T11:18:00.003+05:30

October 22nd, 2009

By Nitish Sengupta

The recent report about China wanting to build a dam to divert water from the Brahmaputra is the latest in a series of anti-India steps that China has taken in the last two-three years. And one that should give India reason for serious introspection. Beijing’s somewhat childish behaviour over Arunachal Pradesh lately should serve as an appropriate reminder of our own blunders on Tibet and related boundary issue six decades ago.

We also need to take a relook at China’s so-called claim of sovereignty over Tibet. On closer scrutiny, these appear to be nothing more than imperialist claims, like Britain’s over Hong Kong and Gibraltar, which cease to have validity in a post-colonial world. The plain fact is that China, as an imperial power, laid claim over Tibet as a colony. The argument about Tibet ethnically being a part of China is incorrect and lacks historical support.

The origin of China’s claim over Tibet goes back to a dynastic marriage over 1,500 years ago, when the Tibetan king Songsten Gampo married princess Wen Cheng of the Tang dynasty. The marriage in itself did not mean that Tibet was incorporated into China at that time, but China, from this point of time, claimed that Tibet was a part of “greater China”. The Tibetans, and in particular the government-in-exile headed by the Dalai Lama based in Dharamsala, has never accepted this untenable claim by the Chinese government. According to them, Tibet has always enjoyed de facto independence. After Songsten Gampo, the Tibetans and the Chinese fought many times and the Tibetans defeated the Chinese on at least two occasions.

After the rise of the Dalai Lama, the relationship between the two countries was politico-religious, resembling the relationship between the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor in Europe. Chinese emperors acted as Tibet’s protectors. In 1911, when the nationalists overthrew the Quing dynasty, the 13th Dalai Lama expelled all Manchu and Chinese officials from Tibet and announced Tibet’s independence (1913). From 1913 to 1951, Tibet was completely independent.

The Simla Agreement of 1914 was the result of a conference attended by representatives of Tibetan, Chinese and British-Indian governments. There is no evidence that the Tibetans acknowledged the Chinese claim over them. The Chinese and the Tibetan delegates, along with the Indian delegates, signed the draft treaty separately. But, thereafter, although both British-India and Tibet formally endorsed this treaty, the Chinese government in Beijing did not do it on account of the fact that the Chinese imperial government got progressively weakened and was eventually overthrown by San Yat Sen in 1911. It is not correct to say that the government in Beijing refused to endorse the treaty as they had objections to its provisions. The Tibetans have always maintained that Tibet enjoyed de facto independence till 1950. It was after the Communist takeover of China under Mao Zedong that Radio Peking started announcing that Tibet was a part of China and that the Chinese government was determined to restore Tibet to a “unified China”. Soon after that the People’s Liberation Army of China invaded Tibet. The Dalai Lama appealed to America, Britain, India and Nepal for help and guidance. The British advised the Dalai Lama to negotiate with the Chinese and reach an arrangement suitable to both. However, the Indian government bent over backwards in acknowledging Tibet as a part of China and advised the Dalai Lama to accept this status.

Delhi went out of its way in withdrawing the Indian Army contingents stationed in Lhasa and Gyantse, under the 1914 treaty. The government of Tibet had no choice then but to sign the infamous 17-point agreement, and agreeing to Tibet being incorporated into the communist regime. The very first point of the agreement was: “The Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the motherland — the People’s Republic of China”.

Tibetans now became one amongst the 55 ethnic minorities of China. Further, China distributed Tibetan territories among different Chinese provinces like Sichuan, Yunan and Gensu, leaving only the so-called Tibetan Autonomous Region as Tibet. Today, the Han settlers outnumber ethnic Tibetans in Tibet proper. China has militarised Tibet and located military bases along the Indo-Tibetan border in a clear policy to intimidate India.

It is forgotten by Indians of the present generation that Indians did not need a passport or visa to visit any part of Tibet for business or tourism until the early 50s. It was only after China’s occupation that they insisted that Indians carry valid travel documents for entering Tibet. It should also be pointed out that traditionally the border between British-India and Tibet was notional rather than political or geographical. And when, for the first time, the Chinese attempted to physically mark the border, this started a process of unending border disputes.

Meanwhile, the flight of the Dalai Lama in 1959 complicated matters. The Dalai Lama is respected widely in the border areas and Tawang is no exception. Chinese claims over Arunachal Pradesh are only on the strength of the attachment of the people living there to the Dalai Lama and his Tibet. The moment the Dalai Lama is no longer in Lhasa that attachment will disappear.

For India, the time has come to engage in real politics. New Delhi should consider retracing steps and reviving the case for Tibet’s complete autonomy and for the withdrawal of the Chinese military forces from Tibet. Once India takes this stand, there will be support for it in the UN as well. After all, during the days of Hindi-Chini bhai bhai, China did not oppose India’s case for Jammu and Kashmir, but the moment China became friendly with Pakistan and border problems erupted between China and India, China dumped India’s case without any hesitation and supported Pakistan’s claim over Kashmir. It was a clear volte-face. So there are good international precedents for India to re-open the Tibetan question.

Nitish Sengupta, an academic and an author, is a former Member of Parliament and a former secretary to the
Government of India

Kalon Tripa's election: Crucial time of our history

2009-07-17T23:02:00.001+05:30

Tenzin Lekshay, July 17, 2009

This year, Tibetans all over the world commemorate 50 years of freedom struggle and in exile by thanking people of the world and its government for their generous support and assistance. As we marked this event, we need to revisit those five decades of our establishment, which till date was considered an exemplary to the refugee world.

Ever since the Tibetan Government in Exile was established in India, the initial twin objectives of rehabilitating Tibetan refugees and restoring freedom in Tibet were put into actions. Different administrative departments were formed to look after welfare of the people. As of now, more than 52 major and minor settlements were established along with 77 different schools in India, Nepal and Bhutan. Under the restoration of freedom in Tibet, the Commission of Tibetan People's Deputies (Tibetan Parliament in Exile) was instituted and hence after the Tibetan Government in Exile became a democratic institution in 1960. Many democratic reforms were subsequently introduced and the most significant one was the direct election of Kalon Tripa, which is of great importance to the survival of Tibetan issues.

A democratic reform: transitory to maturity

After the post colonization era, many nations adopted democracy as a result of sheer hardships and struggle. It is deemed essential for the progress of nation as it guarantees value of individual thoughts and freedom. In exile, we are blessed with democracy, generously granted by our benevolent leader. Soon after the inception of Tibetan Government in Exile, the constitution was drafted. In 1990, His Holiness the Dalai Lama withheld the then members of Tibetan parliament members and Cabinet members nominated by him. He gave a right to the people to choose their parliament members. People in Diaspora enjoyed the virtue of democracy by electing their representatives who are regarded as the highest authorities in law making.

On several occasions, His Holiness recommended a need of an appropriate leader who can take a decisive authorities on political matters, but the matter was not taken as majority of the Tibetans are willing to follow his middle way approach of seeking reconciliation with China. But in 2000, with an immediate recommendation of His Holiness, Parliament in exile amended a charter and had enacted a law to provide direct election of Kalon Tripa. In 2001, the first directly elected Kalon Tripa- Prof. Samdhong Rinpoche took the oath of office on 5 September 2001 after an overwhelming and impressive win. Again in 2006, he was reelected to the post of Kalon Tripa. Since the exile charter commissioned only two terms for an individual to be Kalon Tripa, the incumbent kalon Tripa will relegate the post to his successor who will be elected later in 2011.

Why is next Kalon Tripa important?

We have more than a year to decide our next Kalon Tripa, and it is good to see general populace concerned about the next Kalon Tripa. Many group discussions and talks were held, videos were made to view the public opinions, articles and notes with jotted with thick lines, talk shows were aired on radio services, and a website was created to make people aware about this coming election. So many things are happening just for Kalon Tripa election. Do we know why everybody talks about it and why Kalon Tripa election is so important?

As the plight of the Tibetan peoples freedom movement draws a renewal attention throughout world communities, Tibetan government in exile is in need of a top executive who can stand with China to put Tibet issue on table. As a stateless governmental system, we have so many problems which need to resolve at an earnest, such like sustainability of Tibetan Settlements, Education system, unemployment, migration, health care and above all our freedom struggle. Since the Tibetan government in Exile is the sole representation of the Tibetan people in exile and in Tibet, utmost importance should be given to the freedom struggle. But, the persistence threat of voluntary marginalization of Tibetan identity and cultures due to the migration is a serious cause of concerns. In exile, most of our settlements are guarded by old aged people, with young ones settling in distant abroad. Some of our established schools in the settlements are near to close with the lack of pupils, graduates are scattering around Indian metros with the lack of employment opportunities in our community. Even on the health wise, HIV Aids is silently killing our community, which is unknowingly spreading wide across our community. These are some of the issues, which the Kalon Tripa needs to formulate policies.

During Prof. Samdhong Rinpoche's dual term of Kalon Tripa, many initiatives were taken, such like formulating education policy, privatization of commercial enterprises, organic farming and dialogue process with China. Even though the renewal talks with China started a year after Prof. Rinpoche was elected, it has developed from its initial 'confidence building measures' to serious dialogue. These responsibilities will soon be on the shoulder of next Kalon Tripa who can execute his job and live up the expectation of the Tibetan people. Therefore he has an enormous job in his/her hand. In this critical time of our history, all eligible Tibetans above age 18 have to seriously look for the right candidate and should participate in the 2011 Kalon Tripa Election. After all, we are accountable for the decisions, which we take and also of the next Kalon Tripa.

TIBET DIARY: TREKKING ALONG THE CHINESE PROPAGANDA MISSION

2009-06-21T14:10:00.007+05:30

On June 19, 2009, Chinese Communist mouthpiece, Xinhua attempts to report on "Tibet Diary" a documentary film made by two Americans, Katy and Moge.

As mentioned in that peice, Moge says "I want to give some advice to people who visit Tibet: open your mind and cast aside your connatural concept on Tibet." I believe it is a valuable advice given but taking their "Tibet Diary" into consideration, they both are trapped into the the pool of Chinese propaganda and did not project the true reality of Tibet. So, their action speaks in contrary to their conception of not bounding to connatural ideas.

Moge and Katy, both first time visitor to Tibet have no background knowledge of Tibetan history and socio-political issues prior to their visit and unfortunately, even after the visit. But, they made a documentary on Tibet which tells what they saw, under the watchful eyes of China. I appreciate their effort but I am doubtful that China might have got a hind of their ignorance and used it in their favor. When Tibetans in exile were asking China to make way for the world medias to enter freely in Tibet, many of prominent medias were not permitted to enter Tibet. Few group medias were allowed, but were strictly guided by the Chinese local officials during the whole tour. Tibet Dairy misses it's charm when someone who did not know about Tibet and tries to prove that he/she knows. It sucks!! Some may wonder, How can I know that they are not knowledgeable about Tibet even after going to Tibet. Here is just a simple fact which is so basic about Tibet. This is what Katy says, "I have learnt new things there. The Tibetan Buddhism has five sects and the Yellow Sect of the Dalai Lama is just one of them." To clarify her mistake, Tibetan Buddhism has only four sects consisting of Gelug, Nyingma, Sakya and Kargyu. Even though Dalai Lama belongs to Gelugpa sect, Dalai Lama is a supreme spiritual leader of Tibet. He promotes nonsectarianism as he is committed for years. More in detail at his official website, www.dalailama.com.

Seeing is believing: Wrong judgement

Katy acknowledged that she learnt so many new things in Tibet and perhaps she is right. But she is confused just like any other people who are less informed about Tibet. That's why she was not sure and puzzled about what is really happening in Tibet. She wrote, "so many Tibetans may be uninterested in Dalai Lama's alleged 'political freedom."

In Tibet, Chinese government strictly restricted Dalai Lama's photo, and many Tibetans were caught and imprisoned for possessing his photo. Fear of persecution is very much prevalent in Tibet. Mere absence of Dalai Lama's photo does not necessarily mean that the people have lost their reverence and faith on him. Rather, Tibetans are forced to remain silent under the vigilant of merciless Communist regime. It is evident as we witnessed over the years that Tibetans in Tibet are becoming vocal in support of Dalai Lama. Here are few of the past events which prove in contrary to what Katy criticized about Dalai Lama. During last year's massive demonstrations in Tibet, many have requested the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet and raised slogan like 'Long Live Dalai Lama". Even during the His Holiness Birthday, people gathered silently to pray for him. In 2007, when the U.S. congressional Gold Medal was awarded to the Dalai Lama, many Tibetans in Tibet were overjoyed by the news and we have witnessed the incense burner filled with huge smokes and fire, which was never seen before at Jorkhang Temple in the midst of Lhasa, capital city of Tibet. Years before, during the kalachakra initiation, Dalai Lama called Tibetan people to stop using animal furs, and in support of this call, many in Tibet had launched campaigns. Mass burning of furs used for clothes were burned in areas. Though, Dalai Lama is physically out of Tibet, but the people's faith is as strong as mountain. Over the past 50 years, The Chinese regime had systematically used many cheap tactics to dissociate the two unseparable bond (Tibetans and Dalai Lama), and they failed to crush it. More over, people in Tibet are becoming more vocal in support of Dalai Lama. I think, Moge and Katy need to go to Tibet once again to check the invisible passion of the people, which is boiling and ready to bust at any moment.

On the surface level, Tibetan cities were sophisticatedly built into a modern city. Visitors are astounded by its modernity which is a master plan of Chinese policy to show to the world that Tibet is developed and remains no more a pre-medieval feudalistic system which they always complained about old Tibet. Many people got carried away by this modernity of Tibet, but did not understand the hard reality behind the scene. Tourism is promoted and considered one among the pillars of Tibetan economy. Potala Palace, once the winter residence of Dalai Lama is presently labelled as a fancy backdrop of Tibet tourism, so to generate income for Beijing Administration. Railway lines linking Mainland China and Tibet was started . While on the journey, many were amazed by the beauty of Tibetan landscapes but did not realized how many of Chinese immigrants were on board traveling and settling in Tibet for their own good. Mainlanders visit Tibet for economic prosperity which has been consistently promoted by the Chines regime to assimilate Tibetan identity and to dominate the economy. Millions of Chinese are already settling in Tibet amidst meager Tibetan indigenous people. With the policy of favoritism in Tibet, Tibetans are loosing its ground on socio-cultural, politico-linguistic affairs. It threatens the very survival of Tibetan race and identity. Most of the shops and malls in Lhasa and many other places are owned by the Chinese immigrants. Tibetans are merely a second class citizen in her own homeland.

Tibet reality: A pragmatic role

After making the documentary film, Moge says "Before going there, I felt that Tibet's getting independence was right and proper. After talking with many local Tibetans, I don't feel that Tibet needs to be independent from China. And I don't think the vast majority of them hope for Tibet's independence, either. " It is obvious that the unified voice of Tibetans and supporters worldwide regards Tibet as an independent state which was aggressively occupied by China in 1959. For decades, Tibetans in Tibet and elsewhere proclaimed Tibet independence as a legitimate right and even continue to do so. And it is the historical fact. However, when he mentioned about talking politics with many local Tibetans, as 'Independence' word itself is a politics and uttering a word of Tibetan independence is considered a serious crime against Chinese national security. So, it is natural that the Tibetan people will not openly say yes to independence. it is a matter of their survival and the threat is very prominent. 'Tibet Diary' is a diary of Moge and Katy's journey to the roof of the world, but they politicize their travel diary to impress China and to convey a wrong message to the world. They became a part of Chinese propagandist tool. It exactly goes with the Chinese traditional saying, "if you tell lies thousand times, it will become truth".

Whatever may be the case, the Tibetan Government in Exile, under the leadership of Dalai lama, consistently urged China to give Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetans, rather than independence in order to preserve their culture, identity, environment and religion. But, China fears that if the Dalai Lama allows to returns to Tibet, CCP will loose its grip in Tibet. So, the Chinese leaders show their deaf ear to the international communities, supporters and Tibetans within and outside Tibet by not negotiating with the exile Tibetan representatives. Till now, eight round of talks were held, nothing positive was yielded rather the talk went dead lock last November. These talks were just a mere confidence building measures and the real negotiation is no way near. Chinese leaders are buying time and waiting for the Dalai lama to die. But, does it solves the Sino-Tibetan problem. I bet, the Chinese leaders need to understand that the Tibet issue is a national issue and not a private issue of the Dalai Lama. The welfare of all Tibetans must take into consideration. Otherwise, the Sino-Tibetan problem will not be resolved for years which will lead to more resentments from the Tibetan side. So, the rational and the pragmatic way to solve this crisis is to negotiate with the Tibetans by granting them Genuine Autonomy within China.

His Holiness the Dalai Lama on Tiananmen Pro-Democracy Movement

2009-06-05T14:57:00.002+05:30

This year in commemorating 20th Anniversary of Tiananmen Square Students' Democracy Movement, Tibetans in many part of the world joined to show their solidarity with the Chinese people who are seeking justice and freedom. His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the spiritual and temporal leader of Tibet had stated many times that he has full faith with the people of China. But the Chinese government condemns by ruthlessly calling him 'wolf in a monk's robe' and 'a splittist'.

Since last year's massive demonstrations in Tibet and around the world coinciding with Beijing Olympics, Chinese regime had accused His Holiness for inciting riots in Tibet and had declared war with His Holiness to the end. His Holiness had flatly rejected the Chinese government's accusation and favored Beijing Olympic 2009 as a chance for the Government to rectify its policy on human rights and freedom in China..

Following are some of the quotes of His Holiness the Dalai Lama on Tiananmen Democratic Movement:

"Despite the tragedy at the Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, the democracy movement has been able to set a process in motion which I consider irreversible. Brute force, no matter how strongly applied, can never subdue the basic human desire for freedom."
-His Holiness on June 4, 1995
http://www.tibet.ca/en/newsroom/wtn/archive/old?y=1995&m=6&p=4_1

"I still consider the Tiananmen Square tragedy as only a temporary set-back for the Chinese democracy movement. Brute force, no matter how strongly applied, can never subdue the basic human desire for freedom. People do not like to be bullied, cheated or lied to by either an individual or a system."
-His Holiness the Dalai Lama on June 4, 1997
http://www.tibet.ca/en/newsroom/wtn/archive/old?y=1997&m=6&p=4_1

“China will have to change not only to meet the changing aspirations of the Chinese people but also to meet the demands of a dynamic economy which requires an open and transparent political system.”
-His Holiness the Dalai Lama on June 4, 2000
http://www.tibet.ca/en/newsroom/wtn/archive/old?y=2000&m=6&p=3_1

His Holiness the Dalai Lama issued a statement in support of Tiananmen Democracy Movement on June 4, 2009.
The complete statement is given below:

On occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square students' democracy movement, along with others who take an interest in Chinese affairs, I respectfully honour those who diedexpressing the popular demand for the government to be more accountable to its people.

The students involved in the Tiananmen Square movement were neither anti-communist nor anti-socialist. Their speaking out in defence of the Chinese people's constitutional rights, in favour of democracy, and taking a stand against corruption, truly conformed to the underlying beliefs of the Chinese Communist government. This was confidently stated by the then party chief Zhao Ziyang. Therefore, the forthcoming 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China presents a great opportunity to review the events of June 4, 1989.

Great changes have taken place in the People's Republic of China since 1989. Today, it is a global economic power poised to become a superpower. It is my hope that the Chinese leaders have the courage and far-sightedness to embrace more truly egalitarian principles and pursue a policy of greater accommodation and tolerance of diverse views. A policy of openness and realism can lead to greater trust and harmony within China and enhance its international standing as a truly great nation.

THE DALAI LAMA
June 4, 2009

Tiananmen Voice will remain

2009-06-04T15:24:00.005+05:30

Over the last two decades, China had materialistically developed far beyond their expectations. The national growth rate meritoriously pounded on a high note of 10 digits. It is primarily due to the economic liberalization formula, which Premier Deng had adopted, but Zhou later claimed that it was his idea.

In 1989, when the world communist paternity was shaken to their end with the events of Soviet Union collapse and reunification of Germany, all eyes were on China. During that time, China was also in the state of socio-economic problems, lingering on a widespread anarchy, corruptions, and unemployment. Communist China, in order to survive, had decided to face off their socialist ideology by implementing capitalist entrepreneurship. China, later proudly claims, Socialism in their own character.

This year, during Mao's death anniversary at his hometown, I was fascinated to learn that many people are buying his Red Book, which was once considered a bible of Communist China. Even though, Great helmsman, Mao had many legacies such like reunification of all nationalities into motherland, social systems like commune and medicare were in service of the common people. But, his economic policies of modernization failed drastically as it toppled the nation's economy into doom. Despite Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution and his human rights record, whole China salutes his giant portrait in front of Tiananmen Square, Beijing till date.

After Mao's death, the transitory government failed to uplift the social problems, which led to the rise of Deng Xiaoping, who was earlier accused of being rightist. Deng Xiaoping later opened the market to the outside world that boomed Chinese economy skyrocket. But, the severity of socio-economic system came into scene as a result of his economic policy unlike Mao's time. Anarchy remains unavoidable. Economic prosperity resulted in the increase in corruption, back channels and nepotism. General populaces were drowned in the deep economic whirlpool of economic clashes where minority enjoys the virtue of its economic liberalization.

Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were amongst the prominent reformists who challenged the system to make it people's friendly. Democratization of government and the rule of law were their main agendas. Traditionally, Chinese people were loyalist, but the communist system in which they adapted in 1989 was beyond their acceptance.

In 1989, thousands of students gathered at the square to mark their respect for their beloved leader, Hu Yaobang. But, as more and more students gathered, along with the trade unions and the common people, grievances on issues facing the country such like freedom, employment and democracy were raised. The people's movement was carried on for three months of mass camping in front of the Government building in Tiananmen Square, chanting slogans and revolutionary songs, and negotiating with the government officials. All they had was a unified voice of truth, justice and freedom against the armed soldiers, tanks and machine guns. One of girls among the demonstrator told BBC radio that they are ready to die for the freedom and they did sacrifice their life for the freedom of China.

Party elders, Deng, Li Peng and other hard liners felt the threat of Communist regime and more so with their positions. With their act of cowardice, thousands of unarmed people were savagely killed and whole Beijing was flooded with bloods and tears. They are real martyrs who sacrificed their life for the cause of future China. So much has been changed in China since that incident. Yet, Chinese Communist regime contempt the June 4 people's movement as a taboo and still tries to wipe out from the China's contemporary history. With the Internet censorship, media manipulations, Government controlled schools and college textbooks, it is hard for the China's younger generation to know about the facts of 1989 incident. But will the regime able to close this chapter forever?

Twenty long years had passed, the bloods in the Tiananmen Square were evaporated into a dust, but the memories of June 4 remain deeply in the heart of people. I have seen videos of many people hesitated to talk about that incident with the fear that government will harass them. But, there are also many people who openly talked about it, despite government pressure. Many exiled Chinese who joined the demonstrations are longing to return to China but the fear of prosecution had distant them from their motherland. The Chinese government must realize that those thousand souls were the sons and daughters of China. International communities had openly criticized China and even sanctioned her but China did not even care about the status of those student leaders who are still languishing in prison.

With the rise of political power, China utterly shuts her ears to the other states, but China dare not challenge its own people. Even though, the Chinese people are still loyalist and nationalist, it does not necessarily mean that they are loyal to the CCP. After 1989, China geared up its economic prosperity to shun the people from engaging in political discussions, it has succeeded so far. But for the last couple of years, public grievances are piling in and petitioners are increasingly addressing their problems. It is the test of time for the Chinese leaderships, whether their policy helps sustain China. If their grievances are not taken into consideration, China will ultimately plunge into a sorrowful state of affair. Without them, China will not sustain. It is understandably that China develops, due to those brave young Chinese brothers and sisters who raised their voices in unison at Tiananmen Square, twenty years ago. Despite government censorship and propaganda, the Tiananmen Voice will remain in the hearts and minds of all Chinese people, I guess even for those Chinese leaders who mercilessly killed them.

NANCY PELOSI'S TRIP TO CHINA

2009-05-29T11:30:00.005+05:30

The American bipartisan delegation led by Speaker Nancy Pesoli is touring China to discuss the global climatic changes. Since the international concerns on environmental protection has gained worldwide attentions, the leaders are toiling around to fix this hazardous problem which had significantly changed the world. It is obvious that the greed of human and its nations rose above the height of human civilization, had jeopardized and adversely affected the nature. Rapid industrialization challenged and exhausted the nature by making it week that leaves the world at the brink of disaster. Natural calimities, like earthquakes, floods, global warming had manifestated the human life unto an awkward situation that has left no other choices than to remify the system to adjust. The lost that the human beings had done to our mother nature can not be reinstalled, but can preserve what is existing. We can not kill ourselves, nor we have a right to kill other species in this world. Many species were wiped out of their existence and remained just a history, many more are listed as an endangered species. In a selfish human thinking, if the destruction of nature continues, we shall never survive.

Coming back to the main point, it is quite interesting to see the change in the policy of the Obama administration towards China. China, a lone rising power, is a developing country focusing on productivity. Since the time of Communist inception, China struggles to push forward the manufacturing units to the top priority so that they will become like a Soviet Union. Great Leap forward, initiated by Mao Tsetung is a classic example of China's modernization which is still practising in China without any pollution control mechanism.

China's hunger for modernization for the past six decades had maliciously driven its states into one of the most polluted zone. With the lack of modern technology, skills, and management, China is wasting so much of its resources extracted before reaching the manufacturing unit. Even after the resources were utilized, China pollutes its air and filled it with smogs, rivers turned into poison and the lands turned barren with toxic substances.

In order to avoid its humiliation during the Beijing Olympic, many factories were shut down, many vehicles were restricted for a month to clean the air, but Beijing still remains under the thick blanket of smogs. China did not even spear its colonized Tibet, previously known for clean air. Since its invasion in 1959, China exploited and extracted its rich resources (mineral, water and biodiversity) and still continue to do so in the name of modernization of Tibet. Alas! Tibet, which China called (Xizang) which literally means Western Treasure is tragically becoming a vast barren land. The roof of the world, once covered by snow cladded mountains is running out of it's snow due to the global warming. Scientists are worried that Tibet, the third pole is melting as the highest level in the Tibet's recorded history which will have implications not only in Tibet but also on the other side of the world. China is behind this gruesome disaster, and the world knows about it but stays silent. It is never too late to raise this issue.

Nancy Pelosi's visit to China is imperative and timely as America, the lone super power and China, a lone rising power needs to think about the global environment. It is a wise as well as rational decision of President Obama to engage China on climate, so that China will become a responsible citizen of the world. Over the years, America's benign role on human rights (morale policing) had apprehended Chinese leadership with distrust and considered interfering in their domestic politics. But, the climate issue is whole different subject and considered a global which make America and China to work together.

During her ongoing tour, Chinese petitioners lined up to address their grievances against the government. Some wrote a graffiti on the wall, 'We love you, Nancy' and others considered her a savior of human rights. Nancy Pelosi, a long time Tibet supporters and vocal about China's human rights violation is treated well this time in China, even though the Chinese leaders earlier shunned her when she met His Holiness the Dalai Lama, last year in Dharamsala, India. It is hard to say, whether America has an influence on China but it is surely a one step forward to make China realize what is going wrong with China other than human rights.

Global climatic issue is the main proposition during the meeting, but she raised Tibet and human rights issues with the Chinese leaders and asked for an earnest negotiation with His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

We are with you, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi

2009-05-27T17:00:00.005+05:30

Myanmar for the last couple of decades was blended with trauma under the bloody realm of Military Juntas which makes headline every other day. Rangoon, despite being a member of United Nations plainly nullifies the international principles on human rights and carries out her own rigid control over its people which is deeply a cause of concern for the United Nations. Myanmar paid no heed to the repeated calls and sanctions imposed by the International communities as it was silently supported by People's Republic of China (PRC). The regime is not ready to reconcile with the National league for Democracy leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi who is currently serving more than 14 years of house arrest. Today, when her extended house arrest term was supposed to get over, the military yet again played a foul game to put her behind the four walls and accused her of breaching the security which is related to the recent intrusion of an American man, John William Yettaw into her house. The trial of a crime which she has not committed is going underway and she is paying the price of Military's security lapse which she might have to serve at the most five years imprisonment. What kind of world are we in?

When I look back at what is happening in Myanmar, it reminds me of its similarity with Tibet under the Chinese communist regime. The only difference is that Myanmar is ruled by an insider and Tibet is ruled by an outsider (Chinese). And the similarity between the two can be distinguish into two parts: 1) The nature of politics, and 2) freedom struggle.

The similarities between Myanmar and Tibet on the nature of politics:

1) The political anarchy and the gross human rights violation are widely seen in both the states. People have no freedom and the fundamental rights and the freedom of expression and belief are violated.

2) People in Diaspora represent the voice of those voiceless people in Myanmar and Tibet.

3) In China, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is strongly backed by its military and in Myanmar, the military rules.

4) Both the CCP and Military Juntas act above the law of land and there is an absence of rule of law.

5) In both Myanmar and Tibet, China and India plays a great role.

6) Medias are tightly controlled by both the governments by using censorship and tight surveillance. Party propaganda and Military indoctrination are the only source of information. International medias are restricted.

7) Both China and Myanmar accuse international communities of interfering in their domestic matters.

8) Democratic reforms in both the states are stage managed by the ruling military regime.

The similarity between Myanmar and Tibet on the freedom struggle:

1) Both have an exile government, Myanmar's exile government is based in the United States and Tibetan Government in Exile is based in Dharamsala, India.

2) Both practice non-violent approach in resolving the problem.

3) Both have a charismatic leader, His Holiness the Dalai Lama for Tibet and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi for Myanmar. Both were honored with Noble Peace Prize, Congressional gold Medal, Sakharov Prize, Honorary Canadian Citizenship and others.

4) Both the leaders were inspired by Mahatma Gandhi and his non violent freedom struggle.

5) Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is under house arrest and His Holiness the Dalai Lama is in exile.

6) Both the leaders pursue for democracy.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi relentlessly tried to democratize Myanmar since the time she visited her ailing mother in Burma in 1988. The Military regime with the support of China feared that her popularity after winning the general election in 1990 might jeopardize the military rule over Myanmar. PRC supports the present Rangoon junta's for their ideological, economic and strategic reasons.

Tibetans for the past five decades had suffered greatly under the Chinese military regime and can understand the suffering of the people of Myanmar. In this struggle for freedom and democracy, Tibetans in all over the world stand by you, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and support the democratic movement in Myanmar. His Holiness the Dalai Lama in his message on 23 September 2007 mentioned, 'I extend my support and solidarity with the recent peaceful movement for democracy in Burma....and the early release of fellow Nobel Peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.' Prayers were held in the Tibetan communities in support of the non-violent movement in Myanmar in 2007.

China: Leading Civil Rights Lawyers Face Threats to Licenses

2009-05-27T10:18:00.002+05:30

For Immediate Release, Human Rights Watch

Government Should Guarantee Independence of the Legal Profession

(New York, May 26, 2009) – More than 20 of China’s most prominent civil rights lawyers face the possible loss of their right to practice law as an apparent official reprisal for their rights advocacy efforts, Human Rights Watch said today.

Under Chinese law, lawyers and law firms must get their licenses to practice renewed annually, a process sometimes marred by political considerations. These civil rights lawyers say that in recent weeks the Beijing judicial authorities have been trying to pressure their firms not to endorse their re-licensing applications. The lawyers say that the firms’ heads have been warned by judicial officials in meetings and telephone conversations about possible adverse consequences for their business if they continue to employ lawyers who take up rights cases.

“Control over the yearly renewal of professional licenses remains one of the main obstacles to the independence of China’s legal profession,” said Sophie Richardson, Asia advocacy director at Human Rights Watch. “Even when law firms that have been pressured decide to stand by their lawyers, this kind of interference has achilling effect on the legal profession.”

According to an official April 14, 2009, notice from the Beijing Judicial Bureau detailing the registration procedures, lawyers must present their annual applications prior to the end of the registration period on May 31. Lawyers who fail to renew their professional licenses are in effect temporarily disbarred.

A number of the lawyers currently targeted have been involved in some of the most high-profile efforts to date to litigate on behalf of victims of human rights abusesand press for greater accountability from the government. They have represented families of victims of the melamine milk-powder scandal, parents of children killed during the Sichuan earthquake who are pressing for an investigation into the causes of the disproportionately high rate of school collapses, and Tibetans arrested in connection with the massive crackdown in Tibet. Others have been involved in representing HIV/AIDS patients, victims of police abuses, farmers evicted from their land, and Falungong practitioners.

Over the past few years, Human Rights Watch has extensively documented abuses of lawyers, widespread violations of the right of the defense in legal procedures, and a pattern of interference and political control in cases viewed as politically sensitive by the authorities (http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/04/27/china-restrictions-lawyers-fuel-unrest ). Although the government vowed to establish new procedural protections for lawyers in June 2008 when it promulgated revisions to the Law on Lawyers (http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/05/28/china-rights-lawyers-face-disbarment-threats ), those efforts have been inadequate. No efforts have been made to effectively safeguard the security of lawyers discharging their functions or to allow the government-controlled All-China Lawyers Association – the country’s bar association – to play such role.

Human Rights Watch pointed out that instead of the promised reforms to protect the independence of lawyers, detention and physical abuses against lawyers by law enforcement officials have multiplied. In one such incident on May 13, 2009, lawyers Zhang Kai and Li Chunfu were arrested and beaten in police custody in Chongqing after meeting with the family of a man who had died while in a re-education-through-labor camp. The authorities have so far refused to investigate the incident.

“Interference and retaliation against lawyers are direct attacks on the rule of law,” said Richardson. “Such actions perpetuate injustices, undermine confidence in legal institutions, and negate the government’s own commitment to governing the country according to law.”

Beijing lawyers who have reported concerns over the renewal of their license include Li Heping, Cheng Hai, Jiang Tianyong, Li Xiongbing, Li Chunfu, Wang Yajun, Tang Jitian, Yang Huimin, Xie Yanyi, Li Dunyong, Wen Haibo, Liu Wei, Zhang Lihui, Peng Jian, Li Jinglin, Lan Zhixue, Zhang Kai and Liu Xiaoyuan. Two lawyers who practice outside of Beijing, Wei Liangyue and Yang Zaixin, have also reported threats over their licenses.

To read the December 2006 Human Rights Watch report, “A Great Danger for Lawyers,” please visit:

http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2006/12/11/great-danger-lawyers

For more Human Rights Watch reporting on China, please visit:

http://www.hrw.org/en/asia/china

For more information, please contact:

In Hong Kong, Nicholas Bequelin (English, French, Mandarin): +852-8198-1040 (mobile)

In Washington, DC, Sophie Richardson (English, Mandarin): +1-202-612-4341; or +1-917-721-7473 (mobile)

Prominent human rights lawyers to be disbarred

2009-05-27T10:13:00.001+05:30

By LESLIE HOOK, Wall Street Journal Asia

"Without this stamp, I can't practice law," Jiang Tianyong says as he pulls a leathery booklet out of his shirt pocket. He points to a dog-eared page near the back of the book: A red imprint there grants him permission to practice law in China until May 31. The following page, where his renewal stamp should be, is blank. In a few days he'll be disbarred.

Mr. Jiang is one of at least a dozen prominent human-rights lawyers across China on the verge of disbarment, in what appears to be a clampdown on their practice. Chinese lawyers must renew their credentials every year in May at their local judicial bureau or Lawyers Association through a perfunctory process known as the "annual exam," otherwise they cannot practice. There is no actual test involved -- the association or bureau simply summons lawyers to its offices, confirms they have paid their dues and gives them a stamp. "If you read the regulations, it's very clear it should not be a substantive review, as long as you fulfill the requirements, the registration should be automatic," says Nicholas Bequelin, a researcher at Human Rights Watch in Hong Kong.

But it doesn't always work this way. Mr. Jiang's story is a case in point: A former school teacher from Henan province, last year he led a group of lawyers who volunteered to represent Tibetans after the March 14 riots. That April, the Judicial Bureau sent his firm a warning letter; then the head of his firm asked him to stop taking sensitive cases and giving interviews to foreign media. He aceded to neither request, and the Judicial Bureau refused to renew his license until the end of June, leaving him unable to practice for a month. This year he has continued to handle high-profile cases involving Tibetan monks, one of whom was released a few weeks ago as a result of work by Mr. Jiang and his partner. He doesn't expect his license to be renewed before it expires Sunday.

Last year Mr. Jiang was one of at least three rights lawyers known to have temporarily lost their licenses in this way, but this year there may be many

more. I spoke by telephone or in person to 16 human-rights lawyers who have yet to renew their licenses. Some of these lawyers may receive their licenses before the May 31 deadline or shortly afterwards -- one even said he had been specifically instructed to apply for his renewal on May 30, the second-to-last day.

But none of them will miss the official warning signal. "Other lawyers and law firms have all been approved," says lawyer Li Fangping, who recently handled a Tibetan case with Mr. Jiang. "It is only firms and lawyers who take human-rights cases who will have to stop [practicing]."

When asked about this trend, an official at the Beijing Judicial Bureau pointed out that the deadline for license renewal is still some days away. "All lawyers are treated equally," said Dong Chunjiang, a deputy director at the Judicial Bureau. He disputed the premise that some lawyers were "rights lawyers," saying: "Our 19,000 lawyers are all protecting people's rights."

Some lawyers disagree that the government is treating them equally. Not only do they point to a wide-spread delay in issuing credentials specifically to lawyers with human-rights practices. They believe the delay is linked to the sensitivities of the anniversaries of the June 4 Tiananmen crackdown and the founding of the People's Republic, as well as a general tightening of control. "The Ministry of Justice uses the 'annual exam' to limit and restrict lawyers' professional rights," says Xie Yanyi, who handles cases for people with AIDS and represents farmers in land-rights cases.

The last few months have also seen an uptick in physical violence and detentions of these lawyers. In April, two were badly beaten by thugs in separate incidents. Earlier this month, lawyers Zhang Kai and Li Chunfu were beaten up and detained while investigating a case in Chongqing. For lawyers who lose their licenses, there is little recourse. Although technically they are allowed to sue the Ministry of Justice for reinstatement, there have been no successful cases of this nature in the past, according to several legal scholars.

The lawyers who face suspension as of Sunday have handled a variety of cases, from representing parents whose children died in flimsy school buildings during the Sichuan earthquake, to helping victims of the toxic milk powder scandal sue for compensation. What these cases have in common is that they show what a powerful ally the law can be for China's underdogs.

While those cases may have sealed their fates as far as license renewal is concerned, many human-rights lawyers in China say they are working toward the same goals advocated by their political leaders. "People like us want to use our professional knowledge to help society develop a legally based system," says Mr. Jiang. "Also, I personally want to live in a society that is ruled by the law."

Ms. Hook is an editorial page writer for The Wall Street Journal Asia.

Failed Government Policies Sparked Tibet Riots

2009-05-26T18:49:00.004+05:30

By AUSTIN RAMZY / BEIJING Tuesday, May. 26, 2009

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1900899,00.html

A new report from a group of Chinese scholars has for the first time challenged China's official explanation that the deadly riots that broke out across Tibet in March, 2008, were inspired by "overseas forces" — namely the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile. (Read "One Year After Protests, an Enforced Silence on Tibet.")

The report, which was recently published on a Chinese website, blames the riots not on outsiders but on Beijing's policy toward Tibet, claiming the central government has backed incompetent local officials, created an economy that provides few options for young people, and deprived Tibetans of access to equal justice under the law. (See pictures of last year's uprising in Tibet.)

While international human rights groups have said the rioting, in which at least 19 died, was a predictable response to the repression many Tibetans experience under Chinese rule, domestic criticism of the government on the politically charged subject of Tibet is rare in China.

What's perhaps most unusual about the report is that it was produced by a group of Chinese scholars working for a Beijing-based think tank. The 22-page document is based on research compiled over a month by four graduate students from Peking University, one of China's most prestigious schools. It was released by the Open Constitution Initiative, a six-year-old NGO run by Chinese lawyers. The group focuses on issues such as last year's tainted milk powder scandal and reform of China's household registration policy, which limits migration from the countryside to cities.

"We want to help society, and help build rule of law," says Xu Zhiyong, legal scholar and one of the group's founders. "We want to be objective. On questions like Tibet, human rights, and so forth, the Chinese government has a standpoint, foreign governments and foreign media have a standpoint. But it's also important to have an independent look at the problems."

While the central government says that 50 years of Communist Party rule of Tibet has led to broad economic gains, the report argues that few of the benefits are enjoyed by young people, who made up a large proportion of the rioters last year. The researchers found the while young Tibetans had given up interest in living as herders and farmers like their elders, a lack of opportunities for work or higher education meant that they have little hope of finding a place in the broader world to which they've been exposed. (Read "China Watches as Tibetan Talks Begin.")

In Tibet, many of the stores, restaurants and hotels are owned and run by ethnic Han Chinese, who are reluctant to hire locals. "In interviews with many young Tibetans, they all said finding work was difficult," the report says. "The main obstacle was language and a lack of fluency in Mandarin. In Lhasa, those who can speak Mandarin can't necessarily find jobs. Many employers won't necessarily hire Tibetans because they are seen as too lazy."

The report's harshest critique of Chinese rule was that in tearing down the traditional Tibetan élite, Beijing established a new hierarchy of local Tibetan officials who have badly managed the region's affairs. "The government has given local cadres great power, but shown little supervision. They have learned to use the goal of 'stable development' as a shield," the report says. It adds that many officials have learned to use the threat of "outside forces" promoting Tibetan independence to conceal their inability to address local problems.

By undercutting the official line that all grievances in Tibet are inspired by the Dalai Lama and driven by independence plotters, the group's report offers hope of a freer debate over tensions in China's sensitive border regions, according to Nicholas Bequelin, researcher for the NGO Human Rights Watch. "This is something that we've been waiting for a long time," he says. "Any improvement in Tibet and Xinjiang can only trickle down from more open areas of China." (Read "Dalai Lama to Stay Quiet on Tibet's Future.")

Xu says that Tibet shouldn't be considered a sensitive subject, and that the Open Constitution Initiative hasn't run into any problems with the government since releasing its study. But Bequelin says that the report hasn't caused trouble because it hasn't been widely distributed or covered within China. And while he notes that the group has been able to post the document on its website, he doubts printed copies will ever be permitted to circulate on the mainland.

Chinese tell of Tibet failures

2009-05-23T21:10:00.001+05:30

John Garnaut, China Correspondent, Beijing

May 22, 2009
http://www.theage.com.au/world/chinese-tell-of-tibet-failures-20090521-bh1x.html?page=-1

LAST year's Tibetan uprising was caused by two decades of failed development policies that marginalised Tibetans and created a "new aristocracy" of corrupt and abusive government officials, Beijing scholars say.

Their report describes how Beijing's efforts to pour rivers of money into Tibet since 1989 to ensure "stability" have been spectacularly counter-productive.

It says private-sector jobs went to Han Chinese from other provinces, and public money flowed into the pockets of a new elite that systematically portrayed community discontent as "separatism".

"They use every opportunity to play the separatism card," says Phun Tshogs Dbang Rjyal, a founder of the Communist Party in Tibet quoted in the report.

"And they will try hard to apportion responsibility on 'overseas hostile forces' because this is the way to consolidate their interests and status and eventually bring them more power and resources."

The fieldwork was conducted by four Peking University journalism students who went to Lhasa and a Tibetan region of Gansu province last July.

The report was compiled and recently published on the internet by Open Constitution Initiative, a non-government organisation run by prominent lawyers and intellectuals in Beijing.

The uprising that embroiled much of the Tibetan plateau from March 14 last year is considered one of the most serious challenges to Communist Party rule since 1949.

The report's existence defies a mammoth Government propaganda and security blitz, which Tibetan exile groups say has led to hundreds of Tibetans being killed and thousands being incarcerated.

Propaganda authorities have blamed the violence on Tibetan "criminals", "hostile foreign forces" and "the Dalai Lama clique".

Xu Zhiyong, a prominent human rights lawyer who helped prepare the report, said he hoped it would be picked up by the domestic media, but doubted it would influence government officials.

Tibetans are nevertheless heartened that a balanced account of the causes of last year's uprising can now exist in China.

"As a Tibetan I feel this report is very important," said Tsering Woeser, a prominent Tibetan poet in Beijing. "This is a rare and treasured report under the current circumstances of one-sided official propaganda."

The report details how Beijing's heavy security and propaganda response further alienated Tibetans after the uprisings.

Monks, who Tibetans saw as "the divine clergy", were subjected to "socialist patriotic education". Even card-carrying Communist Party members were treated as security threats because of their ethnicity when visiting Beijing during last year's Olympic Games.

"Just because I was a Tibetan there was no hotels allowed me in. This made me so angry," said a Tibetan woman, Baima Jizhong, when quoted in the report.

New Aristocracy in Tibet: CCP loyalists

2009-05-20T15:23:00.004+05:30

After last year's massive demonstrations inside Tibet, the Chinese government, yet again brutally used barrel guns and tanks to crush the non-violent demonstrators who were raising their grievances to the Chinese Government to grant more human rights and freedom for the Tibetans to preserve their cultures and identity in Tibet. Undeniably, like Tananmien Square massacre, Chinese leaders washed their hands with the blood of innocent people which the whole world witnessed. Though internatonal pressure mounted, China still violates the universal norms in protecting human rights by killing more than 200 Tibetans with thousands imprisoned and still missing. For the chinese governement, western media are considered baised and incorrect without correcting their own propagandist ventures. For them, international communities who raised Tibet issues are criticised not to interfere in their domestic matters. But when China interferes in other state politics like Sudan, Iran and Bruma, China didn't even consider breaking their self-created interferance on other states.

With the recent development in and outside Tibet and due to the superficial nationalism built up by the CCP, many Chinese people became vocal in support of Communist regime even though they know little about Tibet. For the Chinese government, ignorance is bliss. So long as the Chinese people do not know the truth about Tibet, CCP will enjoy the virtue of her people's ignorance. Make no mistake, the Chinese are not dumb. Many of the Chinese both inside and out of China wrote against the regime for not handling the situation peacefully.

Interestingly, I caught hold of an investigation report done recently on the March 14 incident in Tibet by some Chinese think tank established by Beijing University law professors and several other economics professors. They visited Lhasa, the capital of Tibet and Labrang in Qinghai privince which was previously under Tibet.

The findings were remarkably unbelievable as it mentioned that new Tibetan aristocracy has taken over power and it is worse than the old aristocracy. As the new aristocracy, loyalist to Beijing get all their funding directly from Beijing (Central Government), and they do not care about the well being of Tibetans. These new aristocracy came into power during the Cultural revolution and are still very much in power. They also deliberated that the younger generation of Tibetan who grew up in the so called "liberated" Tibet has stronger Tibetan national identity than the elder generation.

This year in commemorating 50 years of Chinese occupation in Tibet, the Chinese government flaunt the moment as "the Serf Emancipation Day" to justify their "liberation" from feudalism and old Aristocrats. If the old Tibet was bad, then why the Beijing hand picked new aristocrats are worst than the old Aristocrats of pre 1959 Tibet.

The Tibetans did not deny that old Tibet needs reform. The present Dalai Lama tried to carry forward the reforms undertaken earlier by the great 13th Dalai Lama prior to the Chinese occupation. But the Chinese liberation and liberalization on Tibet did not help Tibetans more than Beijing itself. It is a selfish means to reach an end. In contrast to "the Serf Emancipation day", I would rather call it "Tibet Enslavement Day". Tibet today under the grip of Beijing loyalist, new Aristocrats is like a "Hell on Earth".

The original report is written in Chinese and for reading click here: https://docs.google.com/Doc?id=df4nrxxq_91ctcf6sck

Article related to it: http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/05/19/chinese-think-tank-investigation-report-of-314-incident-in-tibet/

Is China choking to death?

2009-05-19T11:52:00.002+05:30

China may be the world's fastest growing economy, but scientists and Governor
Feb 21, 1993
http://www.scmp.com/portal/site/SCMP/menuitem.06f0b401397a029733492d9253a0a0a0/?vgnextoid=5cebddd291912110VgnVCM100000360a0a0aRCRD&s=Archive#Top

THE ancient Silk Road city of Lanzhou sprawls along the banks of the Yellow River in central China - at least that's what the guidebooks say.

On a cold winter's morning, the impenetrable smog cuts visibility down to about 100 metres and it is impossible to see the spectacular cliffs which apparently tower over the city let alone the sweep of the river.

Petrochemical industries, a huge oil refinery, a power station and engineering factories belch fumes into the still, cold air.

It is difficult to see the industrial areas under the dense grey shroud. You cannot see the smoke stacks for the smoke.

Lanzhou is widely reputed to be the air pollution capital of China, the dirtiest place in a nation of grimy, polluted industrial cities.

It will soon have many rivals as the Chinese economic miracle gathers momentum and the demands of 1.2 billion people anxious to enjoy a Western-style living standard begin to foul the remaining clean air and water.

''China is a looming environmental catastrophe,'' said a Western diplomat in Beijing. ''It will make Eastern Europe look like a nature park.'' Marine biologist Ms Catherine Cheung is preparing a bio-diversity report for the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and the Chinese Ministry of Forestry.

The softly spoken Ms Cheung became gloomy when she talked about the enormous range of life that was supported across China's widely varying climatic regions.

''A lot of it is destroyed already,'' she said. ''You have to go to very remote areas to find places that are pristine. These areas are under a lot of threat from development. It's very depressing.'' Horrendous air pollution is already killing thousands of Chinese.

A confidential World Bank environmental strategy paper shows the authorities already have evidence respiratory disease linked to pollution is the country's deadliest killer.

''Data from the Ministry of Public Health indicates the chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, which has been linked to exposure to fine suspended particulates and sulphur dioxide, was the leading cause of death in China in 1988 with a death rate of 162.6 per 100,000 which is 26 per cent of all deaths,'' the paper reports.

''When standardised and compared with figures for the United States, the rate in China is more than five times greater. Fine and ultra-fine particulates are considered most dangerous to health and should be the highest priority in regard to air pollutionabatement.'' The paper says air quality across vast regions is poor.

China's National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) and World Health Organisation monitoring show frequent violations of Chinese and WHO air quality standards by wide margins.
The annual average of total suspended particulates is 526 micrograms per cubic metre in north China and 318 micrograms per cubic metre in the south.

WHO guidelines recommend a safe ceiling of 60-90 micrograms per cubic metre.
China is heavily dependent on coal for energy and inefficient industrial and domestic burning pumps clouds of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and particulates into the atmosphere.
The strategy paper reports annual average sulphur dioxide concentration in the north is 93 micrograms per cubic metre and in the south 119 per cubic metre, well above the WHO guideline level of 40-60 micrograms per cubic metre.

The scale and pace of environmental damage is frightening.

The WWF last year sent a team to survey potential nesting sites for the rare Saunders' Gull among the coastal marshes of Liaoning, Hebei and Shandong provinces.

Working off 10-year-old satellite pictures the team allocated six weeks for the survey.

''They finished in a bit under four weeks,'' said the WWF's Mr David Melville. ''Quite a few of the sites didn't exist any longer. There will effectively be no coastal salt marshes north of the Yangtze River in about 10 years.'' THERE are more than 70 species of animals and birds that are highly endangered in China including the giant panda, the golden monkey, the crested ibis, the takin, the Indian elephant and the Yangtze River dolphin.

When paramount leader Mr Deng Xiaoping released his country from its socialist straitjacket in 1978, the bottled up desire to get rich exploded in a burst of industrial and agricultural expansion that has delivered an average GDP growth of about nine percent a year.

China boasts the world's fastest growing economy and the benefits of prosperity are flowing far beyond the southern provinces where the market reforms first took hold.

For the first time in centuries, if ever, hundreds of millions of Chinese enjoy a measure of material wealth. But the environment is taking a hammering.

Soil, air, water and wildlife suffer as more people and bigger industries demand extra coal-fired power while cities designed for bicycles and buses are choked by an expanding fleet of cars.
Some of China's urban centres, including Beijing, disappear from satellite pictures for days, even in fine weather.

Shanghai, once known as the Pearl of the Orient, is a mess.

Years of heavy industry, neglect and now burgeoning economic growth have poisoned its air and waterways.

The broad Huangpu River flowing past the colonial buildings along the famous Bund carries silt, rubbish, plastic bags and sewage in an oily scum.

Drinking water is drawn from this river where almost 500,000 tonnes of untreated human sewage is discharged each year.

Developers have taken little heed of the environment in the race for prosperity in booming Shenzhen.

Here farmland and paddy fields have been buried under a forest of new skyscrapers and factory buildings spreading out into Guangdong province.

Construction has also spelt disaster for sections of the spectacular coral reef offshore from Sanya on the tropical, southern tip of Hainan Island where the beauty of nature was often the only comfort for disgraced exiles who were traditionally banished to this remote outpost.

Builders have satisfied the demand for lime and building materials by dynamiting the reef and carting the coral away.

Some of China's new environmental destruction is compounding ancient damage.

Driving out of Lanzhou's industrial smog into the Loess Plateau of north-central China reveals a landscape tortured by thousands of years of erosion and over-farming.

The vice-director of the Gansu Grassland Ecological Research Institute in Lanzhou, Professor Zhang Zihe, said an estimated 1.6 billion tonnes of topsoil was washed from the 580,000 square kilometre Loess Plateau each year.

Much of this finds its way into the Yellow River, which has been called ''China's sorrow'' because of the load of topsoil it carries away.

Huge erosion gullies tear at precarious terraces on the Loess Plateau while farmers battle to extract a living from the remaining impoverished soil.

Total soil loss to erosion across the country is estimated to exceed five billion tonnes each year. It is water pollution that is perhaps the most serious menace to public health.

The World Bank strategy paper warns 13 out of 15 sections of the seven major rivers that flow past cities are seriously polluted.

''There have been sharp drops in prawns, jellyfish and scallops in coastal waters and an increase in the frequency of red tides, all of which are attributed to sewage in the water,'' it says.
Industrial waste water is the biggest offender in most urban areas.

The World Bank found only 32 per cent of the estimated 25 billion tonnes of industrial waste water discharged in 1990 was treated.

After treatment, only half met effluent discharge standards.

Less than half of NEPA's monitoring stations for urban water quality are able to show test results that satisfy minimum standards for dissolved oxygen or for biochemical oxygen demand.
Urban groundwater reservoirs are becoming increasingly contaminated as polluted surface water carrying hazardous and toxic wastes is leached down.

''While several ministries have differing views on how severe the problem is, the quality of drinking water in cities appears to be at risk,'' the paper says. ''In rural areas, the problem is acute.

''The Ministry of Public Health estimates imply that only about one in seven rural Chinese have safe drinking water,'' it says.

Authorities in China are aware of the problem and efforts have been launched to curb waste emissions and penalise dirty industries, but environmental police are overwhelmed by the speed of development.

The price of stability

2009-05-19T11:29:00.002+05:30

FRANK CHING ay 13, 2009
http://www.scmp.com/portal/site/SCMP/menuitem.2af62ecb329d3d7733492d9253a0a0a0/?vgnextoid=77f6022d5b431210VgnVCM100000360a0a0aRCRD&ss=China&s=News

Twenty years ago, the military crackdown in Tiananmen Square was ordered by Deng Xiaoping and other party elders. They feared that the peaceful protests mounted by hundreds of thousands of students, and supported by up to 1 million Beijing residents, would degenerate into chaos and endanger the country's social and political stability. In their minds, hundreds - even thousands - of lives was a price worth paying for stability and prosperity (SEHK: 0803, announcements, news) . And it has been repeatedly pointed out that, in the years since then, the country has made steady and rapid economic progress.

So this is the formula that the country has been following: stability is more important than anything else and any factors that lend themselves to instability must be removed at all costs.

With this in mind, one can understand what is happening in Sichuan , which is marking the first anniversary of the devastating earthquake. There, parents who suffered the loss of their only child as flimsy schoolhouses collapsed are not allowed to stage protests, take legal action, or speak to foreign reporters, because these things may undermine social stability."

So, after having been victimised by the forces of nature, they are now being victimised by agents of the state who monitor their every word and pressure them to accept their loss stoically; to put their faith in the Communist Party and the government. The last thing these parents must do is call for investigations into whether there was official corruption or malfeasance involved in the construction of schoolhouses that collapsed on children like houses of cards, often while other buildings nearby survived intact.

In the minds of the party and the government, these grieving parents are now potential factors for instability. And so the state will do whatever is necessary to make sure they do not rock the boat. Some parents have attempted to lodge legal cases, claiming that flimsy construction was responsible for their children's deaths. But the courts, under party control, have not accepted a single case.

Last year, immediately after the earthquake, the government was praised for allowing - or, at least, not stopping - the foreign press reporting freely on the tragedy, and promising an investigation into the large number of schools that collapsed, leading to the deaths of thousands of children. At the time, Premier Wen Jiabao touched the hearts of his countrymen as he ventured into the quake area, tears streaming down his face, calling himself "Grandpa Wen" and assuring trapped children that they would be rescued.

A year later, how things have changed. Foreign correspondents are prevented from doing their jobs. Some have been detained while others have been physically attacked by officials while trying to interview parents whose children have died. Parents, meanwhile, are warned not to talk to foreigners.

The Foreign Correspondents Club of China reported that on one day - May 6 - it received "three separate, confirmed reports of journalists being physically attacked in Sichuan", with equipment being broken. In one incident, a Financial Times journalist and his crew were surrounded by 10 to 12 men, one of whom tried to grab the video camera and punched him in the arm. When the news team tried to film an interview with a petitioner, a man ripped the video camera from its tripod. In fact, the government has even accused some foreign journalists of attempting to incite insurrection. One official, Hou Xiongfei , vice-head of the Sichuan party committee's propaganda department, said some foreign journalists do not go "to the earthquake zone to conduct interviews, but to incite trouble".

The Sichuan government last week issued a figure for the number of children killed in the quake, putting it at 5,335. However, no names were provided. It said schoolhouse collapses were due only to the quake and not to shoddy construction.

Now, the government wants people to be forward-looking. But what can parents who have lost their children possibly see in their future? And is stability really being strengthened when the government refuses to accept their petitions and lawsuits?

Frank Ching is a Hong Kong-based writer and commentator. frank.ching@scmp.com

Zhao Ziyang alleges Li Peng 1989 scheming

2009-05-19T11:13:00.004+05:30

Late leader's explosive memoirs out
ZHAO ZIYANG MEMOIRS Chow Chung-yan May 15, 2009 http://www.scmp.com/p ortal/site/SCMP/menuitem.2af62ecb329d3d7733492d9253a0a0a0/?vgnextoid=1bd900d560041210VgnVCM100000360a0a0aRCRD&ss=China&s=News

A controversial editorial by the Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece, People's Daily, that shaped the outcome of the 1989 student democratic movement was prepared by then premier Li Peng without the consent of paramount leader Deng Xiaoping.

This is revealed by the late Zhao Ziyang, then party general secretary, in his memoirs, Prisoner of the State, released yesterday.

Two decades after his downfall and four years after his death, the reformist party leader has shattered the official silence cloaking the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown in explosive memoirs he recorded in secret while under house arrest."

According to Zhao, the decision to use the military against peaceful protesters in Beijing's Tiananmen Square could have been avoided but for the scheming of die-hard conservatives such as Mr Li, Beijing mayor Chen Xitong and vice-premier Yao Yilin, and Deng's paranoia about losing power.

The memoirs, based on about 30 hours of tape, were given to three confidants and smuggled out of China, and transcribed and compiled by trusted friends. The book, published in English by US publisher Simon & Schuster, went on sale in Hong Kong yesterday. The Chinese version will be available later this month.

In the book, Zhao says "the scale of the demonstrations, the mess it turned into and why it happened when it did were all the results of the April 26 [People's Daily] editorial".

That editorial, in which the peaceful student protests against official corruption that began in April 1989 were labelled anti-party, anti-socialist turmoil, stirred the protesters' emotions and made peaceful solutions increasingly impossible.

Zhao says the editorial was the result of manipulation of information by die-hard conservative leaders such as Mr Li and Mr Chen, who played on Deng's fear of instability and disdain for student movements to their advantage.

"Deng's discussion with Li Peng and others on April 25 was supposed to be an internal affair. However, Li Peng decided to disseminate the contents of Deng's remark ... and paraphrased their talk in the editorial that he had the People's Daily publish on April 26."

Zhao says Deng and his family were not happy with the way Mr Li had made Deng's remark public without his consent. The paramount leader later warned Mr Li don't repeat what you did and Mr Li said repeatedly: "I won't, I won't."

But ultimately, it was Deng who should be responsible for what happened, the book says.

"The crux of the issue was Deng Xiaoping himself ... if Deng refused to relax his position, then there was no way for me to change the attitude of the two hardliners, Li Peng and Yao Yilin," Zhao writes.

"Deng Xiaoping had always tended to prefer tough measures when dealing with student demonstrations because he believed that demonstrations undermine stability.

"Deng had always stood out among the party elders as the one who emphasised the means of dictatorship. He often reminded people about its usefulness. Every time he mentioned stability, he also emphasised dictatorship."

In the memoirs, Zhao calls for reversing the party's verdict on June 4 and the need for China to continue its political reform."

Remembering Tiananmen

2009-05-16T11:51:00.003+05:30

Greg Callaghan May 15, 2009
The Australian
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25486912-5012694,00.html

THE tanks crushed the dead. The world looked on in horror. Bob Hawke wept, then threw a lifeline to Chinese students in Australia. Twenty years on, we talk to some whose lives were changed forever.

Tanks ran backwards and forwards over the bodies of the slain until they were reduced to pulp, after which bulldozers moved in to push the remains into piles, which were incinerated with flamethrowers.

" The audience in the Great Hall of Parliament House, most of them Chinese students clutching white carnations or wearing black armbands, listened as prime minister Bob Hawke read a cable from the Australian embassy in Beijing, describing the events in Tiananmen Square five days earlier, on June 4, 1989.

Scrapping his prepared speech, and with tears welling up in his eyes, Hawke paid tribute to the "acts of indescribable bravery" of the estimated 2000 demonstrators - many of them students - slain in and around the square, declaring that to "crush the spirit and body of youth is to crush the very future of China itself".

What had begun on April 15 as a peaceful demonstration by several thousand students mourning the death of reformer Hu Yaobang had ended dramatically seven weeks later in violence, bloodshed and repression. The Chinese communist government, pushed to the brink by more than a million demonstrators converging on Tiananmen, the vast square in the heart of Beijing, had brutally struck back.

The shock of the assault was doubly traumatic because many Chinese had dared to hope, with communist regimes in Eastern Europe beginning to falter and with the visit to China in May of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, that they too might soon enjoy a greater right to speak their minds.

Now all that compelling hope seemed to be gone. And for the 15,000 Chinese students in Australia on temporary visas, there was a rising tide of anxiety as they contemplated their imminent return to their homeland, which had been swept by demonstrations not just in Beijing but in Shanghai, Nanjing and Guangzhou. Many of them were already pleading for asylum or refugee status.

For Bob Hawke, too, the events at Tiananmen had a personal dimension. His good friend, moderate leader Zhao Ziyang, then secretary general of the Communist Party, was rumoured to be under house arrest after he had publicly sympathised with the students.

Ousted former secretary general Hu Yaobang, whose death had sparked the demonstrations, had been a warm acquaintance; the pair had visited Tibet together in 1985 and shared visions of a more open China.

Hawke knew what his audience wanted. When he offered an immediate one-year extension to student visas, a palpable sense of relief fi lled the Great Hall. Within two weeks of the massacre the Immigration Department recorded up to 10,000 visa applications from resident Chinese students, up from 1260 at the beginning of the year.

We Report, We Decide

2009-05-16T11:19:00.001+05:30

By Mitch Moxley
Posted May 2009
Can the Chinese government build an international media behemoth -- and does anyone care?

These are gloomy days for the global media, but you wouldn't know it from looking at China, where the government has reportedly earmarked RMB45 billion ($6.58 billion) for the international expansion of state broadcasting. As part of this push, China Central Television, or CCTV, and Xinhua news agency will produce content in different languages for both Western and Asian audiences. CCTV, which is preparing to move into a new $700 million headquarters in downtown Beijing, has already opened French and Spanish channels and will soon broadcast in Russian and Arabic. Xinhua will reportedly launch a 24-hour English-language news station modeled on Qatar's Al Jazeera that will broadcast news and features from China and compete with CNN and BBC. It will expand its overseas bureaus from 100 to 186. On the print side, China Daily, the state-owned English newspaper, recently opened a Washington bureau and launched a U.S. edition. In April, the Communist Party's mouthpiece, People's Daily, launched China's second major English daily, Global Times.

If there were ever a time for the Chinese press to make inroads into global journalism, it's now, as the death knell sounds for traditional media around the world and a state-financed newcomer has little competition. The big state media companies have already begun looking for international media assets, and CCTV's English channel has developed an audience in Africa and Asia. Observers suggest Chinese media could follow the same path as Al Jazeera, which was met with skepticism just over a decade ago but is now a global news player. So, will media consumers one day find boxes of Global Times on New York street corners? Will viewers in the United Kingdom flip between BBC, Al Jazeera and China TV? Most importantly, will the PR campaign influence the way we think about China?

In a word, no. First, there's the money problem. Despite the large upfront investment, long-term sustainability looks doubtful. The English-language state media has minimal advertising revenue, and there's little indication these will be money-making ventures. Global Times, for example, is expected to lose RMB20 million in its first year of publication. "The government puts money in, but it doesn't get money back," says Qiao Mu, director of the Center for International Communications Studies at Beijing Foreign Studies University (BFSU). "Over 10 or even five years, the government can't sustain such costs. If the government stops the subsidies, what will happen?" Beijing has stayed mum on how long it plans to bankroll the expansion, other than to point out that improving China's communications capability is a priority, and the outlets themselves have not defined their business models. Regardless, for long-term success state media will need to crack North America and Europe -- much tougher markets than Africa and Asia.

A second, but perhaps even more serious problem, is the issue of content. Although there have been marked improvements in recent years, the Chinese media continues to either ignore sensitive issues or report only one side of the story. These issues include, but are not limited to, the Three Ts -- Tibet, Tiananmen, and Taiwan. Stereotypes about China are often highlighted simply because they are glossed over. In order to attract an audience overseas, the Chinese press will need to fundamentally change its presentation of current affairs.

This is not likely to happen, however, as long as all media outlets are owned and run by the state. The Chinese government, frustrated with the way China is portrayed by Western news organizations, has made no secret that the expansion of "overseas propaganda," as party insiders call it, is intended purely to influence the way the world perceives the country. In January, Li Changchun, a CCP Politburo Standing Committee member, said that officials must "vigorously sing the praises of the achievements of the CCP, socialism, the reform policy, and the great motherland." Wang Chen, the head of the party's overseas propaganda division, said the media should boost "capacity to broadcast, to positively influence international public opinion and to establish a good image for our nation." Those words don't bode well for increased press freedom.
One hope for Chinese global media, then, may be for it to diversify its ownership. According to BFSU's Qiao, "If we let other interest groups into media ownership and management, they can manage as the market requests. They can try to please its audience. If management evolves, the content will of course change. They have to think about investment, advertisement, audience interest."

The most obvious path to overseas success -- a solution for both the money and the content problems -- is a model that allows private investment. Consider Phoenix Television, a privately owned Hong Kong-based broadcaster run by a former People's Liberation Army colonel. Phoenix runs five different channels targeting mainland China and other markets with a substantial Mandarin Chinese-speaking population.

"That's a good model" for state media to follow, says Liu Kang, a professor of Chinese media and culture studies at Duke University and dean of the Institute of Arts and Humanities at Shanghai Jiao Tong University. "Everybody knows that Phoenix has a very strong government backing, but it does not appear as state media." Liu adds that it's premature to talk about privatizing state media, but that there are ways to water down state control, including the formation of joint ventures with international media companies. "That's important to appear credible," he says.
Of course, even if the state loosens its grip on the media, it does not mean that the Three Ts will be fair game. Indeed, CCTV, Xinhua, China Daily and others will receive a cool reception abroad if they continue to fawn over their owners and present only the rosiest picture of China's state of affairs. In journalism there's an old saying, "Bad news is good news." If all the Chinese news is good news, expect foreign audiences to change the channel.

Mitch Moxley is a freelance writer based in Beijing. He worked as a writer and editor at China Daily during the lead-up to the 2008 Olympic Games.

Excerpts From Zhao Ziyang’s ‘Prisoner of the State’

2009-05-15T15:38:00.005+05:30

Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang
by Zhao Ziyang, Adi Ignatius (Editor), Bao Pu (Editor), Renee Chiang (Editor), Roderick MacFarquahar (Foreword by)
Publisher: Simon & Schuster Adult Publishing Group
Pub. Date: May 2009, 336pp
ISBN-13: 9781439149386

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/world/asia/15zhao-transcript.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1

The following is a translation of excerpted audio recordings made by Zhao Ziyang, the purged Communist Party chief and former prime minister of China, who was removed from power in 1989 after he opposed the use of force against democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square.

Part 1, Chapter 4: 'The Crackdown' (Pp. 33-34)
On the night of June 3rd, while sitting in the courtyard with my family, I heard intense gunfire. A tragedy to shock the world had not been averted, and was happening after all.

I prepared the above written material three years after the June Fourth tragedy. Many years have now passed since this tragedy. Of the activists involved in this incident, except for the few who escaped abroad, most were arrested, sentenced, and repeatedly interrogated. The truth must have been determined by now. Certainly the following three questions should have been answered by now.

First, it was determined then that the student movement was “a planned conspiracy” of anti-Party, anti-socialist elements with leadership. So now we must ask, who were these leaders? What was the plan? What was the conspiracy? What evidence exists to support this? It was also said that there were “black hands” within the Party. Then who were they?

Second, it was said that this event was aimed at overthrowing the People’s Republic and the Communist Party. Where is the evidence? I had said at the time that most people were only asking us to correct our flaws, not attempting to overthrow our political system. After so many years, what evidence has been obtained through the interrogations? Have I been proven right, or have they? Many of the democracy activists in exile say that before June Fourth, they had still believed that the Party could improve itself. After June Fourth, however, they saw the Party as hopeless and only then did they take a stand to oppose the Party. During the demonstrations, students raised many slogans and demands, but the problem of inflation was conspicuously missing, though inflation was a hot topic that could easily have resonated with and ignited all of society. If the students had intended on opposing the Communist Party back then, why hadn’t they utilized this sensitive topic? If intent on mobilizing the masses, wouldn’t it have been easier to raise questions like this one? In hindsight, it’s obvious that the reason the students did not raise the issue of inflation was that they knew that this issue was related to the reform program, and if pointedly raised to mobilize the masses, it could have turned out to obstruct the reform process.

Third, can it be proven that the June Fourth movement was “counterrevolutionary turmoil,” as it was designated? The students were orderly. Many reports indicate that on the occasions when the People’s Liberation Army came under attack, in many incidents it was the students who had come to its defense. Large numbers of city residents blocked the PLA from entering the city. Why? Were they intent on overthrowing the republic?

Of course, whenever there are large numbers of people involved, there will always be some tiny minority within the crowd who might want to attack the PLA. It was a chaotic situation. It is perfectly possible that some hooligans took advantage of the situation to make trouble, but how can these actions be attributed to the majority of the citizens and students? By now, the answer to this question should be clear.

Part 4, Chapter 2: 'Zhao Walks the Line' (Pp. 189-190)
Another issue was how to deal with people implicated in all of this. The Anti-Liberalization Campaign was not just a theoretical issue. My biggest headaches came from the issues of whether to punish people, how to reduce the harm done to people, and how to contain the circle of people being harmed. From the beginning of the campaign, some Party elders were also very enthusiastic and wanted to punish a lot of people. Deng Xiaoping had always believed that those who proceeded with liberalization within the Party should be severely punished. Wang Zhen and other elders believed this as well. People like Deng Liqun and Hu Qiaomu were even more eager to take the opportunity to destroy certain people and take pleasure in the aftermath.

Under these circumstances, it was difficult to protect certain people, or limit the number being hurt or even to reduce the degree of harm that was done. Hence when it was drafted, the Number Four Document set strict limits on the punishment of those designated by the campaign as having made mistakes. The document defined this as: “Punishments that will be publicized and administrative punishments must first be approved by the Central Committee, and are to be meted out to those few Party members who openly promote bourgeois liberalism, refuse to mend their ways despite repeated admonitions, and have extensive influence.” The document also stated, “For those who hold some mistaken views, criticisms by fellow Party members may be carried out in Party group administrative meetings. They should be allowed to hold to their own views and the method of carrying out the criticism must be calm.”

At the meeting of national Propaganda Department leaders and on other occasions, I also spoke on how to win over the vast majority of people in the theoretical and cultural domains. I suggested we cooperate even with people with biased or false ideas. I pointed out, “Among Party members working in the theoretical and cultural fields, there are those who clearly uphold the Four Cardinal Principles but are a bit conservative and rigid; some are enthusiastic about reform yet have made statements that are inappropriate. We cannot just label the former as dogmatic or the latter as pursuers of liberalization. We should educate and cooperate with them all.”
When proceeding with the Anti-Liberalization Campaign, I had intentionally emphasized that we should classify those who had taken faulty liberal actions as well as those who were too conservative and rigid into the same group of people who were too biased. The purpose was to avoid or reduce the harm being done to people.

Part 4, Chapter 4: 'Preparing for the Main Event' (Pp. 205-206)
Nevertheless, we had practiced socialism for more than thirty years. For those intent on observing orthodox socialist principles, how were we to explain this? One possible explanation was that socialism had been implemented too early and that we needed to retrench and reinitiate democracy. Another was that China had implemented socialism without having first experienced capitalism, and so a dose of capitalism needed to be reintroduced.

Neither argument was entirely unreasonable, but they had the potential of sparking major theoretical debates, which could have led to confusion. And arguments of this kind could never have won political approval. In the worst-case scenario, they could even have caused reform to be killed in its infancy.

While planning for the 13th Party Congress report in the spring of 1987, I spent a lot of time thinking about how to resolve this issue. I came to believe that the expression “initial stage of socialism” was the best approach, and not only because it accepted and cast our decades-long implementation of socialism in a positive light; at the same time, because we were purportedly defined as being in an “initial stage,” we were totally freed from the restrictions of orthodox socialist principles. Therefore, we could step back from our previous position and implement reform policies more appropriate to China.

Part 3, Chapter 4: 'Finding a New Approach' (Pp. 112-113)
The reason I had such a deep interest in economic reform and devoted myself to finding ways to undertake this reform was that I was determined to eradicate the malady of China’s economic system at its roots. Without an understanding of the deficiencies of China’s economic system, I could not possibly have had such a strong urge for reform.

Of course, my earliest understanding of how to proceed with reform was shallow and vague. Many of the approaches that I proposed could only ease the symptoms; they could not tackle the fundamental problems.

The most profound realization I had about eradicating deficiencies in China’s economy was that the system had to be transformed into a market economy, and that the problem of property rights had to be resolved. That was arrived at through practical experience, only after a long series of back-and-forths.

what was the fundamental problem? In the beginning, it wasn’t clear to me. My general sense was only that efficiency had to be improved. After I came to Beijing, my guiding principle on economic policy was not the single-minded pursuit of production figures, nor the pace of economic development, but rather finding a way for the Chinese people to receive concrete returns on their labor. That was my starting point. Growth rates of 2 to 3 percent would have been considered fantastic for advanced capitalist nations, but while our economy grew at a rate of 10 percent, our people’s living standards had not improved.

As for how to define this new path, I did not have any preconceived model or a systematic idea in mind. I started with only the desire to improve economic efficiency. This conviction was very important. The starting point was higher efficiency, and people seeing practical gains. Having this as a goal, a suitable way was eventually found, after much searching. Gradually, we created the right path.

Part 3, Chapter 7: 'One Step at a Time' (P. 126)
In summary, there were two aspects: one was the market economic sector outside of the planning system, and the other was the planned economic sector. While expanding the market sector, we reduced the planned sector. While both planned and market sector existed, it was inevitable that as one grew the other shrank. As the planned sector was reduced and weakened, the market sector expanded and strengthened.

At the time, the major components of the market sector were agriculture, rural products, light industries, textiles, and consumer products. Products involved with the means of production were mostly still controlled by state-owned enterprises.

If the enterprises that controlled the means of production were not weakened or reduced, if a portion was not taken out to feed the market sector, growth could not continue for the emerging market economic sector. If no part of the means of production was allowed to be directly sold on the free market; for example, if small enterprises producing coal or concrete were all under central control; then the new emerging market sector would have run into great difficulties for lack of raw materials and supplies. Therefore, for more than ten years, though there was no fundamental change to the planned economic system and the system of state-owned enterprises, the incremental changes in the transition from planned to market economies had an undeniably positive effect.

Part 6, Chapter 5: 'The Way Forward' (P. 270)
Of course, it is possible that in the future a more advanced political system than parliamentary democracy will emerge. But that is a matter for the future. At present, there is no other.
Based on this, we can say that if a country wishes to modernize, not only should it implement a market economy, it must also adopt a parliamentary democracy as its political system. Otherwise, this nation will not be able to have a market economy that is healthy and modern, nor can it become a modern society with a rule of law. Instead it will run into the situations that have occurred in so many developing countries, including China: commercialization of power, rampant corruption, a society polarized between rich and poor.

Part 3, Chapter 3: 'Opening Painfully to the World' (P. 107)
In hindsight, it was not easy for China to carry out the Reform and Open-Door Policy. Whenever there were issues involving relationships with foreigners, people were fearful, and there were many accusations made against reformers: people were afraid of being exploited, having our sovereignty undermined, or suffering an insult to our nation.

I pointed out that when foreigners invest money in China, they fear that China’s policies might change. But what do we have to fear?

A Month without China

2009-05-15T11:16:00.000+05:30

http://blog.seattlepi.com/beaconlights/archives/168670.asp?from=blog_last3

Post-May Day, the great - well, at least pretty good - experiment is over.

My home went a month without buying anything from the People's Republic of China.
When I told my friend Vinh what I was up to, he looked at me like I was crazy.
"Everything is made in China," he said.

"I've done it before," I insisted. "I've gone years without buying anything from Iceland."

"I've gone all my life without buying anything from Iceland," he admitted.

I mentioned my goal to a Filipino-American who organizes cleanups at a nearby park.

"Everything is made in China," she said.

"But," I answered, "I'm going to buy from Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Japan, and the US and Mexico."

I wanted to buy things from Tibet, but you can't find anything from Tibet these days, except Tibetans, thanks to...the People's Republic.

A few years back, I could have included Hong Kong in that list of preferred trading partners: no more.

Hong Kong isn't a democracy. It could have been, just as Taiwan evolved to be.

Instead, it's part of the PRC.

It's not China's fault that it's a "People's Republic" not of the people, for the people, or by the people, nor a republic.

It's not China's fault China deserves better than the PRC.

Why boycott PRC goods?
Tibet. Taiwan. Hong Kong. Vietnam. Laos. Cambodia. Mongolia. India. Nepal. Japan. Korea. Siberia. Mexico. Canada. The United States. The Sudan.

Too, I'm testing the People's Republic. Quick to take offense, the PRC regularly denounces others for "insulting the Chinese people." Given its track record on human rights, environmental degradation, shoddy construction projects, ethnic cleansing, and food supply contamination, the Communist Party of the People's Republic of China may be the greatest insult the Chinese people have ever known.

China is more than a one-party state. China is a civilization, a people, a culture, a history: China is more than the PRC, yet less than the territory the PRC claims.

I told a Chinese friend about my month without China. Was he offended?

"About that?" he said. "No."

So, what did the household give up?

We didn't buy electronics. We put back cheese slicers, vegetable dicers, ice trays, and knickknacks. When I bought a new used Nissan pickup, I shopped till I found a set of Japanese truck tires and American brake pads.

When our refrigerator died, we found a used one - from Korea.

A pal down the street told me, "I went for twelve years without buying anything from China."
Why?

The massacre of Chinese people by the PRC.

At Tiananmen Square.

Why stop after twelve years?

My neighbors had a son.

"You can't have children without buying from China, strollers, rockers, toys..."

On May Day, the experiment ended. My wife brought home ice trays - from the People's Republic - only we discovered they wouldn't work in our refrigerator.

She took them back.

Shopping, I still read the tags

HIGHLIGHTS-Purged Chinese Communist Party chief's memoirs

2009-05-15T11:02:00.002+05:30

BEIJING, May 14 (Reuters) - Reuters has obtained Zhao Ziyang's memoirs, which were secretly taped while he lived under house arrest after his ouster in 1989 as China's Communist Party chief for opposing the military crackdown on the Tiananmen protests.

Following are excerpts which were transcribed and translated into English. The full text will be published this month in the book "Prisoner of the State", ahead of the 20th anniversary of the crackdown on June 4.

ON THE TIANANMEN CRACKDOWN
"On the night of June 3rd, while sitting in the courtyard with my family, I heard intense gunfire. A tragedy to shock the world had not been averted, and was happening after all ... "

"First, it was determined then that the student movement was a planned conspiracy of anti-Party, anti-socialist elements with leadership. So now we must ask, who were these leaders? What was the plan? What was the conspiracy? What evidence exists to support this? It was also said that there were black hands within the Party. Then who were they?"

"Second, it was said that this event was aimed at overthrowing the People's Republic and the Communist Party. Where is the evidence? I had said at the time that most people wereonly asking us to correct our flaws, not attempting to overthrow our political system."

ON THE WESTERN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM
"... it is the Western parliamentary democratic system that has demonstrated the most vitality. This system is currently the best one available. It is able to manifest the spirit ofdemocracy and meet the demands of a modern society ..."

"If a country wishes to modernise, not only should it implement a market economy, it must also adopt a parliamentary democracy as its political system. Otherwise, this nation will not be able to have a market economy that is healthy and modern, nor can it become a modern society with a rule of law.

"ON POLITICAL REFORM"
If we don't move toward this goal, it will be impossible to resolve the abnormal conditions in China's market economy: issues such as an unhealthy market, profiting from power, rampant social corruption and a widening gap between rich and poor. Nor will the rule of law ever materialise."

"If the final destination is a parliamentary democracy, the ruling Party must achieve two breakthroughs. One is to allow other political parties and a free press to exist. This canhappen gradually, but it must be pursued. The second breakthrough is having democracy within the Party: that is, the Party needs to adopt democratic procedures and use democratic means to reform itself ... Different opinions must be allowed to exist, anddifferent factions should be made legitimate."

(Reporting by Benjamin Kang Lim, Chris Buckley and Ben Blanchard; Editing by Nick Macfie and Dean Yates) ((benjamin.lim@reuters.com; +8610 6627-1212; Reuters Messaging: benjamin.lim.reuters.com@reuters.net))(If you have a query or comment on this story, send an email to newsfeedback.asia@thomsonreuters.com)ENDS

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Memoirs of China's Zhao: What the experts think
BEIJING, May 14 (Reuters) - Four years after his death, reformist Chinese leader Zhao Ziyang has broken the official silence cloaking the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown in memoirs he recorded in secret. Here is what the experts say.

FOREWORD BY RODERICK MACFARQUHAR, HARVARD PROFESSOR
Reading Zhao's unadorned and unboastful account of his stewardship, it becomes apparent that it was he rather than Deng (Xiaoping) who was the actual architect of reform. It was Zhao who, after countless inspection tours, finally realised that thecommitment to rural collectivisation, reaffirmed when Deng came back to power in December 1978, was passe, and who threw his support for a national household responsibility system as the way to develop agriculture and raise farm incomes. As Zhao acknowledges, without Deng's support it would never have been possible to proceed. But Deng did not make the conceptual breakthrough. Zhao did.

PREFACE BY ADI IGNATIUS, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW EDITOR IN CHIEF
It is the first time that a leader of Zhao's stature in China has spoken frankly about life at the top. He provides an intimate look at one of the world's most opaque regimes. We learn about the triumphs and failures, the boasts and insecurities, of the man who tried to bring liberal change to China, and who made every effort to stop the Tiananmen Massacre.

This is Zhao's version of history, and he perhaps was making his arguments for a future generation of leaders who may revisit his case and decide whether he should be rehabilitated in the memory of the Party, and the nation.Although Zhao now speaks from the grave, his voice has the moral power to make China sit up and listen.

EPILOGUE BY BAO PU, SON OF ZHAO'S FORMER TOP AIDE
Zhao Ziyang had no interest in being a visionary. He was a pragmatist who wanted to solve real problems. He led his country through confusion and chaos and made difficult choices for the sake of improving the lives of others. He did his duty. His legacy, recorded here, will ensure he does not fade from history.

(Reporting by Benjamin Kang Lim, Chris Buckley and Ben Blanchard; Editing by Nick Macfie and Dean Yates) ((benjamin.lim@reuters.com; +8610 6627-1212; Reuters Messaging: benjamin.lim.reuters.com@reuters.net))(If you have a query or comment on this story, send an email tonewsfeedback.asia@thomsonreuters.com)
ENDS

China's Zhao decries June 4 "tragedy" from the grave

2009-05-15T10:56:00.002+05:30

By Benjamin Kang Lim and Chris Buckley

BEIJING, May 14 (Reuters) - Two decades after his downfall and four years after his death, reformist Chinese leader Zhao Ziyang has broken the official silence on the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, denouncing the killings of protesters as a "tragedy".

In memoirs recorded secretly under house arrest, Zhao has challenged China's cautious, current leaders just before the 20th anniversary of June 4, when troops crushed pro-democracy protests centred on Tiananmen Square in Beijing.

He praises Western-style democracy and denounces the armed quelling of the protests, when troops and tanks pushed down Chang'an Avenue, shooting demonstrators and onlookers.

Zhao, who was head of the Communist Party in 1989, rejects the government's claim that the student protesters were part of a"On the night of June 3rd, while sitting in the courtyard with my family, I heard intense gunfire," says Zhao. "A tragedy to shock the world had not been averted."n anti-Communist conspiracy."

I had said at the time that most people were only asking us to correct our flaws, not attempting to overthrow our political system," Zhao says in the book "Prisoner of the State", to be published by Simon & Schuster in English this month ahead of the 20th anniversary.

The memoirs, about 30 hours of tape, were given to three confidants and smuggled out of China. A manuscript was obtained by Reuters.

Zhao's account of Party elders pushing him from power sheds rare light on the political warring behind the protests that shook China 20 years ago, culminating in his ouster and the crackdown that killed hundreds on the streets of Beijing.

"I told myself that no matter what, I refused to become the (Party) general secretary who mobilised the military to crack down on students," he says.

Zhao had his eyes fixed on China's future when he secretively recorded his memories throughout years under house detention until his death in January 2005. He decries what he saw as the mistaken conservative path taken by the Party after 1989 and argues for a gradual transition to Western-style democracy.

"In fact, it is the Western parliamentary democratic system that has demonstrated the most vitality," says Zhao."

If we don't move toward this goal, it will be impossible to resolve the abnormal conditions in China's market economy.

"China's current leaders brush aside the "disturbance" of 20 years ago as a distant event with a settled official verdict, and Zhao's book is sure to be banned by authorities who will seek to stop copies of the Chinese edition slipping into the mainland.

But Zhao remains a symbol of reformist rectitude to sympathisers and, with even apolitical citizens eager to learn about the Party's secretive ways, copies may still spread.

Bao Pu, a Hong Kong-based publisher and son of Zhao's former top aide, said Zhao apparently wanted to give his version of events to challenge the Party's official condemnation of the Tiananmen protesters and its one-Party rule."

He did not leave instructions ... but clearly he wanted his story to survive," said Bao, whose New Century Press is publishing the Chinese edition of the book.

"It's a crucial period of history that defines modern day China. It contradicts the government's version of the truth."

Bao Pu's father, Bao Tong, lives under police surveillance in Beijing but has been allowed to meet foreign reporters.

BREAKING WITH DENG
The thread running through Zhao's memories of his rise and fall is his tortured bond with Deng Xiaoping, the wizened revolutionary veteran who steered China to market reforms but rejected -- ultimately with force -- calls for democratic change.

Deng is honoured by China as the pioneer behind the country's economic success, and Zhao's account of double-crossing and betrayal under Deng is likely to irk the country's current leaders, who like to present an image of solid unity.

Zhao rejects the notion Deng was instinctively in favour of political relaxation but was led astray by conservatives.

"Deng had always stood out among the Party elders as the one who emphasised the means of dictatorship. He often reminded people about its usefulness," says Zhao.

Deng's notions of democracy "were no more than empty words". Deng was paramount among Party elders who dominated behind the scenes while Zhao and his colleague, Hu Yaobang, coaxed officials to break up rural communes and strictures on private business that Communist leader Mao Zedong made his legacy.

But by the late 1980s, Zhao found it increasingly difficult to weave between conservatives enraged by the crumbling of Soviet socialism and the advances of market reforms and intellectuals and advisers who wanted to push past barriers to economic andthen political liberalisation.

Zhao says that in ousting him from power, Deng, then-premier Li Peng and Party conservatives trampled on rules meant to prevent a return to Mao's years of arbitrary, one-man power.

The remedy to China's problems, Zhao says, lies in gradual but unceasing movement towards democracy."I believe the time has come for us to tackle this issue seriously," he concludes.

(Additional reporting by Ben Blanchard in Beijing and James Pomfret in Hong Kong; Editing by Nick Macfie and Dean Yates)(benjamin.lim@reuters.com; +8610 6627-1212; Reuters Messaging: benjamin.lim.reuters.com@reuters.net)(If you have a query or comment on this story, send an email to newsfeedback.asia@thomsonreuters.com)
ENDS

Reformist's memoirs will give party 'food for thought'

2009-05-14T17:56:00.000+05:30

Reuters in Beijing
2:30pm, May 14, 2009
http://www.scmp.com/portal/site/SCMP/menuitem.2af62ecb329d3d7733492d9253a0a0a0/?vgnextoid=69a7d8596bd31210VgnVCM100000360a0a0aRCRD&ss=China&s=News

The memoirs of China's late Communist Party chief who was sacked in 1989 for sympathising with student protesters will give the party plenty to think about when deciding the country's political future, his one-time top aide said.

Two decades after his downfall and four years after his death, reformist leader Zhao Ziyang has shattered the official silence cloaking the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown in memoirs he recorded in secret under house arrest.

In his revelations, Zhao praised western-style democracy and said multi-party politics, a free press and an independent judiciary were needed for China to become a parliamentary democracy.

Asked what the impact of the memoirs would be, Bao Tong, formerly Zhao's most trusted aide, told reporters: "I think it will cause party members to reflect deeply.”

"I think it's slightly more likely that senior leaders would read this book. It will give them a lot to think about, and cause them to think about the party's basic survival," said Mr Bao, the most senior mainland official jailed over the Tiananmen protests.

Mr Bao said he was "100 per cent certain" the voice on an audio recording was Zhao's after being given earphones to listen to excerpts during an interview at a Beijing hotel restaurant where he had been followed by plainclothes police.

Zhao had been accused of splitting the party for challenging then-paramount leader Deng Xiaoping's decision to send in troops to crush the pro-democracy protests centred on Tiananmen Square in Beijing. Zhao died in 2005 after more than 15 years under house arrest.

Asked if Zhao's memoirs could split the party again, Mr Bao was adamant: "No."

China has changed dramatically since 1989, breaking out of diplomatic isolation, emerging to become the world’s third-biggest economy and hosting the Olympics and making its first space walk last year. Most Chinese are richer and freer.

But Tiananmen is still taboo in China and the authorities are expected to ban Zhao's memoirs.

"It will not be circulated widely," Mr Bao said.

The memoirs come during a sensitive year, when the party must navigate through potentially volatile anniversaries, including June 4 and the 60th anniversary of the founding of modern China, while coping with a slowing economy and rising joblessness.

Mr Bao was once a political high-flier, and as secretary to the party's powerful Politburo Standing Committee held a rank equivalent to a cabinet minster. Now he is a thorn in the government's side who is under surveillance around the clock.

"If the party wants to survive long-term and in accordance with the law, it will have to respect the law," Mr Bao said. "If they don't they will make the same mistakes they did on June 4."

Zakaria: China strategy is to wait out Dalai Lama

2009-05-13T16:56:00.002+05:30

May 8, 2009 -- Updated 1816 GMT (0216 HKT)
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/05/08/zakaria.dalailama/index.html

Fareed Zakaria is a foreign affairs analyst who hosts "Fareed Zakaria GPS" on CNN at 1 and 5 p.m. ET Sundays.

(CNN) -- The Dalai Lama says the key to stopping violence around the world is to stop "destructive emotion."

In an interview to air Sunday on CNN's "GPS," he tells Fareed Zakaria that he doesn't think even Osama bin Laden wished for violence when he was a child but that it grew of out hatred and frustration.

The Dalai Lama also addressed relations between Tibet and China in the interview, which Zakaria discussed with CNN.

CNN: Why is Tibet such a hot-button issue for China?
Fareed Zakaria: China sees the issue as a separatist movement, as President Lincoln did when the South wanted to secede from the Union. They feel their territorial integrity is being threatened. And Tibetans see their culture, language and religion as being slowly but surely extinguished by the Chinese.

CNN: So who's right?
Zakaria: Well, that depends on who you ask. You need to look at the history to get a complete picture. It all goes back to Genghis Khan, who captured Tibet in 1207. He united Tibet » with China under the Mongol empire. The Chinese have claimed an unbroken line of sovereignty over Tibet ever since.

The Tibetans, however, reject that claim, saying they have been an independent kingdom for many periods during that time, some centuries long.

That was the situation until 1912, when Tibet declared itself an independent republic. China never recognized it, nor did the U.N. or any major Western power.

CNN: Well, that seems to indicate that China has a point. Does it?
Zakaria: It's not so simple, because although China never recognized an independent Tibet, neither did it exercise any control of Tibet.

That is, until 1950, when Chairman Mao sent the Red Army in to liberate -- as the Chinese saw it -- the Tibetan people from the feudal serfdom they were living under.

However, the Tibetans saw the act as an invasion, and in 1959, the political and spiritual leader of the Tibetan people, the Dalai Lama, fled to India, where he set up a government in exile.

CNN: So we've been with the current situation since 1959. Why hasn't there been any resolution?
Zakaria: Well, the Chinese are hoping to wait it out. By letting the issue drag on, they are hoping more and more ethnic Han Chinese move into the region and slowly let the Tibetan freedom movement die out.

CNN: Will it work?
Zakaria:That could happen -- and has worked with other regions. But, it could also work the other way.

The Chinese sometimes use force, as they did last year against the Tibetan monks, which causes a huge backlash in Tibet and outside. This has resulted in some Tibetans becoming more strident in their calls for independence and aggressive in their demands.

However, the Dalai Lama has repeatedly said that he does not seek independence, only cultural autonomy, and urged his followers to engage in no violent protests whatsoever. If there were ever a leader of a separatist group whom one could negotiate with, he's it. And once the 72-year-old Dalai Lama passes from the scene, Beijing might have to deal with a far more unpredictable and radical Tibetan movement.

CNN: Do you think granting what the Dalai Lama is asking for makes sense?
Zakaria: If you look at other cases, such as in Turkey and India, granting autonomy to groups that press for it has in the end produced a more stable and peaceful national climate. But that is a lesson the Chinese government will have to learn for itself; it is unlikely to take instruction from outsiders.

CNN: What ultimately causes this age-old mistrust between the Chinese and the Dalai Lama? What's the stumbling block that keeps them from finding resolution?
Zakaria: The Chinese government has always believed that when the Dalai Lama speaks of "autonomy," what he really means is independence, a sovereign nation for Tibet. I asked the Dalai Lama about this, and he denied it vehemently. He insists that Tibetans would truly be content to live within the Chinese system, as citizens of its government, as long as they are allowed to preserve their culture and practice their religion.

It is difficult to see how this gap -- the difference in perception between the two sides -- can be bridged.

On the Question of Tibet with Wen Jiabao

2009-05-13T16:47:00.003+05:30

Below is the excerpt from the transcript of Fareed Zakaria's interview with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. The interview was taped September 23, 2008.

http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/09/29/chinese.premier.transcript/index.html

Zakaria: May I ask you about another set of possible talks? The Dalai Lama has said now it appears that he would accept China's rule in Tibet, he accepts the socialist system in Tibet, and what he asks for is cultural autonomy and a certain degree of political autonomy. The talks apparently are stuck at a lower level between the Tibetans and the Chinese government. Why don't you, given your power and your negotiating skills, take the issue yourself -- and you or President Hu Jintao would negotiate directly with the Dalai Lama and solve this issue once and for all for the benefit of the Chinese people, and of course the Tibetan people who are also in China?
Wen Jiabao: Our issue with the Dalai Lama is not an ethnic, religious or cultural issue in the ordinary sense. It's a major principled issue concerning safeguarding the country's unity or allowing efforts to separate a country. And we must adopt a two-pronged approach in viewing the Dalai Lama. On one hand, it is true that the Dalai is a religious leader, and he enjoys certain influence in the Tibetan region, and particularly in regions that the inhabitants believe in Buddhism. And, on the other hand, we must also be aware that he is not an ordinary religious figure. The so-called government in exile founded by the Dalai Lama practices a theocratic rule. And the purpose of this so-called government in exile is to separate Tibet from China.

In many places all over the world, the Dalai Lama keeps preaching about the idea of a so-called autonomy in the greater Tibetan region. And actually, the so-called autonomy that he pursues is actually to use religion to intervene in politics. They want to separate the so-called greater Tibetan region from the motherland. And many people in the United States have no idea how big is the so-called greater Tibetan region, the so-called greater Tibetan region, preached by the Dalai Lama, actually covers Tibet, Sichuan, Yunnan, Qinghai and Gansu -- altogether five provinces. And the area covered by the so-called greater Tibetan region accounts for a quarter of China's territory.

For decades, our policy towards the Dalai Lama remains unchanged: that is, as long as the Dalai Lama is willing to recognize that Tibet is an inalienable part of China's territory, and as long as the Dalai Lama gives up his separatist activities, we're willing to have contact and talks with him or his representatives.

Now, sincerity holds the key to producing result out of the talks. After the Tibet incident back in the 1950's, the highest leader of the central government, Mr. Deng Xiaoping, also met the representatives of the Dalai Lama.

So, I don't think there is this problem, as whether I can have contact with the Dalai Lama. The real key lies in the effectiveness of such contact and talks.

We hope that he can use real actions to show sincerity and break the deadlock.

Zakaria: What action would you like to see from the Dalai Lama that would show sincerity?
Wen Jiabao: Actually, I already made it clear that when we observe any individual, the Dalai Lama included, we should not only watch what, we should not only observe what he says, but also watch what he does.

His sincerity can be demonstrated in giving up separatist activities.

Zakaria: And then you might meet with him?
Wen Jiabao: By then, everything depends on the development of the situation. Of course, talks may continue, and in light of the progress in the talks, we may also consider raising the level of the talks.

Hope for a Better Tibet Policy

2009-05-13T16:29:00.001+05:30

by Willy Lam
far eastern economic review April 2008

The question of “Who lost Tibet” is bound to haunt the Chinese Communist Party at least
through to the 18th ccp Congress of 2012, when Party General Secretary and President Hu Jintao is set to hand over power to the “Fifth Generation” leadership headed by Vice President Xi Jinping. The ongoing disturbances in Tibet and four neighboring provinces, as well as the possible boycott of the opening ceremony of the Olympics by several Western countries, could become the biggest blot on the legacy of President Hu.

A revision to the CCP’s longstanding tough tactics against Tibetans as well as the “splitist Dalai Lama clique”—which the Hu leadership has accused of instigating the current anti-Beijing conspiracy—is unlikely in the near term. Yet the possibility cannot be ruled out that after 2012, Fifth-Generation stalwarts like Mr. Xi and Vice Premier Li Keqiang might undertake a reappraisal of Beijing’s policies toward increasingly restive ethnic minorities.

To assess the impact of the Tibetan disturbances on the Chinese political landscape, it is instructive to gauge the extraordinary nature of this frontal assault on the ccp’s authority. In terms of numbers and geographical distribution, the series of protests that first hit Lhasa, capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region on March 10 is the most horrendous display of anti-Beijing and anti-Han Chinese sentiments since the 1959 Tibet Insurrection, after which the Dalai Lama fled to India.

According to reports in internal news digests for senior ccp cadres, more than 30,000 Tibetans took part in nearly 100 “mass incidents” of varying size in Tibet and the provinces of Sichuan, Gansu, Qinghai and Yunnan. The March 2008 cases of what Beijing calls “beating, looting, smashing and burning” are thus much more serious than disturbances in February and March 1989. That culminated in ruthless suppression when then Tibet Party Secretary Hu Jintao ordered the paramilitary People’s Armed Police to use live ammunition against the “rioters.”

There seems little doubt that authorities in both Beijing and Tibet have to bear at least political responsibility for faulty intelligence and inadequate precautionary measures to forestall these blatant acts of defiance. In internal briefings to cadres nationwide, President Hu and his colleagues had warned that underground groups in the two regions would, in collusion with “hostile, anti-China elements in the West,” stage incidents to embarrass Beijing in the run-up to the Olympics in August. More People’s Liberation Army units as well as pap officers were ordered into Tibet and Xinjiang before snowfall last year. Blanket surveillance and arrests of suspects began in earnest in the winter. For instance, police shot dead two suspects and arrested 15 ethnic Uighur activists during a pap swoop on an underground, “terrorist” group in Urumqi last January.

Despite all this, PLA, PAP as well as state security officers guarding Tibet failed to anticipate that recalcitrant lamas and their followers throughout Tibetan communities in five provinces could stage a quasirebellion of such magnitude. Since the 1989 riots, pap officers and state security agents have been stationed inside major monasteries within the tar. Yet Tibetan and central authorities seemed to be caught off guard by the March 10 rally, which marked the 49th anniversary of the 1959 insurrection.

Local and foreign eyewitness to the March 14 riots—in which 13 Han Chinese were allegedly killed—said they were surprised that few police were on hand during much of the rampage. Authorities in the neighboring provinces of Sichuan, Gansu, Qinghai and Yunnan were also slow to respond to demonstrations in towns and counties with large Tibetan communities.

And then there is Beijing’s failure to win the hearts and minds of Tibetans despite record amounts of transfer payments to and massive commercial investments in the autonomous region. The central government spent 96.87 billion yuan ($13.8 billion) in the TAR in the four decades from 1965 to 2005. Since 1993, 90% of the revenues of the tar administration came from Beijing’s largesse. The region’s GDP reached 34.2 billion yuan in 2007, meaning that Tibetans have a comparatively high per capita gdp of 12,000 yuan ($1,712). Many coastal and even central provinces and cities have to observe “aid-Tibet quotas,” meaning they must regularly help the tar through means including building factories and helping local farmers and technicians. The registered capital of domestic Chinese enterprises in Tibet was 22.3 billion yuan in 2007, up 54% from five years ago.

Yet from the Tibetan point of view, capital outlays are just one more way Beijing tries to Sinicize the region. The two-year old Qinghai-Tibet Railway, which was built at a cost of $4.2 billion, is seen as a symbol of Beijing’s effort to control the ethnic minorities through Han Chinese migration, or what the Dalai Lama has called “demographic aggression.” In non-winter months, an estimated 6,000 Chinese—mostly tourists but also traders—flock into Lhasa every day. The capital’s population has swollen to 300,000 with Han Chinese outnumbering Tibetans by two to one. Radical monks in the tar say that if no action is taken, the erosion of Tibetan culture will become irrevocable within a few years.

The extent and ferocity of the March protests means that despite the mass arrests of monks and other instigators,” Tibet remains a time bomb that could at any moment shatter Beijing’s increasingly fragile control over the Himalayan redoubt. Moreover, Chinese authorities’ repeated broadcast of propaganda footage of Lhasa “rioters” attacking defenseless Chinese residents has further exacerbated antagonism between Tibetans and Han Chinese.

Who then will have to shoulder the blame for this colossal policy failure? Given the fact that President Hu is the only member of the Politburo Standing Committee with experience in the tar, he can hardly shirk responsibility for growing instability in one of China’s most strategic regions. Moreover, as chairman of the Central Military Commission since 2004, Mr. Hu is responsible for the deployment of PLA and PAP units around the country.

Much more important is the fact that most of the cadres running western China are protégés of the 65-year-old supremo. Having spent 21 years of his career in Gansu, Guizhou and Tibet provinces, Mr. Hu has taken a personal interest in the appointment of top officials in tar, the Xinjiang Autonomous Region and neighboring provinces. Many of these “western warlords” are veteran members of the Communist Youth League faction—which is headed by Mr. Hu, who ran the league from 1983-85.

The most senior of these Hu cronies is Politburo member Wang Lequan, who headed the CYL's Shandong branch in the 1980s. Mr. Wang owes his promotion to the Politburo in 2002 to Mr. Hu, who has kept his protégé in the top Xinjiang post for 12 years. While Mr. Wang fights what he calls “wreckers, separatists and terrorists” among the Uighur population, he advises President Hu on the overall policy of “pacification” of ethnic minorities through a mixture of economic aid, iron-fisted control, and relentless Sinicization.

The cadre who bears direct responsibility for the Tibet mess is tar Party Secretary Zhang Qingli, who doubles as political commissar of the pap’s Tibet command. Mr. Zhang, a former deputy to Mr. Wang in the xar, was appointed to his current post in mid-2006. The 56-year-old Mr. Zhang worked closely with Mr. Hu in CYL headquarters in Beijing. It was Mr. Zhang who, at a meeting of cadres in Lhasa on March 15, first characterized Beijing’s battle with the “Dalai Lama clique” as a “life-and-death struggle between ourselves and the enemies.” Using language reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution, Mr. Zhang said “we must wage a people’s war to counter separatism and to maintain stability.” Famous for his acerbic tongue, Mr. Zhang once called the Dalai Lama “a wolf in monk’s clothes, a devil with a human face.”

Other members of Mr. Hu’s “western China clique” who have failed to, in Deng Xiaoping’s words, “nip the forces of instability in the bud,” include the party secretaries and governors of the four provinces of Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu and Yunnan. A look at their careers demonstrates the CYL faction’s stranglehold on top slots in this crucial part of China. Like Zhang Qingli, newly appointed Sichuan Party Secretary Liu Qibao worked with Mr. Hu at cyl headquarters in the mid-1980s, while Qinghai Party Secretary Qiang Wei and Yunnan Governor Qin Guangrong are former chiefs of provincial-level CYL party committees. This runs counter to Deng Xiaoping’s famous “credo of the five lakes and four seas”—officials from different backgrounds and factional affiliations should be considered for important posts.

The central government units that play a pivotal role in Tibetan and Xinjiang affairs— the National Nationalities Affairs Commission and the National Administration for Religious Affairs—are also dominated by Mr. Hu’s trusted associates. Both the just-appointed NNAC minister, Yang Jing, and his predecessor Li Dezhu are former bosses of provincial CYL party committees. And NARA director, Ye Xiaowen, headed the Guizhou provincial CYL when Mr. Hu was party secretary of the province from 1985-88. Li Dezhu, who served as NNAC minister from 1998 until early this year, was an exponent of Sinicization as a solution to the “assimilation problem” of minority groupings. An ethnic Korean, Mr. Li has warned in recent speeches that “hostile enemy forces in the West” are behind a conspiracy to “Westernize and divide and rule” China through establishing beachheads in regions with large ethnic minorities. Both Messrs. Li and Ye were behind the Draconian policy announced last year that the reincarnations of deceased lamas— including the successor of the Dalai Lama— must be ratified by Beijing authorities.

At least in the near term, none of Mr. Hu’s allies in Tibet and neighboring areas are expected to be penalized for “losing Tibet.” (So far, only a mid-ranked Tibet official, Danzeng Langjie, has been sacked apparently for mishandling the March crisis.) There is also little possibility of Beijing fine-tuning, let alone reversing, its take-no prisoners approach toward Tibet in general and the “Dalai Lama clique” in particular. This is despite the fact that the Nobel Peace Prize laureate is an advocate of nonviolence and has tenuous control over factions within the “free Tibet” movement. The younger, radical leaders do not rule out nonpeaceful tactics against their Beijing oppressors.

It is perhaps for fear of further alienating global opinion that the CCP leadership has reiterated its willingness to “reopen dialogue” with the Dalai Lama. While visiting Laos in late March, Premier Wen Jiabao repeated a pledge he made at the National People’s Congress a fortnight earlier that “the door for negotiation remains open” provided that the Lama would recognize that Tibet and Taiwan were “inalienable parts of the Chinese territory.” Chinese sources familiar with Beijing’s Tibetan policies say, however, that as PAP and state security personnel go about rounding up more monks and “rabble- rousers” in the run-up to the Olympics, the possibilities for talks are remote.

In the meantime, free-thinking intellectuals as well as members of the CCP’s marginalized liberal wing have urged the authorities to consider reverting to the more magnanimous Tibetan policy initiated by disgraced party chief, Hu Yaobang. In the early 1980s, the late Hu, an early leader of the CYL and a patron of President Hu, won a broad following among Tibetans for the zeal with which he went about repairing damages done to monasteries and Buddhist relics during the Cultural Revolution. The late Hu also reduced the number of Han-Chinese cadres in tar and was the first to invite emissaries of the Dalai Lama to Beijing for “reconciliation talks.”

Another big-name advocate of tolerant policies toward ethnic minorities was deceased party elder Xi Zhongxun. An ally of Hu Yaobang, Xi ran the CCP’s Northwest Bureau, which was in charge of provinces such as Gansu, Qinghai and Xinjiang in the 1950s. Brushing aside objections from diehard conservatives such as Chairman Mao Zedong and General Wang Zhen, Xi masterminded conciliatory measures that prevented bloody confrontation with Tibetans and Uighurs. Xi’s eldest son Xi Jinping, a former governor of Fujian province and party boss of Zhejiang province, is due to become China’s party chief in 2012 and state president in 2013. There is no definite indication that the younger Xi is as liberal as his father, or that he would want to challenge the scorched-earth ethnic policy initiated by President Hu. However, it is in the interest of every new CCP supremo to establish his credentials by exposing—albeit in an indirect fashion—policy mistakes of his predecessor. Deng savaged Mao’s legacy. And the Hu-Wen team has launched a crusade to rectify former President Jiang Zemin’s penchant for putting coastal development above improving the livelihood of disadvantaged sectors, including peasants in western China.

Despite his long experience in western China, President Hu has turned Tibet and swathes of Sichuan, Qinghai and Gansu into a virtual powder keg. And the possibility remains that to win back Tibet—and to establish his credibility—Mr. Xi may yet attempt to resurrect the more rational minority policies associated with his father.

Profile: Mr. Lam is a Hong Kong-based China scholar and author of Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era (M.E. Sharpe, 2006).

Civil Disobedience Movement By Tibetans Continues

2009-05-13T14:39:00.000+05:30

B.Raman, C3S Paper No.264 dated April 4, 2009
http://www.c3sindia.org/tibet/515

The civil disobedience movement launched by the Tibetans living in the Kardze area of the Sichuan province continues. Local Tibetan farmers have been refusing to cultivate their land in protest against the alleged Chinese suppression of the Tibetans. It has been reported by reliable sources that the Chinese authorities have warned the protesting farmers that if they do not resume the farming by April 11,2009, their land will be confiscated by the State. Despite this warning, they continue to be defiant.

2. The Qinghai province, where His Holiness the Dalai Lama was born, and the Kardze area of the Sichuan province, which is the homeland of the Khampas, continue to be affected by peaceful protests by Tibetan monks and nuns and Tibetan students. Over 40 instances of peaceful protests have been reported from these areas since March 10.The Chinese security authorities have been following the same tactics in dealing with the protests—- allow them to take place and arrest those involved after they have returned to their homes or monasteries.

3. March 28, which was observed by the Chinese as the “Emancipation of the Serfs Day” to mark the 50th anniversary of the end of the rule of His Holiness, passed off peacefully without any violent incident reported from the Tibetan-inhabited areas. Since the emancipation of the serfs by Beijing has been a popular measure with a large number of Tibetans whose parents and ancestors had served as serfs, the call for a protest by the Tibetans on that day did not receive much response from the local people.

4. While the protest movement by the supporters of His Holiness continues, it has failed to pick up momentum. A problem faced by the supporters of the Dalai Lama arises from the fact that the Tibetan-inhabited areas have benefited from economic development. How to maintain and increase the protest movement against the Chinese without jeopardising the fruits of the economic development? This is a major question confronting the anti-Chinese dissenters in the Tibetan areas.

5. Apart from the civil disobedience movement by the farmers of the Kardze area, another matter of concern to the Chinese arises from the recent attacks on two soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by suspected Tibetans, who have not yet been identified and arrested.On March 19,2009, an unidentified person wearing a mask shot dead an 18-year-old PLA soldier in Chongqing and ran away with his sub-machinegun. On March 26, another soldier from the same PLA battalion was repeatedly stabbed in the residential area of the PLA unit at Leshan in the Sichuan province by an unidentified person, who managed to run away. It is not known whether the soldier survived his injuries. The Chinese are treating both the incidents as possible terrorist attacks.

6. The Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) itself remained free of incidents during March when three important and emotional (to the Tibetans) anniversaries were observed. Relieved by the absence of any violent incident in the TAR, the Chinese authorities in the TAR have announced that group tourism to the TAR will again be allowed from April 5. The Chinese authorities in Beijing have also taken a group of foreign journalists on a conducted tour of the TAR. The anti-Dalai Lama rhetoric has come down since the end of March. Significantly, “The Hindu” of Chennai, which generally disseminates only the Chinese version of the events in the TAR and censors foreign news agency reports which reflect negatively on China, has prominently carried a detailed interview with His Holiness in its issue of April 1,2009.

7. This prominence to the views of His Holiness has come at a time when the Chinese themselves through academics and others have undertaken an exercise to assess the impact of the success of their diplomatic campaign against His Holiness on his thinking regarding his own future and that of the Tibetan people. They have been gratified by the refusal of the South African Government to issue a visa to His Holiness to enable him to attend a peace conference in South Africa and by the public statement of President Nikolas Sarkozy of France that Tibet is a part of China after a meeting with President Hu Jintao in the margins of the G-20 summit in London.

8. The Chinese, whose confidence in Tibet was rudely shaken by the violent incidents of March-Aprl,2008, have regained their confidence after the success of their security agencies in preventing any repetition in March,2009, and after the muted international reaction to the curbs imposed by them to achieve this. They are now convinced that the international community as a whole—barring sections of non-governmental opinion, particularly in the US and West Europe—- has accepted the irreversibility of the ground reality of Tibet as an integral part of China. They also show fresh confidence that they would be able to deal with the continuing protests in the Qinghai province and in the Kardze area of the Sichuan province.

9. They are prepared to show patience and wait out for the death of His Holiness and thereafter nominate their own Dalai Lama. What they are worried is that His Holiness might try to pre-empt this by changing the traditional process by which a successor to His Holiness is chosen. One thing is certain—- if and when His Holiness dies, his successor—however chosen and by whom—- may not enjoy the same reverence and loyalty from the Tibetans in China as His Holiness. The Chinese are counting on this possibility for ultimately wearing out the Tibetan resistance.

10. At present, the Chinese are not making an issue of the activities of His Holiness from his exile in India. They understand the love and reverence for His Holiness from the Indian people. If and when His Holiness dies, the Chinese attitude to the activities of the Dalai Lama’s followers from Indian territory may harden. This could become a new friction point in the relations between the two countries. It is important for the Government of India to identify the various possible scenarios with regard to Tibet during the next 10 years and examine its options.

Profile: Mr B.Raman, is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

China: Cracks in Party-Army Unity?

2009-05-13T14:25:00.001+05:30

D.S.Rajan, C3S Paper No.265 dated April 10, 2009
http://www.c3sindia.org/army/517

It is not surprising that the open call given by a top Chinese military leader (‘Qiu Shi’, the theoretical organ of the Chinese Communist Party- CCP, 1 April 2009) for “upholding the absolute leadership of the CCP over the Army”, for “making the Party flag as Army flag at all times” and for “ the Army listening to the commands of the Party, Central Military Commission (CMC) and President Hu Jintao at all times”, received world attention. The leader, General Li Jinai, a CMC member and head of the General Political Department of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), while giving the call, also admitted that ‘mistaken backward things’ viz. ‘De-politicisation’ of the Army (feizhengzhihua), Party-Army separation (feidanghua) and ‘Nationalisation’ of the Army (guojiahua) have come to influence the military, to which he demanded ‘resolute’ opposition. Prima facie, the remarks meant an acknowledgement from the CCP that internal differences on the subject persist; their implications need a careful study, considering the importance of Party-Army equation for the country’s politics and governance.

A deeper look would reveal that divergences within the CCP on ‘absolute leadership of the Party over the Army’ are not new; they had originated in the pre-revolution days and are prevailing in the post-liberation period also, as responses to situation prevailing at each stage. Discussing chronologically, worth noting first is the rift in late thirties, as noted by the party historians, between two top leaders - Mao Zedong and Zhang Guodao due to the latter’s alleged ideas in favour of separating army from party; it finally led to Zhang’s exit from the CCP. Coming to modern era, during the ‘anti-rightist’ campaign of late fifties, there were allegations of ‘monolithic military thoughts’ prevailing in the party with some even preferring ‘ liquidation of party committees in the military’[1]. In eighties and early nineties, there were reports on support to a ‘nationalised’ army, coming from advisers to the then Premier Zhao Ziyang as well as some leading organs[2]. More evidences suggesting a test for the Party in enforcing its control over the army were seen - lack of enthusiasm on the part of some PLA men in the matter of dealing with 1989 Tiananmen student protests[3] , the closure of the PLA-led enterprises in 1998 following the then Premier Zhu Rongji’s dissatisfaction over the army’s smuggling activities and observations of Qiao Shi, the then Chairman of the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee (interview to Le Figaro, April 1997) that President and CMC chief Jiang Zemin should be answerable to the parliament.

An active propaganda phase to emphasise party’s control over the army is being seen ever since Hu Jintao took over as Chairman of the CMC during the fourth Plenum of the 16th CCP Congress Central Committee in September 2004. ‘Hostile forces’, trying to ‘Westernise’, ‘Divide’ and ‘Depoliticise’ the army, have become the main target. Their attempts are being seen as ‘important component’ of carrying out a ‘peaceful evolution’ in China[4] . Blame is also being leveled against ‘some factions’ in China for their support to an army under the state control[5] . Since 2005, all important occasions like PLA founding anniversaries and organs like ‘Qiu Shih’ [6] , are being used regularly to lay stress on the need for party’s control over the army. Getting highlighted in this regard are Hu Jintao’s statement that the PLA should ‘obey party and CMC command at any time and under any circumstances’ [7] and his ‘concern over the army’s stability[8].

The question arises as to why the theme of “party’s absolute control over the army” is being repeated again and again in China? Basically, it can be said that the CCP always considers its control over the army, as the principal mean to perpetuate its superiority and protect the one-party system in the country. It is officially stated that the principle of “CCP’s leading the State as the ruling party got evolved historically and also, is the requirement of current national conditions” [9]. In simple language, this would mean that more the party perceives potential dangers to its rule, more its dependence on the army. Both Mao and Deng had to rely on the army at crucial times to bring back normalcy in the country- Mao in the aftermath of Cultural Revolution and Deng in the case of the 1989 Tiananmen student protests.

Hu Jintao faces same compulsions, experienced by Mao and Deng. He needs the army support under the officially described “ new conditions and complicated changes in national defence and military building” and “ multiple security threats and diverse military tasks”. In other words, a party-controlled military would be crucial to Hu in providing guarantee to the country’s stability, which is being viewed by him as an ‘overriding task’ (Hu’s speech of 18 December 2008). Factors that could affect stability and lead to social unrest would include the impact of global financial crisis on China, increasing unemployment as a result of migration of rural workers from cities and less opportunity for young graduates passing out from universities. Army’s backing would also be important for Hu in dealing with separatist tendencies in Tibet and Xinjiang. Also, with military firmly under his grip, Hu may feel confident in fighting pro-democracy movements like “Charter – 2008” group which interalia has demanded party-army separation. However, Hu’s status as only a member of China’s collective leadership without being a ‘core’, in contrast to the supreme positions enjoyed by his predecessors, would imply reduced elbowroom for him in keeping the PLA fully under his grip.

Indisicipline and trends towards taking action independently in the PLA without consulting the party or civil administration may also be pushing Hu Jintao to keep the army under the party control. The authorities are looking upon instances of ‘slack management’ in the army and protests from demobilized soldiers with concern. The party may also have reasons to be unhappy over the military’s failure occasionally to keep the CCP and government fully informed about its actions, for e.g during the Sino-US EP-3 crisis and the Anti-Satellite Weapon test (2007).

Thirdly, a doubt arises whether or not the renewed emphasis of Hu regime on the necessity for the Army to obey the Party, has something to do with factional struggle within the party. An authoritative argument[10] has given a subtle warning against emergence of leaders like Zhang Guodao who were ‘right opportunists” and had supported army ‘nationalization’. It has called for remembering such events in party history. It has in addition cautioned the CCP against repeating the mistake committed by former USSR leading to its collapse,by the way of delinking the Soviet Army from the CPSU. The remarks need a close scrutiny for their hidden meaning, if any.

Lastly, Hu Jintao’s underscoring the need for the PLA to obey the party command may also need to be viewed in the context of ongoing moves in China to bring Hu’s military writings on par with those of his predecessors- Mao, Deng and Jiang. Politically important has been the incorporation of his “ Scientific Outlook on Development” theory in the Party constitution. In military terms, the exhortation to the PLA now to follow Hu’s military line based on “ Three Provides and One Role” principle [11],along with the military thoughts of the three mentioned above, appear significant.

The PLA is fast becoming a professional and apolitical army, with entry into it of qualified persons in engineering and science and technology. Its cyber warfare and space units are being strengthened with specialists. Politicians have less presence in the PLA and the level of military representation in top-level party units has come down considerably. For e.g in the nine- member Politburo Standing Committee, there is no PLA member. Gone are the Long March days, when the military dominated occupying high political posts. There is also presently a large turn over in the PLA representation in the party gatherings, for e.g 17th Party Congress, apparently as part of efforts to prevent emergence of strong military leaders capable of challenging the political leadership at some stage. The old system of having both ‘Red and Expert’ cadres in the party, Army and State, seems to be fast giving way to one disconnecting the two. In sum, the gap between the Party and Army appears to be increasing day by day in practice. Under the circumstances, the focus in the coming years is expected to be on whether or not a ‘State Army’ will emerge, replacing the present ‘Party Army’ model.

Profile: D.S.Rajan is Director of the Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai, India. Email: dsrajan@gmail.com

Footnotes
1. Liberation Army Daily, 1 July 1959 and 17 August 1959
2. Civil-Military Relations: Domestic Power and Policies, by Michael D.Swaine, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2 November 2005
3.China Daily News, Overseas edition, Taipei, 26 November 1989
4.Dai Yuanpeng, Liberation Army Daily, 15 July 2005
5.Xinhua, 17 Jul 2007
6. Qiu Shi, 16 July 2007, 31 July 2007 and 1 February 2009
7.Xinhua, 1 February 2009
8.Xu Caihua, Xinhua, 25 May 2005
9.Prof Shi Zhongquan, Deputy Chairman of the All China Party History Association, Liberation Army Daily, 19 July 2007
10. as in 9 above
11.Three ‘provides’ are: Provide support to ruling party, provide guarantee for success of national defence, provide strategic support to national interests; “One Role” – play a role for world peace and common development

Pro-Justice, Not Anti-China

2009-05-12T16:58:00.001+05:30

May 2009
by Amy Yee
Posted May 11, 2009

http://www.feer.com/authors-corner/2009/may56/Pro-Justice-Not-Anti-China

During the past year that I’ve reported on Tibetan issues from my base in India, one of the Dalai Lama’s recurring messages has struck a chord in me. It isn’t his well-known calls for peace, nonviolence and compassion. Rather, it’s his constant reminder that “We are not against Chinese people. We still have faith in Chinese people.”

The Dalai Lama repeated that again in March of this year, which marked the 50th anniversary of China’s rule in Tibet and his exile to India. That message has become his mantra as he travels the world and almost desperately tries to meet Chinese people.

His call has grown more urgent as he tries to defuse surging Chinese nationalism that peaked with the Olympics in Beijing. Official talks with Beijing broke down last autumn so the Dalai Lama’s outreach to Chinese people is the only way to advance the Tibet issue in China.

But I fear that his outreach to Chinese won’t work because reason is too easily obliterated by the flames of nationalism. Too many Chinese people confuse protests against the policies of the Chinese government with being anti-Chinese.

The Dalai Lama’s outreach to Chinese people isn’t lip service. I am Chinese, though born and brought up in the U.S. by immigrant parents. Even though I wear the face of the “enemy,” I have always been treated warmly by Tibetans during the considerable time I have spent in Dharamsala, home to the Dalai Lama and about 12,000 Tibetans. I have waited for a Tibetan to treat me bitterly or with scorn but it has never happened in dozens of interviews I have conducted here.

Many Tibetans can tell I’m Chinese and even call out "Ni hao!" as I walk through the streets of this hill town. Sometimes we converse in Mandarin, not out of any sense of obligation but because Tibetans still have an affinity with Chinese people even if their religion, language and culture have been repressed by the Chinese government.

After a four-hour prayer service in March, the Dalai Lama thanked the people in Tibet, the international community and “Chinese friends.” At a ceremony to mark the 50th anniversary of Tibet’s failed uprising against Chinese rule, the Dalai Lama shared the stage with 30 Chinese pro-democracy activists. Another group of 30 filmmakers and journalists from Taiwan were also present.

When Han Chinese travel to Dharamsala the Dalai Lama eagerly grants them a coveted private audience if they speak and write Chinese and can somehow convey his message into China.
Why this charm offensive with Chinese people? The Dalai Lama says that Tibetans and Chinese will have to live together in the future, no matter what happens. Communication and exchange is necessary, especially if official negotiations are fruitless.

Since 1994, the Tibetan government-in-exile has printed magazines and newsletters in Chinese. It also launched a Chinese-language website that attempts to convey his point of view within China to those savvy enough to get around Chinese blocks.

However, it is unclear whether the charm offensive is working. Chinese who support Tibet are suppressed in China and branded as traitors on Chinese blogs. When the Olympic torch passed through Canberra last year there were about 10,000 Chinese and some 1,500 pro-Tibet demonstrators.

When the Dalai Lama met with some Chinese in New York who were protesting his visit last year, he said five of the seven wouldn’t listen to him. Fortunately it was a large table or they might have slapped him, he admitted at a press conference last year.

Even overseas Chinese in the U.S., Australia and Europe where there is free media and access to information, waved signs that read “Dalai is a Liar.” I’m not sure what they accuse the Dalai Lama of lying about. He openly advocates autonomy for Tibet under Chinese rule, not separation as China insists.

Is he lying about human-rights violations in Tibet? Why not ask former political prisoners from Tibet who have sought refuge in India? Why not ask thousands of Tibetans who have been arrested since China began its harsh crackdown in Tibet a year ago? And if the list of those arrested is fake, as some claim, why not produce the Tibetan in question to show they are alive and well?

For all of China’s insistence that Tibetans are content and should be happy that they have longer life spans than 50 years ago, the forceful repression in Tibet indicates that something is terribly wrong. The wise thing to do would be to somehow come to the table to discuss how, at the very least, the plight of Tibetans in Tibet could be improved. Measures on improving education and access to jobs for Tibetans are well within China’s reach.

The Tibetans who rioted in Lhasa last year should not have resorted to violence and it is tragic that Chinese people died in the clashes, as the Dalai Lama himself has said. But why not allow an independent investigation into exactly what happened last year in Lhasa?

I know firsthand the effects of Chinese nationalism that can cloud reasoned judgment. Last summer my brother and I were at my parent’s house in Boston when the Olympic torch relay came up. My brother was angry and disgusted by the pro-Tibet protestors. I was taken aback by his response.

We grew up in a progressive part of Boston where activism and questioning of the establishment was de rigueur. U.S. policies were often raked over the coals during dinner table conversations.
But I knew why my brother was so angry. We are Chinese. I believe my brother was mistaking protests against the policies of the Chinese government with some slight against him as a Chinese person.

I didn’t start a heated debate. I simply told him what I knew from reporting in India, where I have lived since 2006. “They shot a 16-year-old Tibetan girl in the head,” I said, referring to Chinese security that shot and killed unarmed and peaceful Tibetan protestors in western China last year. “What’s wrong with protesting?”

I refrained from pointing out to my brother what he already knew: that I lived in China for two years, taught English to about 120 Chinese university students, learned Mandarin and traveled for nearly a month in Tibet in 1998. During that trip many Tibetans I met in Tibet were scared of me until I told them that I was American.

When I mentioned Lhundup Tso, the 16-year-old Tibetan girl whose body was photographed in a pool of blood, my brother’s face contorted. Perhaps his newfound sense of Chinese nationalism was battling with the education—based on reason, fact and analysis—that we both received. Fortunately the latter prevailed. “As long as it’s nonviolent,” he said grudgingly.

I glanced at my mother, who had threatened to disown me when I announced I was going to China after college partly because she feared what Chinese authorities might do to me. She prudently chose to remain silent.

It is easy to confuse protest against Chinese policies in Tibet with being anti-Chinese. But wanting a better way forward in Tibet is not anti-Chinese people or even anti-China. It is, as the Dalai Lama likes to say, pro-justice.

Profile: Amy Yee is a journalist based in New Delhi.

The Dalai Lama Talks with Chinese Leaders in New York

2009-05-08T14:28:00.001+05:30

Matthew Weiner
Program Director at the Interfaith Center of New York
Posted May 7, 2009 10:23 PM (EST)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/matthew-weiner/talking-with-the-enemy_b_198094.html

While governments negotiate about negotiations, debate who they can talk to, and enforce hard parameters for diplomatic discussions, the world's preeminent Buddhist leader does things differently.

Yesterday in Midtown Manhattan His Holiness the Dalai Lama met for over two hours with a group of Chinese students and dissidents living here in the United States. The Chinese Government accuses him of being a demon and a separatist. They will not talk with him. But this does not stop the ever laughing monk from speaking with Chinese people, every chance he has. It is both a religious and spiritual practice for him, and something we can all learn from.
The audience stood as he entered. While people didn't bow the way devotees do when he teaches Dharma, they were very polite. Then he sat and discussed issues of history, culture, and current politics as they relate to the situation of his homeland. He emphasized the need for Tibetans to have autonomy, not national freedom; he also said that the Chinese government needed to be helped out of its political problems by the Tibetan and Chinese people themselves. When the meeting was over, groups clustered around him for photographs.

Ever since The Dalai Lama fled Tibet as Chinese government forces invaded, the world's most famous monk has concentrated his diplomatic efforts on the gaining the backing of western nations, most notably the United States. Indeed, the Tibetan Government in Exile has offices here in New York, but also in Washington, and through out Europe. This leads him to be attacked by the Chinese government as a Western Imperialist. He laughs often at the accusation, as has his own problems with capitalist democracies.

His efforts have had considerable effect. Besides tons of money being donated to the Tibetan cause, and helping their refugees in India, The Dalai Lama is by far the world's most famous Buddhist leader and perhaps the world's most respected religious figure. Except, that is, for the billion plus people living in China, the country that took over Tibet in 1959.

Until recently this decision, to focus on the western audience, seemed to be a necessary choice. Tibetans and their friends in the west have freedom of speech and a democratic process, not to mention capitalist dollars, to help their important non-violent cause. Meanwhile how to communicate with the Chinese people under a dictatorship? Besides, the Tibetans have never had a problem with the Chinese, but with their government.

Or so the line went. Yet with the latest Tibetan uprising that took place a little over a year ago, besides the horror of monks and civilians being killed, the most shocking aspect was the popular Chinese response, which was overwhelmingly anti-Tibetan. Even when the Dalai Lama came here, he was confronted with angry Chinese students.

He said as much in this meeting. "I was shocked at their anger." He said. "Maybe some were paid by the Chinese government. But some were really angry. So now I think it is best for me to meet them, whenever I can. Now things seem to cool down."

The power of the Dalai Lama's ability to engage Chinese citizens, even the ones here, should not be underestimated. While engaging Hollywood will not affect the Chinese government, perhaps their own citizenry will. Things have changed in China in the last decade. There are now human rights lawyers in China who openly represent Tibetan clients who are under arrest from the uprising. And there are many cases of the government responding to the growing force of their new civil society. Yes this response to civil society is in its infancy, yes the government remains brutal, but as its citizenry grows, the Tibetan's opportunity for change grows, if they engage with the Chinese people anyway that they can. In this meeting, without being explicitly Buddhist, the Dalai Lama continued to use Buddhist ideas. That anger could be dispelled through honest discussion. That honest discussion and questioning was critical to problem solving. That having an equanimous mind was important for political leaders as much as for religious leaders. That religious freedom was essential for all of China, and for Tibet.

In fact, though Tibetans have played down their relationship with China as a way to emphasize their unique culture, there were deep relationships between the two nations, through Buddhism.
As Gray Tuttle, a scholar of Tibetan History at Columbia University has said, "For over 700 years these (Buddhist) connections have been the prime means of intercultural contact, and even in the past 100 years when national politics have come to the fore in Asia, Buddhism has consistently been the one area where the two cultures had the most promising developments. For peace to be restored in the troubled Chinese-Tibetan relations, respect for Buddhism is probably the key element."

With the resurgence of Buddhism in China, and the powerful allure of the Dalai Lama as a spiritual leader, Tuttle may be right. One student leader in attendance said that he had originally organized an anti-separatist meeting when the Dalai Lama visited Michigan last year, but now "I am somehow in the middle. I am not against the Dalai Lama. This is a good meeting to see." When asked why, he said, "Well, I'm a Buddhist."

Middle way or bust

2009-05-08T11:14:00.000+05:30

HIMAL SOUTHASIAN
May 2009 Issue
http://www.himalmag.com/Middle-Way-or-bust_nw2915.html)

ANALYSIS

The Dalai Lama’s two-decade-old strategy has gone flat. Is it time for a ‘Baltic solution’?

By Tenzing Sonam

The year 2008, for many reasons, is likely to go down in the annals of recent Tibetan history as a watershed year. This was the year when Tibetans in Tibet, 49 years after the takeover of their country, demonstrated clearly and loudly that they were still unhappy under Chinese rule; when a new generation of Tibetans in Tibet, spanning the entire society from monks and nomads to farmers and students, became politicised; and when the Tibetan movement assumed a pan-national character, involving people from all three traditional provinces of Tibet in a united and hitherto unprecedented manner. Finally, this was also the year when the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way approach, which gives up the demand for independence in return for genuine autonomy, and which he has pursued patiently and unwaveringly since the late 1980s, finally crashed in the face of Beijing’s unequivocal rejection. Now, a year on from the widespread anti-Chinese demonstrations of spring 2008, and six months since the ‘special meeting’ convened by the Dalai Lama to discuss future options for the Tibet movement, it is time to face up to some harsh realities.

After years of leading Dharamsala up the garden path of promised negotiations, Beijing unceremoniously and unambiguously pulled the rug out from under the Dalai Lama’s envoys in November 2008, when it categorically rejected his Middle Way approach and the formal proposal that emerged from it, the Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People. Not only this, Chinese officials even dismissed the right of the Dalai Lama to represent the Tibetan people. In a news conference in Beijing on 12 November, Zhu Weiqun, the Executive Vice-Minister of the United Front Work Department, accused the Memorandum of seeking “half-independence” and “covert independence”. Furthermore, he stated: “We talked with Mr Lodi Gyari” – the Dalai Lama’s special envoy – “and his party only because they were the Dalai Lama’s private representatives. And we merely talked about how the Dalai Lama should completely give up his splitting opinions and actions, and strive for the understanding of the central authorities and all Chinese people so as to solve the issue concerning his own prospect. We never discussed the so-called ‘Tibet issue’.”

It was a major turnaround. Whatever the nature of their discussions in private – and observers have always been led by the Dalai Lama’s envoys to believe that these were substantial and building up to real negotiations – the Chinese clearly had no qualms about publicly quashing the entire exercise in one humiliating move. Those who had always warned that Beijing was not serious about the talks, and was simply playing for time, were vindicated. But even to the most ardent critics of the Middle Way approach, China’s decision to abandon any pretence of discussion with the Dalai Lama so soon after the Beijing Olympics, held just three months before, undoubtedly came as a surprise.

It is clear that China is now ready to embark on a new strategy in its efforts to resolve the Tibet question – one that has no place for the Dalai Lama. In the short term, this seems to mean continuing its campaign to discredit and sideline the Dalai Lama internationally, while using brute force and draconian measures to stamp out any sign of protest or dissent on the plateau. China is engaging in this with impunity, simply because there is no one to tell it not to do so. The international economic crisis has made China an even stronger world player, one that is able to dictate terms to the West in a way that would have been unthinkable even a year ago. Beijing is in no mood to listen to Western admonitions about its human-rights record or conduct, and Western governments are in no position to push the point.

Of course, Chinese officials do understand that there is deep discontent in Tibet. But they believe that this will disappear in the longer term, particularly once the Dalai Lama is no longer there to provide inspiration. And the government is clearly prepared to wait for this to happen. More interestingly, Beijing also seems to have decided to confront the Dalai Lama’s influence on the world stage, by challenging the exile Tibetan perspective in the public debate over Tibet – or, at least, influencing it so that it is no longer a black-and-white issue. It is doing this by aggressively asserting its own view of Tibet to the world.

A case in point is the eight-page advertisement supplement headlined “China’s Tibet: The Past and the Present”, which came out in the Hindustan Times edition of 9 April 2009. Abundantly illustrated with photographs and statistics, it purports to show how backward and hellish old Tibet was, and how much progress and development, both socially and economically, the Chinese government’s munificence has brought to the area. It makes no mention of the Dalai Lama – China wants to marginalise him – or the recent unrest in Tibet, which it chooses to portray as the work of a few agents provocateurs. Instead, it stresses its claim that China’s rule in Tibet has brought modernisation, prosperity and happiness to the long-suffering, and now eternally grateful, people of Tibet. For the uninformed reader, the facts are impressive and convincing.

Similarly, China’s declaration that, beginning this year, 28 March would be celebrated as Serf Emancipation Day in Tibet, is a direct challenge to the 10 March Uprising Day commemorated by Tibetans in exile, an anniversary that has continued to challenge the legitimacy of China’s rule over Tibet. This may seem provocative and crude to those who know something about the real situation in Tibet; but China is not concerned about such individuals. Rather, its officials are seeking to influence the vast majority of the world’s population that knows little to nothing of Tibet. Why else would they decide to take out, on 6 April this year, an 18-page supplement entitled “50 Years of Democratic Reform in Tibet” in, of all places, the Daily Times of Malawi? Indeed, we can expect many more such supplements to appear, throughout the world, as China ratchets up its public-relations campaign on Tibet.

Dithering Dharamsala
How can the Dharamsala government-in-exile counter this new offensive? Unless it fights to reclaim its ground in this debate, and brings fresh thinking into the movement, the Tibet issue risks becoming increasingly amorphous and eventually sidelined. But Dharamsala’s response to both the situation in Tibet and the failure of its talks with China has been anything but convincing. It has simply insisted on holding on to an ever-more tenuous moral high ground, by claiming that the Middle Way approach and the Memorandum for Genuine Autonomy remain the only ways by which to resolve the Tibet issue.

The two key strategies outlined by the Kashag, the exile Tibetan cabinet, earlier this year, are to continue to promote and explain the Memorandum both among its own people and internationally, and to reach out to ordinary Chinese citizens. Its position with regard to China’s rejection of its Middle Way approach is simply to state: “The entire responsibility for the future status of our dialogues, irrespective of what it is going to be, lies squarely on the Chinese leaders. The Tibetan side has already made all the required clarifications and brought a process of dialogue that began in 2002 to its logical conclusion.” But what does this mean, exactly? That, in an ever-unpredictable, politically charged situation, Dharamsala has played its final hand and, come what may, will not budge from its position? A recent Reuters report quoted the Dalai Lama’s lead envoy, Kalsang Gyaltsen, as saying: “If there is any seriousness and political will on the part of the Chinese government, the ball is now in their court,” a sporting metaphor thereafter repeated by Prime Minister-in-exile Samdhong Rinpoche. The image here is of two equally matched contestants playing a back-and-forth game of tennis. But in reality, China has long since abandoned both the ball and the court.

Dharamsala’s curiously passive and moralistic response to the gauntlet thrown down by China is evident in a second statement by Samdhong Rinpoche, from mid-March. “If the present leadership do not wish to take the credit of resolving the Tibetan issue,” he said, “the next leadership will take the credit.” This seems to imply that Dharamsala has done the current Beijing leaders a favour by giving them the opportunity to respond positively to its proposal, and that it would be their loss if they were to refuse. But the most mystifying of the confusing signals emerging from Dharamsala is Samdhong Rinpoche’s assertion that, “As far as we are concerned, we are prepared for another hundred years of struggle. The inspiration is there. So we have no worry.”

This latter contention needs to be examined within the context of the primary justification for the Middle Way approach. The way that this strategy was originally sold to the Tibetan people was on the grounds that the situation in Tibet was so dire and so desperate that its very existence as a culture and a nation faced imminent extinction. Therefore, in order to forestall this, Tibetans had to give up the goal of independence, so that genuine negotiations over the future of Tibet could begin with China. The Dalai Lama has since repeated many times that “Tibet faces something like a death sentence”; that a “cultural genocide” is taking place there; and that if the situation does not improve soon, Tibet, as a nation, would soon disappear. Samdhong Rinpoche himself, in an interview last March, said, “If the Tibet issue is not resolved amicably within five, ten years of time, there will be no more Tibet inside Tibet. It will be a completely non-Tibetans’ land. It may be Han Chinese or it may be some other minority but Tibetans will be completely lost in the vast majority of non-Tibetans. It is very true and we also realize that it is a very urgent threat for the survival of Tibet, but what we can do?”

The crux of the Middle Way approach was that it provided a compromise position that would, ostensibly, be acceptable to China and, therefore, would stand a better chance of being able to save Tibet’s culture and identity. In a meeting with Chinese journalists in Seattle in April 2008, the Dalai Lama clearly spelled out his reasoning behind this approach: “We are not seeking independence. We are very much happy to remain within the People’s Republic of China. We are concerned about the preservation of Tibetan culture, Tibetan Buddhism, environment.” But if this is not the case, as Samdhong Rinpoche now seems to be implying, and if the struggle can continue for another hundred years without any worry, then the question inevitably arises: Why should Tibetans spend the next hundred years struggling for genuine autonomy when they could just as easily be fighting for the very goal that all Tibetans believe in – independence?

Dharamsala’s justification for continuing with the Middle Way approach is that it is a democratically endorsed policy, and one that received renewed support from the people through the outcome of the special meeting that the Dalai Lama convened in November. Unsurprisingly, delegates at that meeting, representing a cross-section of the exile Tibetan community, reiterated their faith in the Dalai Lama’s leadership, and a majority endorsed his Middle Way approach. But anyone familiar with the workings of Tibetan society knows that such an endorsement is not so much for the Middle Way approach as it is for the Dalai Lama himself. If, tomorrow, the Dalai Lama were suddenly to decide that the Middle Way approach is no longer a viable option and that he would instead revert to the goal of independence, would even one Tibetan be prepared to stand up to him because of his or her belief in the principle of the Middle Way approach? The spiritual devotion to the Dalai Lama simply clouds any kind of political realism among his people.

In fact, a more significant result of the special meeting was the recommendation that support for the Middle Way approach should be made conditional on concrete results emerging within a short timeframe. Failing that, all other options, including independence, were to be discussed. Strangely, this point has neither been taken up by the government-in-exile, nor even mentioned in its subsequent statements, which only stress overwhelming support for the Middle Way approach. Why this reticence to open up the debate on the future course of action for Tibet when, patently, the current policy has run its course? What is to be gained from holding on to the Middle Way approach in this context, other than in trying to prove a moral point?

The Middle Way approach is, after all, a political strategy, and one that has not paid tangible dividends. Why, then, is it being promoted with the dogmatic zeal of a religious doctrine, unchallengeable and unshakable? In fact, the Kashag’s insistence on holding on to the Middle Way approach as a ‘democratically endorsed’ decision is both disingenuous and, in the long run, dangerous. There is absolutely no guarantee that, in the Dalai Lama’s absence, there would be continuing support for the Middle Way approach and genuine autonomy.

Baltic archetype
Meanwhile, in Tibet itself the situation could not be worse. A year on from the massive protests of March-April 2008, it would appear that the spring uprising, which inspired Tibetans everywhere so powerfully and seemed to have held out so much promise, has ended in tragedy. The sacrifice of the thousands who risked their lives has today achieved nothing more than a brief, incandescent moment in the international spotlight.

In fact, however, all is not as it seems. The long-term consequences of the demonstrations may yet prove to be more significant than anyone can currently imagine, and might come back to haunt the Chinese leadership. One hint of this came during a radio call-in show on Radio Free Asia’s Tibetan language service in Washington, DC, last September. The reporter, Dolkar, was in conversation with three young Tibetan students studying in Beijing. One told her:
The uprisings of ‘89 and ‘59 were a long time ago, and for us youngsters, these are just like stories from the past. But now, with the recent uprisings and the oppression, the story has unfolded for real in front of our own eyes. This was a reminder of our past; it woke us up. Until recently, people have been disheartened and scared to carry out any action. But with the March demonstrations, and with the coming-together of people from all walks of life, we have been reminded that the burden of the struggle for truth and freedom does not rely only on one or two persons. It isn’t just the responsibility of His Holiness or the Tibetans in exile, nor is it just the responsibility of the educated ones, but it is the responsibility of every one of us. This has become very clear this time.

This may be the real impact of the protests, and the reason why they may not ultimately have been in vain. A new generation of Tibetan activists has been born in Tibet, and it has now been empowered to carry the struggle into the future. The renewed belief and commitment of this new generation in Tibet demand that the policies made by the government-in-exile are strong and inspirational, and are designed to keep the movement alive for as long as it takes to achieve its goals. But it seems increasingly unlikely that doggedly hanging on to the Middle Way approach is the way to meet this challenge.

Given Beijing’s aggressive new strategy to neutralise the Tibet issue internationally, the only practical and effective course of action open to Dharamsala would seem to be what one long-time Tibet watcher calls the ‘Baltic solution’. This would entail shifting the goal of the struggle back to independence. It would require persevering in the international forum by repeatedly and forcefully asserting Tibet’s claim to independence, both historically and in accordance with the principles of self-determination; knowing full well that, in the short term, this would not pay concrete dividends other than keeping the idea of Tibetan nationhood alive. At the same time, it would mean building up a strong and genuinely democratic government-in-exile, which would prepare Tibetans for a post-Dalai Lama future and shift the focus of the struggle away from his person, thereby keeping it from disintegrating in his absence.

These measures would invigorate the Tibet movement, make it vibrant and unified, and help it to remain a source of hope and inspiration for the people inside Tibet. And in some distant future, when the Communist Party of China no longer holds power, these measures would also do much to prepare the ground for real negotiations, and for the possibility of either complete independence or genuine autonomy in its true sense. It took the Baltic states more than 70 years to regain their independence; today, Tibet has as much right and resilience as a nation to hope for the same. If Samdhong Rinpoche is serious about keeping the Tibetan struggle alive for a hundred years, this may be the only option he has.

Tibet on frontline of battle against global warming

2009-05-07T11:01:00.002+05:30

Xinhua 2009-5-7
http://www.shanghaidaily.com/sp/article/2009/200905/20090507/article_400021.htm

GLOBAL warming has had some of its greatest impact in Tibet Autonomous Region, Zheng Guoguang, chief of China Meteorological Administration said yesterday.

"In Tibet, the mercury has climbed an average 0.32 degrees Celsius every decade since records began in 1961," Zheng told more than 500 officials at a meeting in Lhasa, the region's capital, on climate change.

"This is much higher than the national average temperature rise of 0.05-0.08 degrees Celsius every 10 years."

Tibet's temperature rise had also topped the global average of 0.2 degrees Celsius per decade.

The plateau region, with an average altitude above 4,000 meters, is a "magnifier" of global warming as it is more sensitive to temperature changes, Zheng said.

He said greenhouse gas tends to affect higher altitudes, but Tibet, given its underdeveloped industries, produces little greenhouse gas itself.

"The impact of global warming has accelerated glacial shrinkage and the melting glaciers have swollen Tibet's lakes," he said. "If the warming continues, millions of people in western China would face floods in the short term and drought in the long run."

Further, extreme weather conditions often cause geological disasters including mud-rock flows and landslides, he said.

In the worst case, Zheng warned such warming could cause permafrost to melt and threaten the plateau railway linking Tibet with the neighboring Qinghai Province.

A report by Tibet's regional meteorological bureau earlier this year warned the permafrost that lies on the path of the rail link had been shrinking by 4.5 centimeters to 24.9cm every decade since the 1960s.

The report said the fastest shrinkage was reported in Amdo County, which has 346 kilometers of the railway.While experts believe the railway will remain safe for another four decades, the government has spent more than 1 billion yuan (US$143 million) in the past 20 years to reinforce the Qinghai-Tibet Highway, also plagued by retreating permafrost.

"Tibet needs to tackle, and adapt to the persisting climate change," said Zheng, who advised the autonomous region to speed up construction of hydropower stations and exploitation of renewable energy.

related stories:
1) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8035774.stm

An uncertain future on the Plateau

2009-05-07T10:41:00.003+05:30

Katherine Morton
April 28, 2009
http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/2961-An-uncertain-future-on-the-Plateau

Glacial melt poses critical risks to biodiversity, people and livelihoods on the Tibetan Plateau. Katherine Morton explores the possibilities for an effective regional response.

Global climate change is one of the biggest challenges facing humankind in the twenty-first century. It is occurring at a time when China’s economic rise is leading to substantial environmental problems, combined with escalating demands on global resources. Many commentators have warned of impending economic collapse, rising social conflicts and large-scale public health disasters.

It is not only the modernisation drive in China that is at stake. The spillover effects across borders also present security concerns at the regional and global levels. From a security perspective, the emerging environmental crisis is generally cast in highly negative terms. Limited attention has been given to the question of whether China can adapt. In the case of climate change this is now an urgent task. On the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau (henceforth the Tibetan plateau), climate impacts pose significant security risks for China and the Asia region. The ability to adapt is of critical importance to the future sustainability of the ecosystems as well as the millions of people they serve.

The Tibetan Plateau is the largest high altitude landmass on earth, covering an area of approximately 1.6 million square kilometres, equal to one-quarter of China’s land mass. As the largest fresh water reserve outside the polar ice caps it is also known as Asia’s water tower, or the “third pole”. For climate change, the plateau is the equivalent of the canary in the coalmine. Ice core records from the Dasuopu glacier in Tibet reveal that the last 50 years have been the warmest in 1,000 years. Over the past three decades, the average temperature has increased by almost 1 degree Celsius, and Chinese climate scientists predict a further temperature rise of between 2.0 to 2.6 degrees Celsius by 2050.

As a direct consequence, with the exception of the Karakorum, the glaciers that feed Asia’s great rivers – the Yellow, Yangtze, Mekong, Salween, Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra – have retreated by 196 square kilometres in the last 40 years. Data from the International Commission on Snow and Ice reveal that the Himalayan glaciers are shrinking faster than anywhere else and could totally disappear by 2035.

Glacial melt has dramatic adverse effects on biodiversity, people and livelihoods with long-term implications for water, food and energy security. It can also trigger a higher incidence of natural disasters – landslides, flooding and glacial lake outbursts – that can, in turn, lead to internal displacement and the destruction of critical infrastructure. Over the longer term, higher temperatures will increase flooding in the rainy season and reduce water in the dry season, thus affecting food production in the provinces downstream, as well as the livelihoods of over 1 billion people in China, India, Nepal and Bangladesh. Eventually water shortages will occur on a massive scale. The consequences for a region that is already highly prone to both floods and drought are dire. We are, in effect, facing a humanitarian catastrophe in the world’s most populous region.

Overall, the impacts of climate change will be greatest on poor communities that are least able to adapt. Tibetan pastoralists depend upon the grasslands for their survival, and climate change is leading to historically unprecedented pressures. For example, at the source of the Yellow River, at the centre of the Plateau, over one-third of the grasslands have transformed into semi-desert conditions. As environmental security analysts would predict, this is leading to increased environmental migration largely under the auspices of a government-controlled scheme to promote the regeneration of the grasslands. Recent studies have shown that the resettlement scheme is creating new social problems and the environmental benefits are uncertain. A major problem is that we still do not know enough about climate impacts on the grasslands. Field investigations are few and far between. What we do know is that a simple causal relationship between overgrazing and environmental degradation – a “Tragedy of the Commons”-style scenario – is misleading, precisely because it fails to take into account climate change. Placing disproportionate blame on Tibetan pastoralists also greatly undervalues indigenous knowledge and the important role that the original custodians of the land can play in climate adaptation efforts.

What is taking place on the Tibetan Plateau throws into sharp relief the complex relationship between the environment and security understood broadly to encompass the safety and well being of individuals as well as states. The interdependencies between environmental degradation, human well-being and regional security can only be addressed on the basis of a cooperative and people-centred approach. The critical question for policymakers is how to develop a regional response that can encourage a new strategic vision, while at the same time deliver positive results in the short term. Toward this end, I would like to offer four suggestions.

First, given the magnitude of the emerging environmental crisis on the Tibetan Plateau, developing an integrated regional map of the security risks involved is now an urgent task. An even-handed approach to anticipating risks entails a high level of research coordination and cross-sectoral analysis. The science needed to underpin these risk assessments is highly challenging and will require interdisciplinary collaboration, especially between scientists, ethnographers and security analysts. On this basis, current modelling work in the field of global environmental change can be supplemented with grounded analysis of potential harms at the local level.

Second, the region is seriously lacking relevant institutions to deal with the crisis. A consultative process for considering adaptation options and identifying collective responses does not, as yet, exist. What is needed is an inclusive dialogue mechanism that can bring together many stakeholders, including vulnerable communities at risk, corporations involved in infrastructure development and national and local governments. In general, regional security in Asia is concentrated at the state level. The involvement of corporations or non-governmental organisations is rare. This crisis may well provide the necessary catalyst for revitalising security cooperation by helping to dissolve the traditional boundary between the state and its people, which places a serious constraint upon the responsive capacity of states to deal with transnational security challenges.

Third, and somewhat optimistically, in addressing a bigger threat, the potential exists for climate change to unite divided communities on the Tibetan Plateau. Conflict resolution has long been an important motivating factor in designing institutions for managing resources. And placing conflict dynamics within a broader regional framework may well help to ease ethnic tensions. An expanded regional security vision offers an opportunity to resolve conflicts over access to resources, as well as ensure a fairer distribution of the benefits.

Fourth, and at a deeper level, the threat of large-scale environmental catastrophe reaffirms the need for a twenty-first century view of progress that moves imperatively beyond the nineteenth century model of nation-building based on the expansive exploitation of natural resources. Rather than simply a strategic buffer zone caught between the ambitions of great powers, the Tibetan Plateau could become a strategic conservation zone acting as a buffer against environmental catastrophe that threatens one-fifth of humanity.

Clearly, such a transformative approach would not be without its immediate economic costs, but as a guarantee of future Asian security it may well be a price worth paying. Industrialised countries have accrued a large debt for past malpractices and they are now seeking to make amends. For developing counties with limited adaptive capacities, the impacts of climate change are potentially devastating and, therefore, a wait-and-see policy is no longer an option. In some cases, environmental damage is irreversible: losses in biodiversity that provide essential services for human survival, such as the control of crop pests and carbon storage, are difficult to restore. The threat of massive ecosystem decline is, in part, a consequence of the failure to act. Hence there is now an urgent need to look to the future and build cooperation on the basis of regional collective responsibility, not only between states but also between peoples. If this does not happen, then the pessimistic scenarios put forward by security analysts, of wide-scale migration and conflicts over access to resources, may well result.

Dr Katherine Morton is a fellow in the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University. Her research interests include China's international relations, environmental governance, and non-traditional and human security. She is currently conducting research on the impacts of climate change on the Tibetan Plateau and its implications for regional security. The author would like to thank the Asia Pacific Review for granting permission to publish an adapted version of the original article titled ‘China and Environmental Security in the Age of Consequences’ Asia Pacific Review, 15:2, 2008: 52-67.

A Way out of Tibet’s Morass

2009-05-06T10:40:00.002+05:30

by Robert Barnett
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/barnett1

NEW YORK – China has survived the 50th anniversary of the failed uprising by Tibetans against Chinese rule in 1959 without major protests. But, to keep Tibetans off the streets, China’s government had to saturate the entire Tibetan plateau with troops and secretly detain in unmarked jails hundreds of people for “legal education.” Those moves suggest that Tibet has become an increasingly serious concern for China’s rulers, one that they have not yet found ways to handle without damaging their standing in Tibet and around the world.

A year ago, Chinese and Western intellectuals competed in dismissing popular interest in Tibet as a childlike confusion with the imaginary Shangri-la of the 1937 film Lost Horizon . But after more than 150 protests in Tibet against Chinese rule over the past 12 months, concerns about the area seem anything but fanciful. Indeed, Tibet could soon replace Taiwan as a factor in regional stability and an important issue in international relations. The areas populated by Tibetans cover a quarter of China; to have such a large part of the country’s territory under military control and cut off from the outside world weakens the Communist Party’s claims to legitimacy and world power status.

Last year’s protests were the largest and most widespread in Tibet for decades. Participants included nomads, farmers, and students, who in theory should have been the most grateful to China for modernizing Tibet’s economy. Many carried the forbidden Tibetan national flag, suggesting that they think of Tibet as a separate country in the past, and in about 20 incidents government offices were burned down. In one case, there were even attacks on Chinese migrants, leading to 18 deaths. It is hard not to see these events as a challenge to China’s rule.
The government’s reaction was to blame the problem on outside instigation. It sent in more troops, hid details of protestors’ deaths, gave a life sentence to an AIDS educator who had copied illegal CDs from India, and for months banned foreigners and journalists from the Tibetan plateau. In November, Chinese officials, live on national TV, ridiculed Tibetan exiles’ proposals for negotiation. They canceled a European summit because of a meeting between French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the Dalai Lama, and regularly imply that Tibetans are terrorists.
On March 28, Tibetans in Lhasa had to celebrate “Serf Emancipation Day” to endorse China’s explanation for its take-over 50 years ago. But such class-struggle terminology reminds people of the Cultural Revolution and, since such language would be unimaginable in inland China today, only makes Tibet seem more separate.

Although both sides claim to be ready for dialogue, they are talking at cross-purposes: the exiles say that talks must be based on their autonomy proposals, while China says that it will discuss only the Dalai Lama’s “personal status” – where he would live in Beijing should he return to China. Visceral sparring matches are continuing, with the Dalai Lama recently describing Tibetans’ lives under China as a “hell on earth.” He was almost certainly referring to life during the Maoist years rather than the present, but his remarks enabled China to issue more media attacks and raise the political temperature further.

Western governments have been accused of interference, but it is unlikely that any want to derail their relations with China, especially during an economic crisis. Last October, British Foreign Minister David Miliband was so anxious to maintain Chinese good will that he came close to denouncing his predecessors’ recognition of Tibet’s autonomy 100 years ago. But foreign concerns about the status of China’s mandate in Tibet are understandable: Tibet is the strategic high ground between the two most important nuclear powers in Asia. Good governance on the plateau is good for everyone.

China could help to lessen growing tensions by recognizing these concerns as reasonable. The Dalai Lama could cut down on foreign meetings and acknowledge that, despite China’s general emasculation of intellectual and religious life in Tibet, some aspects of Tibetan culture (like modern art, film and literature) are relatively healthy. Western observers could accept the exiles’ assurances that their proposals on autonomy are negotiable and not bottom-line demands, rather than damning them before talks start.

All sides would gain by paying attention to two Tibetan officials in China who dared to speak out last month. A retired prefectural governor from Kardze told the Singapore paper Zaobao that “the government should have more trust in its people, particularly the Tibetan monks,” and the current Tibet governor admitted that some protesters last year “weren’t satisfied with our policies,” rather than calling them enemies of the state, the first official concession from within China that some of its policies might be connected to the recent protests.

The Party has so far been following a more conventional strategy: last week it sent a delegation of officials to the US (the first ever sent, it said, to have been composed solely of Tibetans – a fact that one might expect them to have been embarrassed to admit) and had its leader, Shingtsa Tenzin Choedak, tell journalists that Tibetans enjoy freedom of religion.

As anyone who has worked in Tibet recently knows well, this was an inexactitude: since at least 1996, all Tibetans who work for the government and all Tibetan students in Tibet have been forbidden any Buddhist practice, even though it is illegal under Chinese law to stop people from practicing an official religion.

China’s government could improve the situation overnight by sacking the officials responsible for such illegal policies, and by apologizing to Tibetans for having overlooked such abuses for 15 years. And it could start reassessing its Tibetan policies instead of increasing controls and allegations. Until then, China’s quest for international respect is set to remain elusive and Tibet is likely to stay on the world’s agenda.

Profile: Robert Barnett is Director of the Modern Tibetan Studies Program, Columbia University.

Spanish judge seeks China Tibet answers

2009-05-06T10:34:00.001+05:30

May 6, 2009, 8:35 am
http://au.news.yahoo.com/a/-/world/5546534/spanish-judge-seeks-china-tibet-answers/

A Spanish judge said on Tuesday he intended to question eight Chinese leaders as official suspects in a case of genocide in connection with a crackdown on unrest that erupted in Tibet in March 2008.

National Court judge Santiago Pedraz sent a letter to Chinese authorities formally requesting permission to travel to China to question the eight, including Defence Minister Liang Guanglie and Minister for State Security Geng Huichang.

"Given the cordial relations between our two respective countries, I hope that you will respond favourably to my request," he wrote referring to a bilateral justice cooperation agreement signed in 2005, according to a court document obtained by AFP.

The suit was filed against the Chinese leaders in July 2008 by a Tibetan rights groups, the Tibet Support Committee, and accepted by the court the following month just days before the opening of the Beijing Olympics .

It "denounces the new wave of oppression that began in Tibet on 10th March 2008, and just goes to prove that acts of genocide continue to be committed against the Tibetan people".
It also "denounces China's manipulation of the global war against terrorism in its attempt to justify and cover up crimes against humanity committed against the Tibetan people".
Unrest in Tibet erupted on March 14 last year after four days of peaceful protests against Chinese rule.

The Tibetan government-in-exile says 203 Tibetans were killed and about 1,000 hurt in China's crackdown. Beijing insists that only one Tibetan was killed and has in turn accused the "rioters" of killing 21 people.

The crackdown sparked international protests that dogged the month-long global journey of the Olympic torch in April.

The judge said that if the accusations made in the complaint are proven, they would constitute crimes against humanity under Spanish law.

"The Tibetan population would appear to be a group that is persecuted by the cited authorities for political, racial, national, ethnical, cultural, religious or other motives universally recognised as unacceptable under international law," he wrote.

Spain has since 2005 operated under the principle of "universal jurisdiction", a doctrine that allows courts to reach beyond national borders in cases of torture, terrorism or war crimes.
Other Chinese officials named in the suit were Communist Party Secretary in Tibet Zhang Qingli, Politburo member Wang Lequan, Ethnic Affairs Commission head Li Dezhu, People's Liberation Army Commander in Lhasa General Tong Guishan, Public Security Minister Meg Jianzhu and Zhang Guihua, political commissar in the Chengdu military command.

The suit against the eight is an extension to another complaint filed by the Tibet Support Committee in 2006.

That suit accuses Chinese leaders, including former president Jiang Zemin and former prime minister Li Peng, of torture and crimes against humanity as well as genocide allegedly carried out in Tibet during the 1980s.

The National Court has been hearing that case since June 2006.

Beijing has condemned the accusations of genocide in Tibet as slander and it has accused Madrid of trying to interfere in its administration of the Buddhist Himalayan region.

China has ruled Tibet since 1951, a year after sending troops in to "liberate" the remote region.

Life is a trial for Chinese lawyer

2009-05-06T10:21:00.002+05:30

LA Times[Tuesday, May 05, 2009 17:24]

Gao Zhisheng, once officially honored for his work, grew bolder in taking on officials. The secret police are thought to have him.

By Barbara Demick

Reporting from Beijing -- For the family of Gao Zhisheng, a maverick lawyer under house arrest for years after confronting the Communist Party head-on, security was so tight that police sometimes sat in the bedroom of their Beijing apartment, insisting the lights remain on all night so they could keep an eye on them.

In order to keep the family incommunicado, authorities forbade telephones or Internet access. When Gao's 15-year-old daughter went to school, her classmates were not allowed to carry cellphones lest she borrow one to make a call.

After more than four years under surveillance, Gao's wife managed to slip out of the apartment in mid-January with their daughter and 5-year-old son. They traveled nearly 2,000 miles by bus, train, motorcycle and on foot to reach Thailand, from where they were allowed to fly to the United States.The 45-year-old Gao disappeared weeks later and is presumed to be in the custody of Chinese secret police.

"We know nothing. We don't even know if he is alive or dead," said his wife, Geng He, in a tearful telephone interview. In the last month, she has talked to members of Congress, the press and human rights groups about what happened to her family.

Her story speaks to the unbearable pressure Beijing continues to apply on its citizens, even savvy lawyers, who cross an unstated line by taking on taboo causes.

In the first four months of 2009, Amnesty International has documented at least four cases of lawyers who were threatened with violence by the authorities as they defended their clients, and many more in which they were stopped from meeting clients, detained or barred from practicing law.

Beijing authorities in March issued a six-month suspension of the Yitong law firm, one of the country's most prominent human rights practices, saying one of its lawyers was improperly licensed."That was just an excuse to punish us for accepting sensitive cases," said Li Jinsong, head of the firm.

Yuan Xianchen, a lawyer in northeastern China who represented miners and farmers against state-owned companies, was sentenced in March to four years in prison for "inciting subversion of state power."

Lawyers have also been blocked from bringing lawsuits on behalf of parents whose babies were sickened by melamine-tainted milk.

"In terms of China's overall legal development, nobody ever said the road forward would be straight, but I think we are going backwards at the moment," said Nicholas Bequelin of Human Rights Watch.

The crackdown has come in an era when Chinese lawyers have become bolder about pushing for the rights of the ordinary citizen in a culture where individual grievances have long been subordinated to the good of the collective.

China has a minuscule legal community -- just 143,000 lawyers, or about 1 for every 9,090 people. (The U.S. has about 1 for every 300.)

Traditionally, Chinese who believe themselves wronged write up their own complaints and travel to Beijing to seek justice -- a wildly inefficient system known as petitioning that dates back to Imperial times.

Among the new breed of lawyers, Gao wasn't merely pushing the envelope -- he was an in-your-face advocate, a large man with a booming voice who took on China's leadership.

The Chinese government says he and his family have been treated responsibly.

At a Foreign Ministry briefing in March, spokesman Qin Gang said: "There's no political persecution or limits on the freedom of the family. . . . We've handled the case in strict accordance with the law."

Gao, born in a cave in rural Shaanxi province and self-educated, was named one of the top 10 lawyers in China in 2001 by the Chinese Ministry of Justice's Legal Daily. He represented clients in medical malpractice and land confiscation cases, which in China meant suing the government. Over time, he grew more daring, taking as clients underground churches and members of the Falun Gong, who alleged they had been tortured for their participation in the banned quasi-Buddhist sect.

The government closed Gao's law practice in 2004, and he was convicted of subversion two years later and given a suspended sentence that kept him under house arrest for much of the time after. Unable to practice law, he started speaking out publicly, giving interviews to the foreign press and dashing off letters to the European Union and the U.S. Congress.

As he became more strident, the secret police became more frantic to quiet him. They would pick him up frequently for questioning; at other times they kept him under house arrest. They set up camp in the stairwell outside his second-floor flat. At one point, while Gao was in custody, his wife said, an officer stayed in the bedroom as she and the children slept.

Police also followed family members onto buses and stood outside phone booths as they made calls.

Despite the intense surveillance, Gao managed to send letters in 2007 to the European Union and U.S. Congress urging a boycott of the following year's Olympics in Beijing over alleged human rights abuses.

Shortly afterward, Gao was picked up by men in plain clothes presumed to be secret police and a black hood was placed over his head. During 59 days in custody, he was beaten and sexually abused, prodded with electric probes, bamboo skewers and burning cigarettes, according to a letter wife Geng wrote April 23 to Congress.Oddly enough, she now says, it wasn't the torture as much as the confiscation of her daughter's classmates' cellphones that drove the family to the brink.

"Her teacher told everybody in the class that because of her father, they can't take any cellphones to school. They couldn't go to computer classes like other students," Geng recalled. "Everybody at the school was angry with my daughter."It was then that the family began seriously planning their escape. On Jan. 9, Gao abruptly walked out of the Beijing apartment. When the police rushed after him, Geng and the two children left, wearing as much clothing as they could fit under their winter coats. They dared not carry bags.

After a journey of nine days that included traveling by night over smugglers' routes through Southeast Asia, they reached Thailand, where a Christian group helped them get to the United States.

Gao was seized at his brother's home in Shaanxi the morning of Feb. 4 and has not been heard from since, his family told human rights advocates.

It is common in China for family not to be notified for weeks or even months after an arrest, but Gao's fate is of keen interest because of his high profile. He was a nominee last year for the Nobel Peace Prize, and in 2007, the American Board of Trial Advocates tried to present him with its Courageous Advocacy Award at a dinner in Santa Barbara.

He was not permitted to attend.

PLA’s “Absolute Loyalty” to the Party in Doubt

2009-05-05T10:28:00.002+05:30

China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 9
April 30, 2009 03:22 PM
By: Willy Lam
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34920&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=993a3be340

China’s military forces crossed a watershed when the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) celebrated its 60th birthday by holding a parade of state-of-the-art hardware such as indigenously developed nuclear submarines. That the 2.4-million strong People's Liberation Army (PLA) has attained quasi-superpower status was also supported by the fact that defense delegations from 29 countries attended the festivities in the port city of Qingdao (Guardian, April 22; Time [Asia edition], April 21). Paving the way for preparations for an even bigger event on October 1—an unprecedented large-scale military show at Tiananmen Square to mark the 60th birthday of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Two factors underpin the PLA’s ostensible salience in China’s political life. Demonstrating military might is an essential component to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership’s recent decision to aggressively project hard power worldwide. With the 20th anniversary of the June 4, 1989 crackdown moving closer, the Hu Jintao administration is playing up the fact that the PLA, as well as it sister unit, the People’s Armed Police (PAP), is ready to deal a frontal blow to dissidents, separatists and other “destabilizing elements.”

Yet, speeches by President Hu since early this year have betrayed the CCP leadership’s doubts about the key Communist-Chinese tradition that, “the army must be absolutely loyal to the party.” Hu, who chairs the policy-setting Central Military Commission (CMC), has masterminded an ideological campaign to promote “core values of contemporary revolutionary soldiers.” The commander-in-chief has enunciated the following five crypto-Maoist norms as the army’s foremost values: “Be loyal to the party, love the people, serve the country; devote yourself to [the party’s goals]; and value honor.” Hu’s instructions have been eulogized by the PLA’s General Political Department as “the scientific summation of the historical experience of the political construction of the armed forces.” In indoctrination sessions nationwide, political commissars have stressed that military units “must, in areas of ideology, politics and organization, remain a people’s army that is under the absolute leadership of the party.” Furthermore, while inspecting PLA divisions around the country since the spring, Hu and his military aides have emphasized that “the PLA must never change its [political] nature” of being the party’s faithful defenders and executioners (Xinhua News Agency, April 7; Liberation Army Daily, March 16 & April 27).

Yet it is obvious that the moral and ideological standards of officers as well as rank and file are hardly up to scratch. PLA Chief Political Commissar General Li Jinai, who is in charge of ideological indoctrination, warned in an article in the early April issue of the theoretical journal Seeking Truth that officers and soldiers must never succumb to the “erroneous” concepts of the West. The latter include the de-politicization of the armed forces, and that they should be a “national army,” instead of a “party army” as in the case of China and other Communist countries. “Upholding the party’s absolute leadership is [the basis of] our army’s political superiority and its unchanging quintessence,” General Li said. “This is also the political guarantee of our army’s development and aggrandizement.” “We must take the party’s will as our will, the party’s direction as our direction,” added General Li, who is deemed personally close to Hu. “For each and everything, we must abide by the instructions of the party central authorities, the CMC, and Chairman Hu” (China News Service, April 1; People’s Daily, April 2).

Last week, President Hu admonished Chinese military attachés attending a Beijing conference to be “resolute in politics and to be pure in ideology and morality.” He called on the top brass to “uphold and develop the superior traditions of our party and army” by ensuring that overseas-based staff would pass muster regarding “the core values of contemporary revolutionary soldiers.” “Military attachés must be a high-quality corps that is loyal to the party, willing to make self-sacrifices, and strict in observing discipline,” the supremo added (Xinhua News Agency, April 17). Earlier this year, Hu noted when meeting military delegates to the National People’s Congress that “ideological and political construction”—code-word for fostering obedience and “absolute loyalty” among officers and soldiers—must remain the PLA’s priority task. He pointed out that defense personnel must have “four types of consciousness,” meaning awareness of politics, awareness of the requirements of the party and state, awareness of dangers and pitfalls, and consciousness about their mission of serving the party (Liberation Army Daily, March 12).

While issues about the PLA’s fealty toward the CCP may seem an internal Chinese affair, the Middle Kingdom’s neighbors may feel justified in showing concern about the apparent discrepancy between Commander-in-Chief Hu’s views on the nation’s pacifist tradition on one hand, and the hawkish sentiments of a number of military officers on the other. After all, failure to toe the line of the commander-in-chief clearly constitutes a breach of discipline. Take, for example, the oft-repeated doctrine of the “peaceful rise of China.” While officiating at the military parade in Qingdao last week, Hu reiterated his administration’s commitment to “the path of peaceful development.” He pointed out that the PLA would remain “an important force in safeguarding world peace,” and that “China will never be a threat to other nations.” “China would never seek hegemony, nor would it turn to military expansion or arms races with other nations,” he indicated (Liberation Army Daily, May 24; People’s Daily, May 24).

Leave aside for a moment the issue of whether a no-holds-barred modernization of PLA weaponry has spawned a virulent arms race among China, India, Japan and the United States. Pronouncements made a bevy of officers and military strategists, most of which have made it to military mouthpieces, suggest that a sizeable sector of the defense forces holds views on war and peace that are markedly different from those of the Hu-led party leadership. Take for instance, the doctrine of “shelving sovereignty disputes and focusing on joint development,” which was first laid down by late patriarch Deng Xiaoping and is still honored by the current party leadership. This principle has been used to defuse tension with countries that have territorial disputes with China. Yet it seems evident that a younger generation of PLA officers wants Beijing to play hardball while handling sovereignty conflicts with its neighbors.

According to naval officer Yang Yi, who teaches at the National Defense University, Deng’s dictum about shelving disputes “must be based on the premise that sovereignty [over disputed areas] belongs to China.” He warned unnamed countries that it is “dangerous” to assume that Beijing would not resort to force simply due to its anxiety to foster peaceful development and to polish its international image. “Strong military force is a bulwark for upholding national interests,” Yang pointed out. “The Chinese navy is a strong deterrent force that will prevent other countries from wantonly infringing upon China’s maritime interests” (International Herald Leader [Beijing paper], March 3). Equally significantly, strategist Huang Kunlun has raised the notion of “the boundaries of national interests.” Huang argued that China’s national interests had gone beyond its land, sea and air territories to include areas such as oceans traversed by Chinese oil freighters—as well as outer space. “Wherever our national interests have extended, so will the mission of our armed forces,” Huang indicated (see “China Flaunts Growing Naval Capabilities,” China Brief, January 12). These assertions of naked power have raised fears particularly in countries such as Japan and the Philippines, which have had recent run-ins with Beijing regarding sovereignty claims over islands in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.

While President Hu and his civilian advisers may have reservations about provocative statements made by the likes of Yang and Huang, however, it seems unlikely that the CMC—which is after all dominated by generals—would rein in the hawks. The 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre has again reminded the CCP leadership that had it not been for the “protection” of the armed forces, the party might in 1989 not have survived the onslaught of hundreds of thousands of protestors. Particularly given the likelihood that social unrest may escalate this year due to reduced living standards and growing unemployment, the Hu-led Politburo is eager to retain the loyalty of this most potent “pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat” (Apple Daily [Hong Kong], April 24; Strait Times [Singapore], March 9). That the Politburo has given the army budget boosts averaging around 15 percent the past decade shows that while the party leadership is often seen cracking the whip on disobedient officers, it is at the same time anxious to win over the support of the top brass.

In a commemorative article on the “historic and glorious path” taken by the PLAN, the Xinhua News Agency disclosed details about how CCP leaders from Mao Zedong onward had lavished stupendous amounts of material and human capital on expanding China’s fleet. The commentary pointed out that the first major cash injection into the Chinese navy of $150 million—which enabled it to procure its post WWII-vintage frigates and airplanes—came from the $300 million that Beijing had borrowed from the Soviet Union in 1950. In that same year, revenue for the entire central government was as little as $2.27 billion. It was Chairman Mao, one of the founders of the Red Army, who made the fateful decision to divert the nation’s scarce resources to army construction (Xinhua News Agency, April 22). It was also under the same spirit that even though millions of Chinese were suffering from malnutrition in the 1960s, the Great Helmsman earmarked generous funds for building China’s first A-bomb and long-range missiles. While it is true that Hu and his Politburo colleagues may feel uncomfortable about grand-standing PLA officers, it is unlikely that the party leadership will go against the long-standing Communist-Chinese tradition of giving the military a disproportionately large share of the economic and political clout.

Wary welcome for China's human-rights plan

2009-05-05T10:12:00.002+05:30

By Verna Yu
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KE05Ad02.html

China issued its first action plan on human rights in mid-April, touting it as a major step forward in its efforts to safeguard the rights of its people. While lawyers and rights activists have commended the move, they are also skeptical it will translate into a genuine improvement in rights for ordinary Chinese.

The Chinese government said the 2009-2010 plan "signals that the human-rights cause has become a major theme of China's national ... development" and "will promote the concept of respecting and safeguarding human rights at various levels of government ... and the whole of society at large".

The 54-page document promises better protection of economic, social and cultural as well as civil and political rights. It calls for an end to the extraction of confessions by torture and illegal detention, the protection of detainees from abuse, and respect for the right to a fair trial.

It also calls for the protection of ethnic minorities, women, children, elderly and disabled people.

Nicholas Bequelin, a senior researcher at New York-based Human Rights Watch, said while the plan is not a panacea for the wide range of human-rights abuses that frequently occur in China, it is nonetheless a "victory" for the human-rights movement. "

In itself, the plan is no remedy for the serious range of human rights violations that we see in China," he said.

But the move nonetheless endorses human rights - long regarded a bourgeois concept in communist China - as a legitimate cause, indicating it is no longer a no-go area, Bequelin said.

"It [shows] the battles of the norms have been won, that human rights are universal and they are accepted by China as legitimate rights," he said. "It does not lead to any immediate improvement, but by creating a bit of space for human rights activists. In the long term it might translate into better human-rights protection."

Human-rights lawyers in China, who are often harassed for defending dissidents and journalists, have also applauded the official rights plan though they are not hopeful it will lead to immediate change.

These lawyers have said the document only consists of a set of guiding principles - many of which are already in China's constitution - that do not mandate concrete measures that will result more freedoms being granted to ordinary people.

"I can't see much of a breakthrough in this. Most of the issues are already included in the constitution, such as freedom of speech and other rights," said Teng Biao, a lecturer in law at the University of Political Science and Law in Beijing and a human-rights campaigner.

"They are a set of principle-based and abstract stipulations and lack specific workable measures. ... Moreover, little is mentioned about the judiciary or political system, so it's very difficult to have any real impact."

Rights lawyer Mo Shaoping, who has represented many high-profile political prisoners, including New York Times researcher Zhao Yan and democratic party organizer Xu Wenli, said authorities have violated rights such as the freedom of speech and assembly for years, despite them being guaranteed in the Chinese constitution.

While acknowledging the plan is an encouraging move, Mo said he is not confident that the promises will necessarily be translated into action.

"The protection of human rights, including civil and political rights in China should not be something that exists only on a piece of paper. I think what is more important is the question of implementation," he said.

For example, the prohibition of forcing confessions through torture is already stated in China's Code of Criminal Procedure and mentioned in the documents of the Supreme Court.

"These are rules that date back many years and yet in reality [the abuses] go on unabated," Mo said.

Meanwhile, international rights body Amnesty International has also pointed out that in several areas of civil and political rights, such as the death penalty, torture and freedom of religion, the new proposals simply repeat existing laws and policies that have failed to adequately protect human rights.

The action plan fails to address many serious rights violations in China, including the detention and imprisonment of rights activists, censorship of the Internet and other media, as well as the continued use of administrative detention for "re-education through labor", which can be used to detain individuals for up to four years without trial.

Mo points out there are also other major gaps in the plan.

It should have spelt out when China plans to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which it signed in 1998, he said.

The plan also fails to address crucial issues on freedom of speech, such as defining what actions constitute subversion - a blanket charge that has been used to send many journalists and cyber-dissidents to jail simply after they criticized the government or called for democracy and freedoms.

"In criminal law, you have a charge called 'inciting the subversion of state sovereignty' but yet the constitution grants citizens the freedom of speech," he said.

Amnesty International also said China should take steps to address specific civil and political human-rights violations highlighted by United Nations human rights monitoring mechanisms and treaty bodies.

The UN-affiliated Committee against Torture said last year it remained concerned about the continued allegations of widespread use of torture and ill-treatment of suspects in police custody.

Cases that have attracted international concern include the jailing in 2006 of blind activist Chen Guangcheng, who has campaigned against China's strict family planning policy, and of HIV/AIDS activist Hu Jia last year for "inciting the subversion of state power".

"For China's human-rights action plan to have real impact on the ground, the authorities will have to take concrete steps that will meaningfully improve life for the people," said Roseann Rife, Amnesty International's Asia-Pacific deputy director, in a statement.

Critics say the Chinese government could have launched the action plan in part to deflect Western criticism of its human-rights record in a year full of sensitive anniversaries such as the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen bloody crackdown on June 4 and the 50th anniversary of the Tibetan uprising on March 10.

The plan may also have been prepared to help China defend its rights situation at the Universal Periodic Review of China at the United Nations Human Rights Council in February this year, Bequelin said.

Bequelin called on the Chinese authorities to stop suppressing human rights activists, allow a free press and allow international human rights bodies to be based in China. "These measures would be enough to tremendously help human rights in China," he said. "If you hide everything under the carpet, the problems don't go away, they often get worse."

Profile: Verna Yu is a freelance journalist from Hong Kong.

China's Tibet: question with no answer

2009-05-04T11:51:00.002+05:30

By Li Datong ON THE WEB, 24 April 2009
Open Democracy
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/chinas-tibet-question-with-no-answer

China’s Tibet has been given a new holiday to mark the passing of a half-century since the events it commemorates: Serfs’ Emancipation Day. Several groups of senior politicians, including Hu Jintao — general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party’s central committee — have attended an exhibition marking these fifty years of democratic reform in Tibet. The official media have decried the evils of “serfdom” in historical Tibet, while trumpeting the accomplishments of today. China’s foreign minister and prime minister have presented criticisms of the Dalai Lama’s “independence stance” (one he has long since renounced) to reporters both foreign and domestic.

This orgy of celebration of the moment in 1959 when Chinese troops “liberated” Lhasa and sent the Dalai Lama and many of his followers into exile in India shows that the Beijing leadership has abandoned the policy of “negotiations” with the Tibetan figurehead, one it was forced by world opinion to undertake in the run-up to the Olympic games. The successful completion of the games is itself one reason for the government’s tougher position; the western countries’ search for help from China to survive the ongoing global financial crisis is another. China no longer need bite its tongue. The Tibet question is deadlocked.

The hard line reflects widespread misunderstanding of the Tibet question; even those in China who do understand the issue seem not to know where the crux of the problem lies. After all, the Dalai Lama has abandoned calls for independence; repeatedly stated that Tibet is a part of China; accepted the rights of Beijing over foreign relations and national defence (including, naturally, the right to station troops in Tibet); and agreed to seek greater autonomy only within the framework of China’s constitution and “law of regional national autonomy”. So why does the Chinese government refuse to acknowledge even the basis for negotiations? What happened to Deng Xiaoping’s approach — stated when he met the Dalai Lama’s brother in 1979 — that “everything can be discussed, bar independence”?

An ideology against itself
The Communist Party had an entirely different stance on national autonomy before it came to power in 1949. It adopted wholesale as part of its ideology the idea of “national self-determination”. This arose from the modern European idea of the nation-state, and was given its widest interpretation in Lenin’s essay “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination” (1914): that any group with common cultural characteristics and regarding itself as a nation had the right to autonomy in its permanent homeland, and to found an independent sovereign state.

It is clear that for any empire this can end only in fracture. The Soviet Union made strenuous efforts to avoid this fate. It identified one hundred different nationalities, each of which on paper had the constitutional right to leave the Soviet Union; but sought to create the image of a happy socialist family in which all these national members were united by ideological belief in a higher, unifying goal. In reality, the “multinational family” was held captive by single-party rule, violent suppression and economic exploitation; not even autonomy was granted.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) followed closely the Soviet blueprint. In 1928 its sixth congress (held in Moscow) declared “only when we admit the right of nationalities to independence and separation, that all nationalities within China’s borders can secede from China and form their own countries, will we be true communists.” On 7 November 1931, the party founded the Chinese Soviet Republic in Jiangxi. Article 14 of the 1934 constitution of this republic reads: “The Chinese Soviet Republic acknowledges the right to national self-determination of minority nationalities within China’s borders, to the extent that even minor nationalities have the right to secede and found independent countries.”

The party’s years in power after 1949 saw it continue to learn from the Soviet Union by “identifying” — or inventing — nationalities. The five nationalities of the Republic of China — the Han, Man, Mongolian, Hui and Tibetan — had by 1986 become fifty-six. The arrangements for regional national autonomy were also adopted from the Soviets, although China’s historical tradition of unification meant “countries” became “regions”. This creation and strengthening of national differences meant that members of minority nationalities came to identify more with their ethnicity than their country. Even today not one single party secretary of a national autonomous region is actually of that nationality — the so-called autonomy is always under the leadership and supervision of a Han party secretary. If the party is so worried about fragmentation or loss of authority, what was the point of the system in the first place?

A policy against movement
There are two issues at the heart of the “national autonomy” issue. The first is the relationship between different nationalities (for if the principle of national autonomy is accepted, this creates the possibility of friction and logically includes national independence). The second is the issue of political mechanisms that might become a route to self-determination (for the will of the majority of the nationality is a permanent threat — since autonomy can only be founded on democracy, on voting for a leader and his or her policies). Both aspects of “national autonomy” thus pose difficulties for official policy: the first is incompatible with the ideal of a unified China that the party inherited and carries forward, the second is incompatible with the one-party political system.

In this light, whatever the Dalai Lama does — proclaims himself a loyal Chinese citizen, refutes independence, or declares himself willing to achieve Tibetan autonomy within the scope of the Chinese constitution — the Chinese government cannot respond. It is bound by the contradictions of its official ideology to evade the question.

The policy is stuck in another way too. It lacks any foundation to engage with the Dalai Lama’s view of the Tibetan government-in-exile as the natural representative of the Tibetan people. For fifty years the party has been carefully selecting and training a Tibetan elite, many members of which have been educated in China or even Beijing before returning to take up government posts, and are bilingual in Chinese and Tibetan. Many of these are the descendants of past “serfs”.

By contrast, those in the exile government have often never lived in Tibet, have been educated in India or the west, and speak fluent English but not a word of Chinese. Even in a free election the local elite may have the advantage — they would have arguments to persuade people not to hand over power to those “incomers”. I suspect the greatest opposition to the return of the Dalai Lama is that rising Tibetan elite. Chinese control of Tibet relies on them; they are able to influence central policy on the region; they have a stake in power.

The accumulated result is stasis. China’s political systems and institutions of nationality mean that the Tibetan issue cannot be solved.

Profile: Li Datong is a Chinese journalist and former editor of Freezing Point, a weekly supplement of the China Youth Daily newspaper.

Dalai Lama takes firm stance on China

2009-05-04T11:46:00.001+05:30

By Michael Paulson CAMBRIDGE, US, 30 April 2009
Boston Globe

The Dalai Lama kicked off a four-day visit to the Boston area yesterday by acknowledging China’s extraordinary economic and political might, but said any quest by the world’s largest nation to be considered a superpower will be stymied as long as China continues to dodge human rights concerns.

The 73-year-old Dalai Lama alternated between stern finger-pointing and boyish laughter as he fielded questions from the news media at the Charles Hotel. At first, he appeared fatigued, but he became increasingly animated over the course of the 40-minute news conference, and as he rose to leave, he abruptly turned back to offer a lengthy explication of the meanings of home and of hope in answer to a reporter’s shouted question about whether he ever expected to set foot in Tibet again.

Perhaps the most pointed moment of his remarks came when the Dalai Lama, seated in front of images of doodles and notes drawn by President John F. Kennedy, appeared to compare the United States to China, citing the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq alongside his criticism of China’s repression of Tibetan demonstrators last year.

“I love Mr. Bush . . . as a human being — very straightforward, very nice person,” the Dalai Lama said, referring to former President George W. Bush. “Some politicians, some leaders, that I met were a little bit distant. He is not like that, he become very close friend. So I love him.”
But, he added, in somewhat halting English, “as far as his policies are concerned, sometimes I think different. . . . President Bush, I think out of sincere motivation, bring democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan, sincere motivation, but the method: use more force, so counterproductive.
“So, exactly, the Chinese case also. For temporary, short method, sometimes they use these violent methods. How can violent method solve problems? Never. Never.”

Discussing the current American stance toward the Tibetan cause, the Dalai Lama said he perceives “more or less the same policy” by the Obama administration as that of Bush. He praised President Obama as “straightforward” and for trying to reach out to nations with whom the United States has had tense relations. He said he did not agree with critics who have charged that the Obama administration has soft-pedaled human rights concerns.

But the Dalai Lama, who in 1989 received the Nobel Peace Prize for his insistence on nonviolence in the struggle by Tibetans for greater freedom, also acknowledged that he is not meeting with Obama during his current trip to the United States, and said he is not certain that his request for a meeting with the president in October will be granted.

“The People’s Republic of China is the most populous nation, and economically now is very important, therefore China must be in the world community . . . good relations is very essential,” he said in discussing why the United States should press China on human rights. “Meantime, principles such as human rights and religious freedom and Democracy and freedom of speech and freedom of press — these are matters of principle, so while you are engaging the economy . . . you should be firm.”

The Dalai Lama, who is the spiritual and political leader of Tibetan Buddhism and has led a government in exile in India for 50 years, offered warm remarks about Harvard University, which he first visited in 1979, and will visit again today with a speech at The Memorial Church and a tree-planting ceremony in Harvard Yard. He has cultivated a relationship with Harvard because of a perception that many the nation’s future leaders study there.

During this visit to Boston — the Dalai Lama’s sixth trip to the region — he will also dedicate a new ethics center, named after him, at MIT; will discuss the relationship between meditation and psychotherapy at a Harvard Medical School-sponsored panel discussion; and will host two large public events, including an introductory course in Buddhism, that are expected to be attended by as many as 13,000 people on Saturday at Gillette Stadium.

“I doubt there is a single Tibetan in Boston who won’t be there — this is a huge deal for Tibetans to see His Holiness,” said Dhondup Phunkhang, a spokesman for the local Tibetan community, which numbers about 600. “Tibetans in Tibet risk their lives to see him, so of course we who live in a free country should go.”

At yesterday’s news conference, the Dalai Lama, asked whether, after 50 years with no success in his quest to win greater autonomy for Tibet, there is any reason for hope for the Tibetan cause, acknowledged that, “if we look at issues locally, then, it is almost hopeless.” However, he said, “if you look from a wider perspective, there is real hope.”

He offered several reasons for hope, including “Tibetan spirit,” which, he said, “remains very strong” despite the passing of the generation that remembers the Tibetan uprising of 1959. He also cited “big change” in China, calling China’s ruling party “a Communist party without Communist ideology” and labeling it as “capitalist-authoritarian-communist, something like that.”

He then offered a quick review of six decades of post-revolutionary Chinese history, suggesting that the priorities of the Chinese government have changed over time, and that “this shows the Communist leadership have ability to act according to new reality.”

“Their ambition is to become superpower,” he said. “It is right. It is deserved. [But] what is lacking is moral authority. So in order to carry more effective rule on this planet, China needs to get the world’s trust, respect. Without that, it’s difficult.”

The Dalai Lama said several times that his quarrel is with the Chinese government, not the Chinese people.

“We are not anti-Chinese,” he said. And he said he was pleased that several hundred Chinese writers penned articles critical of China after last year’s arrests of Tibetan protesters.

“These are positive signs,” he said. “I feel more optimistic.”

As for whether he will ever see Tibet again, the Dalai Lama said, “Oh, yes.”

China at the Wheel of the World: Sissy or Superpower?

2009-05-04T10:59:00.003+05:30

April 30, 2009, 2:10 PM
By Thomas P.M. Barnett
http://www.esquire.com/the-side/war-room/china-government-043009

The Chinese may be helping the States, but can they help themselves? The view from Beijing is a tea party hell-bent on global leadership, but if the government can't give up its moribund socialist movement, America might be riding solo well after Obama.

Chinese president Hu Jintao (left) acts nice, but will he play nice?

[Ed. Note: Welcome to "The World War Room," contributing editor and global-security expert Thomas P.M. Barnett's weekly column for Esquire.com. Read his breakdown of Robert Gates and Iran, then subscribe to Esquire's RSS feed for in-depth analysis on a new hotspot every Thursday.]

BEIJING — China is in a foul mood, according to the appropriately titled Unhappy China, a white-hot bestseller that is as controversial here as I've found it to be accurate in a week-long canvassing of this country's increasingly important growing pains. It's a collection of essays from five overtly nationalist writers who want China to stand up and assume the global leadership that, in their opinion, naturally falls to their country once America's profound bankruptcy has been revealed. The book has triggered an intense debate across China's vast sea of netizens, with the bulk of commentary as scathingly critical of the authors' long-term vision of China's superpower-dom as the book is of American leadership.

Taken as a whole, one can easily get the impression that China is deeply distressed by Team USA's recent streak as globalization's guns-a-blazing Leviathan, but equally reluctant to replace. Having survived Mao Zedong's murderous insanities, China's version of Boomers are truly careful what they wish for.

But if the Chinese are unhappy with America's government, there's even more dissatisfaction with their own. Between the milk scandal, a poor response to the massive Sichuan quake, and pervasive corruption of officials, China's ruling capitalist party finds itself wading nervously through a series of anniversaries: twenty years of Tiananmen Square memories, thirty since Deng Xiaoping's world-shaking reforms, and the sixty for the People's Republic itself.
With that kind of ideological crossroads, it's little wonder that China's confused about what it wants to be when it's all grown-up.

Still, some of this anger from the Chinese is rather petty: The Olympics were a massive coming-out party last year, and not everyone on the planet gave the regime a thumbs-up, being so rude as to complain about situations like Tibet, Darfur, and Myanmar. But if China's going to get all pissy over some Hollywood blowback, then how's it going to handle the kind of widespread enmity that comes with being king of the hill? Being a superpower ain't for sissies.

It's almost as if Chinese people expect the world to withhold its political opinions in the same manner as they're commanded by the Party. Then again, maybe that's why Unhappy China has triggered such a cathartic social debate. With President Hu Jintao standing front and center at G-20 photo-ops and Premier Wen Jiabao publicly calling out America for sabotaging the global economy, why should China take any of this sanctimonious guff from the West?

Unprepared for Takeover, In Need of a Makeover
Honestly, I agree with Unhappy China's primary prescriptions: China needs to lead the world in discovering new ways to use natural resources more intelligently (necessity being the mother of invention), and step up to some serious global policing (how about some Asian blood for Asian oil?), and navigate its way toward true democracy (Deng's own long-term prediction).

If getting mad at America is what it takes to fire up the Chinese people, that just proves a little social anger goes a long way to push governments for better answers. So bring on da' noise (populism) if you wanna bring on da' funk (progressivism). And then get yourself a bevy of Teddy Roosevelts, Upton Sinclairs, and suitably self-righteous civic groups to drive the much-needed makeover.

Right now China and globalization at large are suffering from the same growing pains that plagued "rising" America in the latter decades of the 19th century: too much income inequality, too much despoiling of the commons, too little regulation of a rapacious capitalism desperately in need of taming. So I might ask, If not China, then who? And if not now, then when? Europe's too busy getting old, and America's too busy paying off its second mortgage (plus Afghanistan).
Speaking of Hu and Wen, my sense is that this global crisis caught China's tight-lipped leadership about a decade too early. Beijing's current ruling generation consists of homebodies who never took their junior years abroad. The next generations, teed-up for rule in 2012 and 2022 respectively, earned plenty of graduate degrees from the West's top universities. But today's leaders were trapped at a young age by the Cultural Revolution — a formative experience that left them risk-averse.

So just when this financial meltdown tempts China to grab globalization's steering wheel, we get guys whose entire lives prepared them to pull the parking brake and little else.

Heads in the Sand, Missed Chances for the Future
I've spent the past couple days lecturing at China's version of Harvard — Beijing's prestigious Tsinghua University, where I found no shortage of best-and-brightest material among the school's small army of Ph.D. candidates in International Relations. There is a glorious naïveté about these young students, none of whom can remember a time when China wasn't on the rise. They truly believe that if we all just play nice with one another, there'll be nothing to kill for, nothing to die for, and no extremists either.

I felt like such a cynic, then, telling them that China is better off sticking with the whole "peaceful rise" mantra and leaving the Leviathan work to a greater power. Unless, of course, they could foresee a day when the People's Liberation Army leads the U.N.-sanctioned coalition force into some shoot-'em-up with seriously bad actors.

Moreover, I told them that China can't possibly lead the world until it evolves past single-party rule. As smart and as sophisticated as the upcoming generations of Chinese leaders are, they'll never be able to match America's tolerance for strategic risk — the essence of genuine leadership. The United States has the political confidence to lead because, in the event of great failure, it can change ruling parties with a lag time that's four years at worse and sometimes as quick as two. There is no "throw-the-bums-out" option in China, and when face cannot be lost, it'll remain masked by diplomacy.

And that's what I mean by history catching China too early: Leadership here is still based on authority rather than legitimacy — it's not about how you gained power that counts but how you wield it. Beijing's bosses have long based their authority on being able to deliver strong economic growth, the implied grand strategy being nothing more than restoring China to its rightful place in the world.

But like the dog chasing the car and eventually acquiring its target, China has little idea of what comes next.

Instead, China purposefully dithers when it could be decisive. Afraid of arousing America's lingering suspicions but too proud to be its junior partner, China has avoided comprehensive strategic cooperation by insisting that the Taiwan issue "must be settled," as if Hillary Clinton could snap her fingers and make that happen. Yet China's military build-up remains based primarily around this scenario, leaving the force rather useless for actual global policing.
Imagine an American political system obsessed with reunification with Cuba, or a U.S. military designed primarily for that conflict scenario. Would anybody in the world take us seriously as a global superpower?

What's most telling is China's avoidance of any real regional leadership on North Korea: China's party chiefs can't bear the thought that Kim's fall would reflect badly on their perceived legitimacy as a socialist state, and so they prop up his criminal regime while facetiously mumbling about "peaceful resolution."

My advice, again: give Washington a call when you're serious about leading the world instead of the moribund world socialist movement. Hell, on the basis of Medicare and Social Security alone, I'd give the U.S. a higher score than China on the socialism scale.

On the Bright Side, a Chance to Lead
Nonetheless, I've come away deeply impressed with Tsinghua's students and faculty. They strike me as deeply aware of China's many strengths and weaknesses, and completely committed to building not just a better China but even a better world.

And, no, I ultimately don't want to disabuse these bright minds of the notion that trade and connectivity and globalization are all pacifying and therefore good. Because they are. I just want them to understand that something that good is worth defending with more than just words.
So I remain optimistic about China's future, and this trip has only reinforced my confidence. The country and government and people are all strenuously progressing through a long list of social and economic transformations at a stunningly fast rate. Yes, with that magnitude of change comes plenty of social friction, but when those are eventually resolved with more competitive domestic politics, I fully expect China will become happier with itself and the world — and thus capable of truly visionary global leadership.

I just hope China hurries up and gets its act together, because our superpower — even after these first hundred days — could use some competition.

Esquire contributing editor Thomas P.M. Barnett is the author of Great Powers: America and the World After Bush.

Dalai Lama meets Chinese intellectuals, students at Harvard

2009-05-02T12:42:00.000+05:30

Phayul[Saturday, May 02, 2009 10:48]
by Bhuchung D Sonam

Boston, Massachusetts: At a meeting with a group comprised of a large number of Chinese intellectuals and students, His Holiness the Dalai Lama said that it’s crucial and important for Tibetan and Chinese peoples to set up friendship societies as is being done in some places in Australia.

According to the Tibetan leader, 1989 events of Tiananmen Square was a staring point, which made it easier for the Tibetans to reach out to Chinese students who were forced into exile. The Chinese students protesters who came out of China underwent similar experience as the Tibetans and hence a mutual solidarity was formed.

"We are elder refugees and they are younger refugees," said the Dalai Lama. A Harvard-Yenching Professor of Chinese History and Philosophy chaired the meeting, during which many Chinese students expressed their opinions about various aspects of the Tibetan issue including the Chinese Government's accusation against the Dalai Lama and western media's portrayal of Tibet-China problem.

The Dalai Lama said trust is "the key factor" for the harmonious society as promoted by Hu Jintao to succeed. However, the 73-year-old Nobel laureate said that the present Chinese policies are counter-productive to building such a society.

While responding to a series of questions His Holiness gave a broad picture of the Sino-Tibetan talks and his logics behind seeking genuine autonomy for the whole of Tibet comprising the three traditional provinces.

The meeting was co-sponsored by Harvard Education School, Harvard Divinity School and Harvard Medical School Department of Continuing Education.

A Manifesto on Freedom Sets China’s Persecution Machinery in Motion

2009-05-02T12:37:00.002+05:30

New York Times [Friday, May 01, 2009 15:36]
By MICHAEL WINES

BEIJING — Behind the west Beijing apartment building where Liu Xia keeps a fifth-floor flat, the police have built a guardhouse. Its purpose is not to protect Ms. Liu, who seeks no safeguarding. The house is for the guards who watch her.

Inside, they take notes to record her comings and goings. When she ventures out, a guard picks up the phone. Soon, a sedan with darkened windows carrying a man with a telephoto-lens camera is trailing her.

During a recent chat in a nearby teahouse, Ms. Liu wondered aloud why she unnerves China’s rulers enough to merit her own guardhouse. She is not active in politics, she said, and does not even use a computer. “I take photos, paint paintings, write poems, read books, cook food,” she said with a mirthless laugh. “And drink.”But, of course, she knows why. She is married to Liu Xiaobo, a writer, philosopher and democracy advocate. On Dec. 10, Mr. Liu and 302 others issued a manifesto, called Charter 08, that urged China’s Communist Party to abandon monopoly rule and establish a multiparty system of government.

The police seized Mr. Liu two days before Charter 08 was released. He has been locked ever since in a windowless room about an hour’s drive north of central Beijing. He is denied access to lawyers, to pen and paper and, except for two brief visits, to his wife.

He is allowed to ask for books. His latest request was for the works of Kafka.Perhaps Mr. Liu sees himself in Gregor Samsa, the Kafka protagonist who, transformed into a giant pest, is locked in a room in the hope that “out of sight” will become “out of mind.”

But his captors’ plight is also surreal. Signed by leading intellectuals, including some with links to the Communist Party, Charter 08 has been called the most important political statement since the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests.Increasingly, Liu Xiaobo is no ordinary dissident, but an international cause. And the crackdown on him and his wife shows signs of becoming a public-relations dilemma for Chinese leaders.

“If they don’t suppress this matter, its influence will keep growing,” said Zhang Zuhua, a political theorist who helped Mr. Liu and others draft the charter. “But the more they suppress it, the more its influence will grow.”Mr. Zhang also has a police guard, and a sedan that follows him. He has been warned that he is under investigation and should not make political waves.

Charter 08 concerns party rulers, some contend, because it posits an alternative to their monopoly just as China is integrating with an overwhelmingly democratic world.Among the 20 largest economies, China is alone in enshrining single-party rule in its Constitution. Russia and China both persecute political opponents. But only China is visibly agitated by Charter 08’s premises: that people should elect their leaders, divide power among government’s branches and make the military answerable to civilians.

“Freedom is at the core of universal human values,” the charter states. “The government exists for the protection of the human rights of its citizens.” And, it states, “The most fundamental principles of democracy are that the people are sovereign, and the people select their government.”

Mr. Liu and Mr. Zhang first drafted those phrases more than three years ago with about eight other friends. Their inspirations, Mr. Zhang said in an interview, were the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, France’s 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and Taiwan’s 1980s democracy movement.

Mr. Zhang says their goals are evolutionary, not revolutionary. Most of the signers witnessed the destruction of China’s last pro-democracy movement in Tiananmen Square in 1989; some, including Mr. Liu, were participants in that movement. “Twenty years later,” Mr. Zhang said, “we all think that China will head toward liberal democracy eventually. But the problem is that we cannot use such sacrificial means again. So how to find a better way toward democratization that’s more suitable to China’s situation?

“People must come up with a constructive view. That’s the main idea behind Charter 08,” he said.Such manifestos are hardly new. In December 1978, the Fifth Modernization, a proposed liberalization of the political system to go with China’s other moves toward modernity, was posted on Beijing’s Democracy Wall — and its author was handed a 15-year prison sentence. Evidence of the document was wiped from Chinese history.

Whether Charter 08 and Mr. Liu will meet similar fates remains unclear. Thirty years later, party leaders appear equally determined to retain power, but more cautious about how.Censors have deleted Charter 08 from Chinese-language Internet pages and chat rooms, and some Web sites publishing pro-charter bloggers have been shut down. Without mentioning the charter, party leaders have railed against multiparty democracy and separation of powers as Western-imposed “erroneous ideological interferences.”

Many of the charter’s original signers have been interrogated; some have lost prominent positions or, in one case, been transferred from Beijing to remotest western China.Mr. Liu, the only signer to be detained, is officially under “residential surveillance,” suspected of inciting subversion. But his secret confinement, lacking even a written explanation, meets no legal standard, his lawyer said.

Mr. Zhang says the aim of the authorities is to smother the charter with a minimum of force and international outcry. “They make a very precise calculation,” he said. “If they can manage to suppress this matter by arresting only Liu Xiaobo, then that’s the best deal for them.”

Yet Charter 08 continues, slowly, to gain adherents. Mr. Zhang says considerably more than 8,000 Chinese citizens have joined the original 303 signers, representing a swath of society well outside the clique of political dissidents. Another tranche of signatures is imminent.

In Beijing, the police recently searched the flat of a man who printed T-shirts with Mr. Liu’s face on the front and “Charter 08” on the back. In Nanying, a central city of about a million, an oil refinery worker named Liu Linna handed out perhaps 100 copies of the charter on April 4 before the police seized her.

“Seeing how severely Charter 08 was blocked on the Internet, I could not stand it,” she said. “So I decided, if I can’t talk about it on the Web, then I must spread the word on the streets.”

Liu Xia says her husband passes his time in detention watching sports — his captors recently installed a television — and lying in bed, planning his legal defense. It is a familiar role. Mr. Liu spent two years in prison after the 1989 Tiananmen protests, and three years in a labor camp starting in 1996 for challenging single-party rule and advocating negotiations with the Dalai Lama over Tibet.

Liu Xia and Mr. Zhang meet weekly to play badminton. Their sedans follow them to the game and wait outside the court until they have finished. Then the automobiles follow them home.Jonathan Ansfield contributed reporting.

Dalai Lama part of solution for China

2009-05-02T10:30:00.002+05:30

Sat, May 02, 2009AFP
by Shaun Tandon
http://news.asiaone.com/News/Latest%2BNews/Asia/Story/A1Story20090502-138758.html

WASHINGTON, US - China should see the Dalai Lama as "part of the solution" on Tibet instead of trying to isolate him, US President Barack Obama's top Asia adviser said.

Jeff Bader, senior director for Asia on the White House's National Security Council, told the Committee of 100, a Chinese-American group, that it should use its influence in Beijing to encourage a different view of the Dalai Lama.

"I hope that you will use that credibility and those relationships to help persuade Chinese officials that the Dalai Lama is not part of their problem but rather part of the solution to the situation in Tibet," Bader said.

Beijing brands the Dalai Lama a separatist and has stepped up pressure on world leaders, including Obama, not to meet with him. The Buddhist leader fled to India 50 years ago as China crushed an abortive uprising in Tibet.

The Dalai Lama, an advocate of non-violence, says he is only seeking greater rights for Tibetans under Chinese rule. The Nobel Peace laureate is currently touring the United States, but he does not plan to visit Washington.

Bader acknowledged that human rights have become an irritant in US-China relations -- "unsurprisingly, because China's human rights record, as we know, is poor."

But he said Obama believed the most effective way to persuade China was to lead by example, citing the president's decision to shut down the widely condemned "war on terror" detention camp in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

"President Obama does not believe in lecturing. He believes in leading by example, not finger-pointing," Bader said.

Obama has called for a broader relationship with China that includes cooperation on pressing global issues such as climate change and the economic crisis. The US leader is due to visit China later this year.

"President Obama, with his unique gifts in communication and popularity, will be looking for ways to reach out to Chinese audiences and connect," Bader said.

Before his appointment, Bader served at the Brookings Institution think-tank where he led a project encouraging Chinese academics to make contact with the Dalai Lama. He said he was pleasantly surprised at the response.

"It suggested to me that there is an openness to discussion among non-official Chinese on this subject and I hope that one of these days officials will catch up," Bader said.

But Ken Lieberthal, who held Bader's position at the end of Bill Clinton's presidency, said there was a "total disconnect" between the way the US public and the Chinese government viewed the Dalai Lama.

"So long as the Chinese refuse to understand that to most of the world this is a revered religious figure -- someone who has extraordinary ethics and is deserving of great respect ... I don't see a good future here," Lieberthal told the same forum.

"Once he passes from the scene, if there has been no progress, I think the next generation of Tibetans have the possibility to be China's worst nightmare," he said.

The Dalai Lama, 73, has frequently said he wants to retire but has kept a frenetic travel schedule. His current visit to the United States has included serving food to the homeless in San Francisco and opening an ethics center named after him at the prestigious Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

He is expected to return to the United States in October, when he hopes to meet with Obama.
Asked this week in Boston whether he expected to return to Tibet, the Dalai Lama said with a smile: "Oh yes, every Tibetan feels like that."

"If the leadership in Beijing thinks in a more wider way ... within a few days can solve," he said in English. --AFP

A Reader on Tibet

2009-05-01T15:26:00.002+05:30

4/03/2009
http://thechinabeat.blogspot.com/2009/04/reader-on-tibet.html

Tibet has been much in the news the past few weeks, as China attempted to divert attention from the anniversary of last year's riots and protests and reports leaked out of arrests and crackdowns in Tibet. Here are a few of the pieces from this week that we recommend.

In the current issue of The New York Review of Books, Pico Iyer writes about the Dalai Lama’s sinking faith in the Chinese leadership’s desire to resolve the situation in Tibet. Iyer points to the current situation in Tibet as the reason why—the title of his piece is “A Hell on Earth”:

"The situation inside Tibet is almost like a military occupation," I heard the Dalai Lama tell an interviewer last November, when I spent a week traveling with him across Japan. "Everywhere. Everywhere, fear, terror. I cannot remain indifferent." Just moments before, with equal directness and urgency, he had said, "I have to accept failure. In terms of the Chinese government becoming more lenient [in Chinese-occupied Tibet], my policy has failed. We have to accept reality."

Accepting reality—first investigating it clearly, and then seeing what can be done with it—is for him a central principle, and now he was about to convene a meeting of Tibetans in his exile home, in Dharamsala, India, and then another, in Delhi, of foreign supporters of Tibet, to discuss alternative approaches to relieving the ever more brutal fifty-year-long suppression of Tibet by Beijing. "This ancient nation with its own unique cultural heritage is dying," he said later the same day. "The situation inside Tibet is almost something like a death sentence."…

Over the decades I've known him, the Dalai Lama has always been adept at pointing out, logically, how Tibet's interests and China's converge—bringing geopolitics and Buddhist principles together, in effect—and at arguing, syllogistically, for how the very notion of enmity is not only a projection, nearly always, but, in today's globally interconnected world, an anachronism. But now, with the skill of one trained for decades in dialectics and personally familiar with the last few generations of Chinese history, he seems more and more to be holding the Chinese government up against its own principles. "Chairman Mao, when I was in Peking, said, 'The Communist Party must welcome criticism. Self-criticism as well as criticism from others,'" he noted pointedly in Tokyo. But now the Party seemed to be all mouth and no ears. Deng Xiaoping, he reminded another audience, always stressed "seeking truth from facts," the very empiricism the Dalai Lama would love to see more thoroughly deployed. "When President Hu Jintao talks of a 'Harmonious Society,' I am a comrade of his," he told the Chinese scholars. "Even today I have points of agreement with Marxist thought."

His argument, unexpectedly, was that Communists in China today are not Communist enough, as they ignore Marx's ideas of ethics and equality (which the Dalai Lama has long admired) and move ever further from the purity and self-sacrifice of their early years. "Mao Zedong was a true idealist, a real comrade, initially," he told the Chinese students. "But in '56, '57, that disappeared." The result, he said, was that "the Communist Party in China today is something very special; it is a Communist Party without Communist ideology." At one point, he even said to his Chinese listeners, "Maybe in some ways I'm more 'red' inside than the Chinese leadership!"

The article is worth reading in full for its cogent assessment of the limited options for Tibet’s future, limitations that result not only from Chinese oppression but also from choices by the Tibetan people.Those in Southern California may be interested to see Pico Iyer speak at CSULB on April 16.Earlier this week, Evan Osnos discussed “Serfs’ Emancipation Day” (the CCP’s response to last March’s riots) at his blog, noting the similarities between China’s rhetoric on Tibet past and present:

Watching the Chinese government, this week, inaugurate “Serfs’ Emancipation Day,” to mark the fiftieth anniversary of Beijing’s direct rule of Tibet, I couldn’t help but notice how little of the Party’s message has changed since the 1963 film “Serfs,” a classic from the heyday of Party cinema…Are Beijing imagemakers ideologically intoxicated enough that they don’t see how the West interprets an event like this? Not that simple. The central government encompasses a mix of real sophistication and demagoguery, and my guess is that many urbane diplomats at the Foreign Ministry were cringing at the sight of the event…But, ultimately, they don’t hold sway in China, so the celebrations continued.A BBC report on Tuesday discussed the emerging public profile of the Chinese-selected Panchen Lama and China’s placement of him as a China-positive representative for the Tibetan people:

Although he is only 19, the Panchen Lama has already stepped onto the public stage to praise the Chinese Communist Party.Tibet expert Professor Robert Barnett, of New York's Columbia University, says this is part of China's efforts to undermine the appeal of the Dalai Lama, the spiritual head of Tibetan Buddhism."He will never really replace the Dalai Lama, but his role confuses the picture and can gradually be used to weaken the Dalai Lama's standing," he said."I think [China's] Panchen Lama is being built up very gradually as a public spokesman within the Tibetan Buddhist world."An excerpt from a piece by Elliot Sperling is up at the Far Eastern Economic Review website (the full article will appear in April’s print version), arguing that though China has painted a picture of a historically inequitable and cruel Tibet, actually the post-1949 years have been much harder on Tibetans:

When the Dalai Lama’s first representatives returned to tour Tibet in 1979 cadres in Lhasa, believing their own propaganda, lectured the city’s residents about not venting anger at the visiting representatives of the cruel feudal past. What actually transpired was caught on film by the delegation and is still striking to watch: thousands of Tibetans descended on them in the center of Lhasa, recounting amidst tears how awful their lives had become in the intervening 20 years. These scenes stunned China’s leadership and for some, at least, made clear the depths to which Tibetan society had sunk since the era of “Feudal Serfdom.”It’s hardly likely that most Tibetans, after all these decades, are ready to buy into the government-enforced description of their past; such ham-handed actions may well make many view the past as far rosier than it actually was. It is also unlikely to win over large foreign audiences beyond those who already are, or would like to be, convinced. Most likely, it will simply reinforce a Chinese sense of a mission civilatrice in Tibet. The colonial thinking and arrogance inherent in such missions when entertained by European powers in the past is obvious. And it is precisely the kind of attitude that will likely exacerbate friction in Tibet and—justifiably—lead Tibetans to view China’s presence in their land as of a sort with the colonialism of other nations.Though much of the coverage of Tibet in the media in past weeks has focused on politics, a few journalists took time out to look at Tibetan culture as well. Among them, those at The New York Times, who wrote about the growing market for Tibetan religious paintings or thangkas:

The artists here practice the Rebkong style of thangka painting that has flourished since the 17th century. Thangkas from this part of northwestern Qinghai Province are commissioned by monasteries as far away as Lhasa, the Tibetan capital. In recent years, thangkas have gained a following among some ethnic Han Chinese, and individual collectors from Chinese cities and foreign countries have driven up the prices. (For his painting of Chenresig, Lobsang was asking 3,600 yuan, or about $530, a fortune for most Tibetans.)

The commercialization will “drive thangkas far from their origins, from their use as religious objects,” said Zhang Yasha, a teacher of fine arts at the Minzu University of China who specializes in Tibet. “We see more young people learning the art because it’s lucrative.”

Tibet experiencing higher temperature

2009-05-01T10:34:00.000+05:30

29 Apr 2009, 2018 hrs IST, PTI
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Health--Science/Earth/Tibet-experiencing-higher-temperature/articleshow/4464685.cms

BEIJING: Hit by global warming, excessive grazing and human activities, temperature in Tibet has risen continuously over the past 48 years, triggering snow melting, glacial shrinking and rising water levels in the fragile Himalayan region.

The study, based on data from 38 weather stations under the Tibet Autonomous Regional Meteorological Bureau, indicated that the average temperature in the landlocked region rose 0.32 degree Celsius every 10 years between 1961 to 2008.

In China, average temperatures rose 0.05 degree Celsius to 0.08 degree Celsius every decade, while the global level was 0.2 degree Celsius, a senior meteorologist with the bureau, Du Jun said.

Lhasa, the Tibetan capital, and the cities of Tsedang and Shiagatse experienced the sharpest rise of more than 0.3 degree Celsius every decade.

Tibet is one of the most sensitive areas to climate change, Du was quoted as saying by Xinhua news agency. The temperature change in Tibet was a direct effect of global warming, he said, which triggered snow melting, glacial shrinking and rising water levels.

He said that other phenomena included grassland degradation, more plant diseases and insect pests, a reduction in bio-diversity and higher risks of disasters.

DIALOGUE WITH DALAI LAMA ALONE CAN DELIVER LASTING PEACE

2009-05-01T10:03:00.003+05:30

China’s Colonial ‘March’ in Tibet
DIALOGUE WITH DALAI LAMA ALONE
CAN DELIVER LASTING PEACE
- Vijay Kranti
“BORDER AFFAIRS” (Jan-March 2009 issue)
Released on 14th April, 2009

Year 2009 has very special significance in the history of today’s People’s Republic of China (PRC). In October this year the Communist rulers of Beijing will celebrate the 60th anniversary of their coming to power and the founding of PRC. This year also marks the 60th anniversary of People Liberation Army’s entry into Tibet with the aim of ‘liberating’ and assimilating her back into ‘Great Motherland’ after over a century of “imperialists’ deceptions”. While Dalai Lama, the exiled ruler of Tibet, completes 50 years of his exile and his refugee compatriots have observed the 50th anniversary of Tibetan people’s uprising against the occupying PLA on March 10, Beijing rulers have decided to ‘celebrate’ the escape of Dalai Lama to exile. March 28, when Dalai Lama escaped to India, has been designated as the ‘Serf Emancipation Day’ and a national holiday. According to the report submitted by the International Commission of Jurists in 1960 to the Secretary General of United Nations, it was in this very fortnight (from March 10 to 28) when the PLA gunned down more than 80000 such Tibetan ‘serfs’ in Lhasa and other parts of Tibet who rose up against the occupation of Tibet by the PLA.

This year President Hu Jin Tao too has good reasons to celebrate the 20th anniversary of imposition of Martial Law in Tibet that paved the way to his current supreme position. As the Governor of Tibet he had effectively used tanks and armoured vehicles in Lhasa in March 1989 to crush the Tibetan people’s second major uprising against the Chinese colonial rule on Tibet after 1959. It was Hu’s this very ‘Lhasa Model’ which Beijing rulers emulated to save their control on China three months later on June 4 in the wake of an unprecedented upsurge of China’s democratic youths at Tien Anmen Square in Beijing against the Communist Party’s one party rule. No wonder, the wonderful efficacy of Hu’s Lhasa Model brought to light Comrade Hu’s special talents as a ‘disciplinarian’. It made him stand out of the crowd of comrades and subsequently lead to his induction into the inner power circle of the Party.

However, in addition to this spate of anniversaries at hand, the Chinese leadership has good reasons to peacefully revisit some major issues this year that stare into eyes of today’s PRC, but had to be kept on the backburner due to the government’s six year long focus on Beijing Olympics. One such issue is corruption that has seeped too deep into the system and acquired too serious dimensions to ignore any more. Another is finding some long lasting solutions to the unending resistance of PRC’s two most difficult colonies namely Tibet and East Turkistan (Xinjiang). Third one, rising unemployment and the resultant socio-political unease, may be a bit old problem, but has gained new dimensions for the Chinese leadership in the wake of a perpetually worsening world economy and its serious impact on China’s work force.

Present review is focused at the Tibetan issue that has come to stay as a major source of political and moral embarrassment to China’s communist rulers on the national as well as international fronts. An unending resistance from Tibetan population inside occupied Tibet for over half a century has seriously damaged PRC leaders credibility as well as their control over this colony. In the wake of recent breakdown of dialogue between Beijing and Dalai Lama’s Dharamsala based ‘Tibetan government in exile’ (TGIE), we shall review what stands between the two sides and if there is still some hope and space left for a peaceful and mutually acceptable solution.

HISTORY OF DIALOGUE
Historically speaking, the dialogue process between the Chinese and Tibetan governments started in 1950 after the just-found PRC’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attacked and occupied big chunks of Tibet’s Eastern provinces of Kham and Amdo. In the wake of this national emergency, the caretaker council of regents of Tibetan government forced the 16-year old Dalai Lama to take over the reigns of the state two years ahead of due time. In the wake of threats from Beijing, Dalai Lama was shifted to a safer place Dromo in southern Tibet near Indian borders.

In this backdrop of events the Chinese government invited the Tibetan government to send a delegation to Beijing for mutual consultation in early months of 1951. Beijing surprised the boy Dalai Lama and his colleagues in the Tibetan government when Radio Beijing broke the news of ‘peaceful liberation’ of Tibet through a ‘17-Point Agreement’ between the two sides on May 23, 1951.

Recalling those moments in his autobiography ‘Freedom in Exile’, Dalai Lama writes, “….Every evening I would listen to the Tibetan language broadcasts of Radio Peking…… However, one evening, as I sat alone, there was a very different sort of program. A harsh, crackling voice announced that a ‘Seventeen-Point Agreement’ for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet had that day been signed by representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and what they called the ‘Local Government’ of Tibet. I could not believe my ears. I wanted to rush out and call everybody in, but I sat transfixed……. What was most alarming, however, was that Ngabo* had not been empowered to sign anything on my behalf, only to negotiate. I had kept the seals of state with me at Dromo to ensure that he could not. So he must have been coerced….”. Later it became clear that Beijing forced the Tibetan group leader to sign an already prepared ‘agreement’ under a seal of Tibetan government that was manufactured by Beijing especially in a hurry for this purpose. *(Ngabo Ngawang Jigme : a junior minister and leader of Tibetan delegation. He was the Governor of Kham provice when China’s PLA attacked and defeated Tibetan army to occupy Kham in 1950.)

In the recorded history of China and Tibet it was second time that an ‘agreement’ based on a ‘dialogue’ was being claimed to have been ‘signed’. The first recorded treaty dates back to 821-822 AD which was signed between a powerful Tibetan king Trisong Dretsen and the Chinese king Hwangti (Wen We Hsiao-te Hwang-ti). This treaty remains engraved in Tibetan and Chinese languages on two identical stone pillars, one installed in Tibetan capital Lhasa and other in China. Opening with the declaration of an ‘alliance’ between the two kingdoms, this treaty clearly defines independent character of the two countries and calls for conditions that ensure that ‘Tibetans shall be happy in the land of Tibet, and the Chinese in the land of China’ in future. The operative sections read:
“The Great King of Tibet, the Miraculous Divine Lord, and the Great King of China, the Chinese Ruler Hwang-ti being in the relationship of nephew and uncle, have confirmed together for the alliance of their kingdoms…..Tibet and China shall abide by the frontiers of which they are now in occupation. All to the east is the country of Great China; and all to the west is, without question, the country of Great Tibet. Henceforth on neither side shall there be waging of war nor seizing of territory….. According to the old custom, horses shall be changed at the foot of the Chiang Chun pass, the frontier between Tibet and China. At the Suiyung barrier the Chinese shall meet Tibetan envoys and provide them with all facilities from there onwards…… Between the two countries no smoke nor dust shall be seen. There shall be no sudden alarms and the very word ‘enemy’ shall not be spoken…… This solemn agreement has established a great epoch when Tibetans shall be happy in the land of Tibet, and the Chinese in the land of China…. If the parties do not act in accordance with this agreement or if they violate it, which ever it be, Tibet or China, nothing that the other party may do by way of retaliation shall be considered a breach of the treaty on their part……”

17-POINT AGREEMENT
The language of the 17-Point ‘agreement’, though claimed by China to be the outcome of a ‘dialogue’ between the two sides, gives away the feeling that it was outright a Chinese draft that was simply pushed through the Tibetan government’s throat. Although the title “The Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet On Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” presumes Beijing’s unquestionable authority as the ‘Central’ government over Tibet as just a ‘local government’, yet the very opening paragraph of the main statement admits Tibet’s status as a separate entity where, for whatever reasons, China did not enjoy any effective control for “over the last hundred years and more”.

Most of its clauses simply testify to the status of the Tibetan government, led by Dalai Lama, as an independent entity until the day China decided to walk in. Seeking support of Tibetans on so many counts, the ‘agreement’ also exposed the status of invading Chinese army as ‘outsiders’. For example, the very first point of the ‘agreement’ starts with calling upon the Tibetan people to ‘drive out’ some imaginary ‘imperialist aggressive forces’ from Tibet and expects that the Tibetan people “shall return to the big family of the motherland--the People's Republic of China.”
The second point, which reads: “The Local Government of Tibet shall actively assist the People's Liberation Army to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defences,” too exposes what level of control the ‘Central Government’ or its army enjoyed in Tibet. This surely does not jell favourably with the present PRC leadership’s claims that ‘historically Tibet has been an inalienable part of China’.

While assuring the people of Tibet that they “have the right of exercising national regional autonomy” (Point-3) the same clause takes it back simultaneously through the rider which clarifies that this autonomy would operate “under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government.”

The ‘agreement’ made many other promises too to the Tibetans which included “not (to) alter the existing political system”, especially the “established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama” (Pt-4); freedom of religious belief (Pt-7); development of Tibetan language (Pt-9); and “no compulsions” on reforms on the part of the ‘Central Authorities’ (Pt-11). The ‘agreement’ even went to the extent of assuring the Tibetans that the funds for the Chinese Army and administration would be provided by the ‘Central People’s Government’ (Pt-16) and that “the PLA entering Tibet … will also be fair in all buying and selling and will not arbitrarily take even a needle or a thread from the people.” (Pt-13).

In lieu of all these ‘concessions’, the ‘agreement’ also announced the privileges which China was going to enjoy in Tibet. These included the predominance of PLA through dissolution of Tibetan troupes as “Tibetan troops will be reorganised step by step into the People's Liberation Army” (Pt-8); and an end to all ties of Tibetan government with the outer world as PRC decided to take charge of ‘all external affairs of the area of Tibet” (Pt-14);

As expected, the civilised world took note of this forcible takeover of Tibet by PRC as yet another case of colonising a powerless country. But no government or international organisation like the erstwhile ‘UNO’, demonstrated the guts to challenge the government of China on this issue. Even a country like India, the most affected by this sudden change in the Asian map, chose to discourage the UNO from taking any steps against China on the basis of Chinese Premier Chou En-Lie’s personal assurances to her Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru, that PRC would honour the unique cultural identity of Tibet and Tibetan people. No wonder, this meek and indifferent international response only encouraged the PRC leaders to take their own course in occupied Tibet.

In next few years the much hyped 17-Point ‘agreement’ was more known for breach of most of the clauses than following its spirit or letters. The promises of autonomy were overturned as the control of political and administrative system shifted to the hands of communist cadres and PLA’s machinery, thus, leaving no scope for Dalai Lama to play any meaningful role. The sudden arrival of hundreds of thousands of PLA soldiers and cadres is a thinly populated Tibet pushed up food prices to unheard levels. Forced cultivation of wheat in place of traditional barley too led to unprecedented food shortages and food riots all over Tibet. The cadres’ intolerance for Tibetan religion forced closures of monasteries and monastic schools in favour of Chinese language schools. PLA’s armed attacks on monasteries forced the dominant community of monks and nuns to join the resistance movement which was already spreading across Tibet, especially in the eastern regions of Kham , Golok and Amdo.

Things came to a head in March 1959 when a 100,000-strong crowd of visiting pilgrims in Lhasa clashed with the PLA. Soon this clash morphed into a Tibetan uprising against the occupying Chinese army. What followed was the escape of Dalai Lama to exile in India and PLA killing over 80,000* Tibetans across Tibet in order to put a decisive end to the uprising.

BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN
The following two decades saw a completely closed and non-communicative PRC as far as Tibet was concerned. This was the period when Tibet witnessed the most intense and longest spell of political suppression and cultural destruction. Believing that religious faith and unique culture of Tibet were the only barriers holding the Tibetan masses back from assimilating into the socio-political system of ‘Motherland China’, the regional administrators of Tibet and communist party cadres did everything imaginable to destroy every visible symbol of Tibet’s religious, cultural, social and national personality. Far away from the eyes and physical control of central leadership in Beijing, remotely located Tibet faced the worst form of the Red Guards’ Cultural Revolution for a much longer time and with a far devastating impact.

Out of total population of about six million Tibetans, over a million died of unnatural reasons. These reasons included direct execution of citizens by the Public Security Bureau (PSB) for various ‘crimes’; torture in jails; public death sentences in humiliating ‘Thamzing’ (public street trials) sessions which became a part of daily indoctrination and cleansing of “peoples’ enemies” in towns and villages across PRC; PLA’s killing of rebellious Tibetans who took to armed resistance to the Chinese rule; and starvation due to perpetual food shortage caused by the state’s colonial policies in Tibet. Barring a very few (less than 10) among the 6259 monasteries and other religious centres, almost all were either closed, destroyed or taken over by the PLA and party to accommodate their soldiers, cadres and their animals (horses, mules and pigs). In the fateful days of Cultural Revolution, even a ‘crime’ like making ‘Bod-Chha’ (traditional Tibetan tea with yak butter and salt) was labelled as a ‘reactionary’ act, even ‘treason’, which could end up into public execution in a ‘Thamzing’ trial. In later years Communist Party leaders did admit and regretted these atrocities in Tibet, but also termed it as of ‘little consequence’ compared to what happened in mainland China during Cultural Revolution.

DENG OPENS THE DOOR
However, things started changing when Deng Xiaoping emerged on the scene with a brand new economic and political outlook. The Tibetan situation made him realise that attempts to win hearts through attack on faith and coercion had proved counter productive. He could see that Tibetan people’s faith in their exiled ruler and religious leader Dalai Lama had, rather increased during two decades of Tibetan occupation. His own pragmatic approach and PRC’s new interface with the civilised world made him understand that if handled properly, Dalai Lama could be made a part of the solution than treating him as ‘the problem’. It was at this stage that Chinese leadership started realising that Dalai Lama was a key that could unlock the Tibetan problem and, hence, deserved PRC’s special attention.

An extreme view that emerged from this thinking, and still dominates the minds of a section of Chinese leadership, is that the real problem is Dalai Lama and not the Tibetan people. Most of their policies emerge from the assumption that return of Dalai Lama to China on China’s terms will end the Tibetan problem or, in the absence of such an eventuality, the death of ageing Dalai Lama will automatically see the end to the Tibetan headache of PRC.

All this encouraged Deng to establish a dialogue with the exiled Dalai Lama. In early 1979 he sent a message to Dalai Lama in India through the latter’s elder brother Gyalo Thondup. A senior political functionary of China ’s government controlled news agency Xinhua, who personally knew Gyalo Thondup from their Hong Kong days, played a pivotal role in fixing his meeting with Deng in March 1979. To many Tibet observers, Beijing ’s choice of using Gyalo Thondup as its link to Dharamsala came as a surprise. For it was Gyalo Thondup who played a pivotal link between the American intelligence agency CIA and “Chu Shi Nga Druk” (meaning ‘Four Rivers, Six Ranges’), the fiery Tibetan guerrilla force that spearheaded the armed resistance against occupying Chinese forces inside Tibet. (In mid 1970s when USA ’s honeymoon with China overwhelmed its love affair with Tibet and its resistance movement, sudden withdrawal of CIA support to the guerrilla force made Beijing ’s job easier. Before Tibetans disbanded Chu Shi Nga Drug Beijing over ran its command centre in Mustang , Nepal and gunned down most of its leaders with active help of Nepalese Royal Army.)

Deng asked Thondup to communicate to Dalai Lama that "except independence, all other issues can be resolved through negotiations". This marked the opening of a new door between Beijing and Dharamsala, the seat of Dalai Lama and his Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGIE) in northern India . TGIE functions through a democratically elected Parliament and an impressive paraphernalia of ‘ministries’ and representative offices in over a dozen important countries.

HISTORIC APOLOGY
Even though these talks broke down in 1993 and Beijing-Dharamsala contacts remained almost snapped until 2002, the 1979-1993 period saw some significant developments in these ties. The hope of bringing back the Dalai Lama to the fold of ‘great motherland’ encouraged Beijing leaders to usher in some relief in the life of Tibetan masses inside Tibet. They adopted relatively more liberal policies inside Tibet thereby bringing some relief for Tibetans who have been used to seeing difficult days.

This welcome change provided some fresh breathing space to the Tibetan masses in matters like religious practice, social interaction and travel to other parts of Tibet and China. It was in this atmosphere that something unimaginable happened. Communist Party Secretary Hu Yaobang offered a public apology to the Tibetan people when he visited Lhasa in 1980. He termed the unfortunate happenings as, ‘excesses of some over enthusiastic party cadres’ in Tibet in the past.
FROM ‘RANGZEN’ TO ‘MIDDLE PATH’
However, it was much later that these liberal policies were condemned and reversed by the later regime of Hu Jintao in Tibet in the wake of Tibetan uprising in 1987 and 1989 and the Martial Law that followed. It was believed among the dominant section of the Communist Party that these relaxations gave Tibetan ‘reactionaries’ fresh opportunities to reorganise and rise against the government. But openness on the part of PRC had its demonstrable impact on Dalai Lama’s side too. It encouraged the Dalai Lama to publicly climb down from his people’s popular demand for ‘Rangzen’ (total independence) to a more liberal concept of ‘Middle Path’ that calls for just ‘genuine autonomy’ for Tibet within the political framework of PRC.

WAR OF WITS
However, what followed the opening of doors in 1979 between the two warring sides reads more like a war of wits. The PRC leaders remained focused on enhancing their physical grip on Tibet during this period and prolonged the dialogue process to buy more time to achieve their goals of population transfer to Tibet. Dalai Lama too made a few brilliant moves to make best of this Chinese enthusiasm about bringing him back to their fold. Following the open invitation from Deng’s government for a dialogue, the Dalai Lama went public to express his eagerness to visit Tibet provided he was convinced that conditions inside Tibet were normal and as good as the Chinese claimed. Biting the monk statesman’s bait, an overenthusiastic Beijing offered him an invitation to come, even if on a short visit ‘to see things with his own eyes’ and to ‘seek truth from facts’.

FACT FINDING MISSIONS
In his response the Dalai Lama accepted the offer ‘in principle’ but proposed to start the process by sending his ‘fact-finding’ delegations from among exile community to verify the Chinese claims of ‘progress, prosperity and happiness’ of Tibetan community under the Chinese rule. Between August 1979 and 1985 Dharamsala sent four such ‘fact-finding’ delegations. First three delegations namely the High Power Delegation of senior Tibetan leaders, the Delegation of Youth Leaders and the Educational Delegation were sent in quick succession between August 1979 and September 1980. The nature of study of each delegation was designed in such a manner that each got the privilege of travelling to all the three Tibetan provinces of Kham, Amdo and U-Tsang. Citing reasons like hugeness of the geographic area, lack of good transport system and tiring journeys, the travel plans of each delegation were spread over 2-3 months each to ensure that the delegates had enough time to see things and meet maximum number of Tibetan people.
The delegations were comprised of senior serving and former cabinet ministers of the exile government, senior religious leaders, members of exile parliament; and other well informed community leaders. Almost all of them were such individuals who were familiar with pre-1959 Tibet and, hence, could make sense of the changed situation. An interesting aspect of this delegation diplomacy was that even though Beijing has been highly sensitive about presenting only ‘Tibet Autonomous Region’ (TAR) as the ‘real Tibet’, yet it permitted the delegations to visit those areas of Kham and Amdo provinces of Tibet which now belonged to the adjoining Chinese provinces of Yunnan, Sichuan, Qinghai and Ganzu.

SHOCKING EXPERIENCE
These delegation visits proved a bit too shocking for Beijing leaders as far as the response of Tibetan masses was concerned. Relying heavily on the feedback reports of self-serving party leaders and government functionaries in TAR, the Beijing leadership had come to religiously believe that Tibetan masses were ‘extremely happy’ under the Chinese rule and that the country of ‘former serfs’ was too opposed to the Dalai Lama to see him back in Tibet. In their enthusiasm to make the guests comfortable in their former homeland and to save Beijing from any embarrassment caused by public hostility, the government propaganda machinery went in over drive to educate the Tibetan masses on how and how not to treat the visiting guests. In addition to regular radio broadcasts, loudspeaker fitted propaganda vans were specially sent to villages and towns to warn the Tibetan masses against ‘stoning’, ‘spitting’ or any other kind of ‘misbehaviour’ against the visiting representatives of the fugitive Dalai Lama.

However, the actual public response turned out just opposite of what the Chinese leadership was expecting. The delegations were mobbed by massive cheering crowds who listened respectfully to them, cried and competed with each other to shake hands or touch them to seek their blessings. It was first chance for the Tibetan masses to hear in their own language that their ‘Yeshi Norbu’ (‘Precious Jewel’, a common address for Dalai Lama in Tibet) was fine and what kind of life and freedoms the Tibetan refugees enjoyed in exile. At places the crowds swelled into such huge gatherings that the Chinese Public Security Bureau personnel were left with no choice but to stand aside and watch the unimaginable surge with surprise.

The second delegation, comprising of some prominent youth leaders of the exile community, had to face trouble following similar public response from Tibetan masses in some areas. The visit of this delegation was cut short by the Chinese government alleging that the delegates indulged in provoking the Tibetan masses against it.

A common feature of all these delegations was that many delegates had to leave behind their personal belongings to accommodate hundreds of hand written memoranda, presented by individuals and communities, addressed to the Dalai Lama. This exceptional experience had its own messages for all three parties viz. the Tibetan masses, the visitors as well as the Beijing rulers of Tibet.

No wonder the Beijing regime kept the visit of the fourth and last fact-finding delegation on hold till 1985 when some senior religious leaders from exile were allowed to have a look at the religious situation in Tibet. The intervening period between the first three delegations and the fourth witnessed the beginning of a new process of negotiations between Beijing and Dharamsala. In 1981 Beijing invited Gyalo Thondup again. His meeting with Chinese leader Hu Yaobang on July 28 paved the way for opening a discussion process that was aimed at ‘probing the possibilities of detailed talks on the future of Tibet’. This was the real beginning of what many call the phenomenon as “Talks about Talks” between Beijing and Dharamsala

DIALOGUE BEGINS
Two high-level Tibetan delegations under the leadership of Kalon Tripa (Prime Minister) Juchen Thupten Namgyal visited Beijing in 1982 and 1984. Interestingly, the Chinese perceptions on Tibetan problem remained predetermined and never moved beyond the person of Dalai Lama. From the very onset Beijing appointed the Central United Front Work Department, as the exclusive interface between PRC and Dharamsala to underline the ‘local’ and ‘internal’ nature of the Tibetan issue. This Front, an internal organ of the Communist Party of China, was created by late Chairman Mao during his Long March days to win ‘cooperation’ of all those non-Chinese nationalities that Mao intended to absorb in his ‘People’s Republic of China’. Though the Front appears to be headed by a ‘Minister’, the overall status of the Front is nothing more than a ‘department’ of the Communist Party of China. Its focus remains till this day on ensuring how the Dalai Lama and/or his fellow exiles are won back to the fold of PRC as just other ‘Chinese’ citizens. Beijing government’s official communiqués have been consistently presenting the delegations from Dharamsala as ‘overseas Chinese’ who were on ‘private’ visit to meet their relatives. At no stage Beijing recognised the Tibetan delegates as the ‘representatives of Dalai Lama’ or that of ‘Tibetan Government-in-exile’.

REWRITING HISTORY
In addition, almost on each occasion China has been demanding Dalai Lama to give certain undertakings. One such undertaking demanded him to accept and declare that “Tibet has been an integral part of China through history”. To this Dalai Lama’s consistent response has been that although this is untrue and though he can not go back in history to rewrite it, yet he is ready to accept Tibet as a part of PRC provided some ‘genuine autonomy’ for Tibet and Tibetans is ensured. Another Chinese condition which Dalai Lama has been finding difficult to fulfil is to declare that “Taiwan is an integral part of China”. To this his response is that since he has no authority to speak on behalf of people of Taiwan, Chinese leaders should better contact Taiwan government directly on this issue.

WHAT IS THE ISSUE? DALAI LAMA OR TIBETAN PEOPLE?
On the other hand the Tibetan side has been showing keen interest in evolving a special, long term and mutually acceptable arrangement for Tibet and Tibetans within the framework of PRC. They have been keen to have a special arrangement which ensured some special status for Tibet on similar lines as was being discussed by Beijing for Taiwan and Hong Kong under a ‘one country two systems’ idea at that time. But Beijing’s approach was limited to reaching an arrangement which ensured that Dalai Lama could be allowed to return and settle comfortably in Beijing. In response to this Dalai Lama’s consistent stand has been that “Dalai Lama is not the real issue. The real issue is the happiness of six million Tibetans living inside Tibet.” In his annual address to Tibetans on March 10, 1980, the Dalai Lama said, “…. I would like to remind everybody that the core of the Tibetan issue is the welfare and ultimate happiness of six million Tibetans in Tibet. The limited leniency that the Chinese have introduced is a welcome first step. But we are still nowhere near being satisfied that the Tibetans in Tibet are content…” However, he also took care that Beijing’s interest in the dialogue was not lost. In February 1983 he pleased Beijing by repeating that he was very keen to visit Tibet.

BEIJING’S CHANGING PRIORITIES
However following the visit of fourth fact-finding delegation of religious leaders in 1985 the change of guards in Beijing cooled the dialogue process with Dharamsala. Moreover, in the wake of two major Tibetan public upheavals in Lhasa in 1987 and 1989 against the Chinese regime the talks suffered a serious set back. Rather, the magnitude of the Tibetan uprising in March 1989 and the decision of Hu Jintao, then Governor of Tibet, to crush it with a heavy hand with the help of army tanks and armoured vehicles, spoiled the atmosphere beyond immediate repair. Only three months later, the Chinese youths’ democratic uprising against the one-party rule of Communist Party over PRC and the subsequent massacre at Tien Anman Square shifted Beijing’ priorities to an altogether different direction.

This upheaval inside China and sudden collapse of world’s most prominent communist heaven i.e. the Soviet Union, wiped out whatever enthusiasm remained in the hearts of Beijing rulers about a dialogue with the exiled Dalai Lama. The Chinese embassy in New Delhi functioned as the only contact point between Dharamsala and Beijing till 1993 when the relations broke down completely. 1989 also saw the death of Panchen Lama who lived in China and was used by Beijing leaders extensively as a counter against Dalai Lama. On a rare visit to Shigatse, the town of his main religious seat at Tashi Lhumpo monastery, he died under suspicious circumstances only a day after his public speech which was highly critical of Chinese regime for its mistakes in Tibet. Interestingly, it was not first time he had openly criticized Beijing leaders for their mistakes in Tibet. Despite siding with Beijing during fateful period of 1950s, Panchen Lama had to undergo public humiliation and 12-year long confinement in a labour camp during Cultural Revolution for submitting a list of Chinese misdeeds in Tibet to Chairman Mao.

Beijing-Dharamsala relations nosedived to lowest ever heights in 1995 when the Chinese government arrested the 5-year old boy Gedhun Choeky Nyima, authenticated by Dalai Lama from exile as the next reincarnation of the deceased Panchen Lama. This boy was quickly replaced by Beijing by another boy of its choice. Despite all efforts by Dalai Lama and his supporters across the world, Beijing has refused to give any information on Gedhun during past 14 years.

FIVE-POINT PROPOSAL: A MONK’S PEACE OFFENSIVE ?
While maintaining his contacts with Beijing, Dalai Lama has been busy in evolving a long-term strategy and winning support from the world community to find a lasting solution to the Tibetan problem. His address to the U.S. Congressional Human Rights Caucus on September 21, 1987 was the first milestone in this direction. It was here that he launched his peace offensive against the Beijing regime. Addressing the Chinese sentiments about maintaining Tibet as an ‘integral part of China’ he presented a five-point peace plan which underlined basic problems of Tibet under Chinese occupation. These five points are:
1. Transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace;
2. Abandonment of China's population transfer policy which threatens the very existence of the Tibetans as a people;
3. Respect for the Tibetan people's fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms;
4. Restoration and protection of Tibet's natural environment and the abandonment of China's use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste; and
5. Commencement of earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet and of relations between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples.

THE STRASSBOURG PROPOSAL
But Beijing rejected his demands outright saying that it smacked of asking for independence for Tibet from China. Next year at Strasbourg (France) the Dalai Lama presented a refined and detailed version of this proposal before the European Parliament on June 15, 1988. In this version Dalai Lama clearly offered to let Tibet remain within the framework of PRC and accepted Beijing’s right to conduct foreign relations of Tibet. In return he demanded a ‘self governing’ democratic system for entire Tibet which, as against the Chinese concept of Tibet as a much truncated ‘Tibet Autonomous Region’, comprises of ‘Cholka-Sum’ the traditional Tibet comprising of U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo provinces.

In his address, Dalai Lama elaborated each point in details:
“The whole of Tibet known as Cholka-Sum (U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo) should become a self-governing democratic political entity founded on law by agreement of the people for the common good and the protection of themselves and their environment, in association with the People's Republic of China.

“The Government of the People's Republic of China could remain responsible for Tibet's foreign policy. The Government of Tibet should, however, develop and maintain relations, through its own foreign affairs bureau, in the field of commerce, education, culture, religion, tourism, science, sports and other non-political activities. Tibet should join international organisations concerned with such activities.

“The Government of Tibet should be founded on a constitution or basic law. The basic law should provide for a democratic system of government entrusted with the task of ensuring economic equality, social justice, and protection of the environment. This means that the Government of Tibet will have the rights to decide on all affairs relating to Tibet and the Tibetans.

“As individual freedom is the real source and potential of any society's development, the Government of Tibet would seek to ensure this freedom by full adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including the rights to speech, assembly and religion. Because religion constitutes the source of Tibet's national identity and spiritual values lie at the very heart of Tibet's rich culture, it would be the special duty of the Government of Tibet to safeguard and develop its practice.

“The Government should be comprised of a popularly elected Chief Executive, a bi-cameral legislative branch, and an independent judicial system. Its seat should be in Lhasa.
“The social and economic system of Tibet should be determined in accordance with the wishes of the Tibetan people, bearing in mind especially the need to raise the standard of living of the entire population.

“The Government of Tibet would pass strict laws to protect wildlife and plant life. The exploitation of natural resources would be carefully regulated. The manufacture, testing, stockpiling of nuclear weapons and other armaments must be prohibited, as well as use of nuclear power and other technologies which produce hazardous waste. It would be the Government of Tibet's goal to transform Tibet into our planet's largest natural preserve.
“A regional peace conference should be called to ensure that Tibet becomes a genuine sanctuary of peace through demilitarisation. Until such a peace conference can be convened and demilitarisation and neutralisation achieved, China could have the right to maintain a restricted number of military installations in Tibet. These must be solely for defence purposes.
In order to create an atmosphere of trust conductive to fruitful negotiations, the Chinese Government should cease its human rights violations in Tibet and abandon its policy of transferring Chinese to Tibet……”

As expected, this too was rejected, rather more strongly, by Beijing. Besides strong objections to almost all other points, it specifically refused to accept the concept of ‘Cholka-Sum’ for defining Tibetan boundaries.

MEANINGLESS MINORITY IN THEIR OWN HOMELAND
This Chinese reaction to Dalai Lama’s 5-Pt Peace Plan is natural because since absorption of most parts of Kham and Amdo provinces into adjoining Chinese provinces China has settled millions of Chinese in these areas to reduce Tibetans into a meaningless minority in their own home regions. Today only few Tibetan pockets remain in Yunnan, Sichuan, Ganzu and Qinghai with some Tibetan character amidst a sea of Han towns and villages. During recent visit to Xiling, the captal of Qinghai, the home province of present Dalai Lama, this author was surprised to note that one would have to watch over 500 Chinese pass a road junction before one could see the first Tibetan face. Things were no different in towns and villages of Kham in Yunnan and Sichuan either.

According to the TGIE’s claims the population of entire Tibet (Cholka-Sum) was 6 million before occupation by China. Today the Tibetan population accounts for 0.5 percent of the Chinese population while Tibet contributes over 25 per cent of land in PRC’s present geography. Figures from China’s official Statistical Year Book-2002, (China Statistics Press, p-100) show that only 3.5 million Tibetans live among a total population of 154.7 million in these four Chinese provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Qinghai and Ganzu:

Tibet (Truncated) i.e. TAR 2,616,329
Sichuan 82,348,296
Yunnan 42,360,089
Qinghai 4,822,963
Gansu 25,124,282

*Tibet (Original 6,000,000
(*As claimed by Dalai Lama and his TGIE)

THE EUROPEAN ULTIMATUM:
Following a total breakdown in Beijing-Dharamsala talks in 1993 it was only in 2002 when Beijing, pushed by an ultimatum from the European Parliament and pulled by its own internal needs, restarted its talks with Dharamsala. It’s a different matter that the process was abruptly stalled in November 2008 without taking it anywhere through eight rounds lasting
On July 6, 2000 that happened to be the 65th birthday of Dalai Lama, the European Parliament passed a resolution (nr. B5-0608, 0610, 0617, 0621, 0641/2000) which called upon the Beijing authorities to restart their negotiations with Dharamsala. In a stern language it underlined that “Tibet was invaded and occupied in 1949 and 1950 by the Chinese armed forces” and called upon PRC government to “….reach a new status for Tibet which guarantees full Tibetan autonomy in all areas of political, economic, social and cultural life, the only exceptions being defence and foreign policy.”

Since the fateful events of 1959, it was first time when an international forum of this status threatened Beijing with as serious consequences as recognising the ‘Tibetan government in exile as the ‘legitimate representative of the Tibetan people’. The operative part of this resolution “Calls on the governments of the Member-States to give serious consideration to the possibility of recognising the Tibetan Government in exile as the legitimate representative of the Tibetan people if, within three years, the Beijing authorities and the Tibetan government in exile have not, through negotiations organised under the aegis of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, signed an agreement on a new Statute for Tibet.”

BEIJING WINKS – FOR OWN REASONS
Though Beijing demonstrated all its contempt to this resolution, yet it finally announced in 2002 that it was keen about restarting the talks with Dharamsala on how to find a solution to Tibetan issue. Beijing had its own compelling reasons and designs behind eating this humble pie. It had already moved ahead on its ambitious plans of hosting the Olympics in 2008. The PRC leaders were in no mood to invite direct confrontation with the European community and the rest of Western block and thereby take the risk of seeing Beijing Olympics to go the Moscow Olympics way. The projects of connecting Tibet with railway to rest of China and developing new townships for future Chinese settlers too were in full swing at that time. Any major confrontation with Dharamsala would have rocked the boat inside Tibet to create problems for these projects which were essential requisites for Beijing’s plans of implementing the ‘last solution’ to Tibetan problem through population transfer.

Moreover, Beijing leaders who have high hopes of seeing the Tibetan issue end with the death of current Dalai Lama, feel that each passing year in the life of an ageing Dalai Lama is highly ‘precious’. No surprise that Beijing decided to buy this precious time by agreeing to ‘talk about talks’. This, surely, did not surprise those Tibetans and international friends of Tibet who had their reservations about Dalai Lama’s climb down from ‘Rangzen’ to ‘Genuine Autonomy’ and who believe that talks were just a ploy of Beijing to buy time.

BEIJING’S U-TURN
The fears and warnings of these groups came true in November 2008 when Beijing leaders banged the door on the Tibetan delegation. Now anybody could see how Beijing had been dragging its feet on talks for six years. It had not taken talks an inch further from where they were in 1993. Just a month before the Beijing Olympics China asked Dharamsala to present its concept of ‘Genuine Autonomy for Tibet’, a step it should have taken on day-one of the dialogue. Now any body could see that it was on the first available opportunity after the successful conclusion of the Olympics that Beijing threw back Dharamsala’s memorandum on its face with all contempt at its command and called off the talks on the grounds that not a single of the five-point proposal was acceptable to it.

Adding insult to injury, Zhu Weiqun, executive vice minister of the United Front Work Department (UFWD) in his press statement after the meeting advised the Dalai Lama “to do something beneficial for the people of Tibet” before he dies. He categorically rejected all the five points saying that the ideas were just unacceptable. He termed the concept of ‘Cholka Sum’ as that of a ‘Greater Tibet’ which ‘never existed’ before 1951. "The unification of the motherland, territorial integrity and the national dignity are the greatest interests of the Chinese people. We will never make a concession," Zhu Weiqun, told reporters in Beijing on November 10, 2008
He ruled out any kind of special status for Tibetan areas. "China is a country in which various ethnic groups live together. If ethnic groups in China all ask for an autonomous region in which only people of their own groups could live, the whole country would be cast into chaos," Zhu said.
As expected, China also refused to take Dalai Lama’s call on ‘demilitarising’ Tibet. "Everybody knows that the army is a basic guarantee of territorial integrity, national security and social stability… I believe not a single nation would agree to withdraw its own army from its own territory," Zhu declared.

Zhu also reiterated that the door for the Dalai Lama's return to a patriotic stance had always been open and would remain open, "But the door for 'Tibet independence', 'half independence' and 'independence in a disguised form' had never been open, nor would it be open in the future," he clarified.

On the issue of settlement of the Chinese population in Tibet, Zhu made it clear that Beijing has no intention of stopping or undoing what the Dalai Lama side terms as ‘the demographic aggression’. He even went to the extent of accusing the Dalai Lama of having intentions to “… carry out ethnic discrimination, apartheid and ethnic cleansing…” in the name of restoring Cholka-Sum to Tibetan population.

TIBETAN RESPONSE
On the other side of the Himalayan divide, Dharamsla appears to have already anticipated this Chinese response. At least that is what reflected from Dalai Lama’s decision in September 2008 to use his special constitutional powers to call for a general international meeting of leading Tibetan leaders and opinion makers in Dharamsala and a special conference of international Tibet Support Groups after the conclusion of the next and eighth round of talks which was scheduled for October 31 to November 5.

Thee two conferences, held from November 17th to 22nd and from November 30 to December 1 were asked to discuss the situation following the results of the 8th round and to give their suggestions on future course of action. Expressing their dismay on the Chinese response on the memorandum, both the gatherings, attended by respective galaxies of leading Tibetans and Tibet supporters, reiterated their faith in Dalai Lama’s leadership and advised him to carry forward his ‘Middle Path Policy’ on Tibet in near future. Both the conferences underlined that the concept of ‘Rangzen’ i.e. complete independence for Tibet should not be abandoned altogether. An immediate gain for Dalai Lama from these two conferences was a demonstration to Beijing and the world community that despite failure of talks he still commanded support and respect of his followers and friends.

WHO GAINED WHAT?
The net-sum of this 29- year long contact is a mix of gains and setbacks for both sides. Although the two sides have been engaged in talks since 1979 with the aim of finding a mutually agreeable solution, they have been simultaneously busy in their own ways to prepare for the future. Beijing has been frantically focused on ensuring a ‘permanent solution’ to the problem by fortifying its position inside Tibet. Its major focus has been on cementing its military position inside occupied Tibet through a widespread network of roads, other transport and communication facilities and defence installations inside Tibet as well as along its borders with other countries in South Asia.
Of late, Beijing has been busy in ushering in a new economic environment in Tibet to accommodate millions of new Han settlers. By extending the Chinese railway network up to Lhasa in 2006, China has successfully removed the last hurdle that discouraged Chinese from mainland to settle permanently in Tibet. Already used successfully in taming most of other 55 national minorities like the Manchurians and Mongols, this population transfer policy has been advocated by successive Chinese Premiers as the ‘Last Solution’ to the unending Tibetan problem. Thanks to abundance of invaluable minerals and timber across Tibetan plateau, establishment of this rail link has converted Tibet from a net financial liability to a ‘national asset’ for China. Beijing is already working on at least three more similar rail links to Tibet besides its plans to extend the present Gormo-Lhasa rail to Nepalese border.

PREPARING FOR THE NEXT LIFE?
Dalai Lama too, like a typical Buddhist monk who would use current life time to prepare for his next life, has been busy preparing for a Tibetan system that can outlive his own life time. Internally, he has already succeeded in replacing an outdated theocratic political system of old Tibet into a highly modern democratic system which functions through its an elected Parliament and is presided over by a Prime Minister who too is elected through a direct secret vote by the Tibetan community. Today Dalai Lama can claim that in his absence following his death, this democratic system is capable of carrying Tibetan people’s struggle forward.

Thanks to the tremendous help and autonomy provided by the government of India to Dalai Lama, the Tibetan community of nearly 100000 refugees across India, has successfully revived its lost national and cultural identity. This well organized community has revived a wide range of over 500 cultural, religious and other institutions which can boast of their most authentic Tibetan character. An autonomous and widespread modern educational network of schools and technical institutions, including three universities in India too has played an important role in converting a hopeless and helpless bunch of refugees into a self sufficient community with one of the highest literacy rates among Indian communities.

A chain of fact-finding delegations and direct links between Dharamsala and Beijing have encouraged Beijing to bring some relaxation and economic progress in the life of Tibetan masses. All this has helped Dharamsala in establishing communication links with the people. These links and information about the outer world have improved people’s organising skills and internal communications which have come handy in build up a resistance movement across Tibet despite Chinese controls. Instant public demonstrations in almost all areas of ‘Cholka-Sum’ during the March-April 2008 uprising was an unheard phenomenon and a major highlight of changing situation inside occupied Tibet in the past six decades. Beijing’s enthusiasm to bring in economic development in Tibet and to open it for international tourism too has helped the Tibetan freedom movement inside Tibet in many ways. New tools of communication like mobile phones, internet and fast road networks have had their own contribution to strengthening this movement.

On the international front too, Dalai Lama has covered an impressive distance. Although Beijing has been consistently avoiding conferring any official status to Dharamsala’s TGIE establishment or its representatives, but accepting them across the table itself has given a de facto international recognition to Dalai Lama and the TGIE as ‘the representative’ of Tibet and Tibetan people.
Because of Dalai Lama’s style of whirlwind travels and his impressive style of promoting peace and universal responsibility, he has emerged as the most popular statesman of current era. (His average travel itinerary logs in around 250 days away from his exile home despite his +70 age during past many years). Almost every time his foreign travels are marked by Chinese threats to the heads of states across the world against allowing the Dalai Lama to enter their country or meeting him personally. But these travels invariably end up with new irritants for Beijing leaders in the shape of his addresses to Parliaments, hugely attended public meetings and/or photo sessions with Prime Ministers, Presidents and all those who matter.

In past two decades more than two dozen Parliaments have adopted over 50 resolutions expressing their appreciation and support to Dalai Lama and his Tibetan cause. Literally speaking, by now he must have collected more ceremonial keys than his own body weight to European and American towns which are gifted to him by enthusiastic city mayors. His list of international honours, starting with the Nobel Peace Prize and Magsaysay Award has become almost endless by now. A regiment of around 300 Tibet support groups across the world too has come to stay as a pain in the neck for visiting Chinese leaders in almost every state capital and big city of the world.

THE REFUGEE DILEMMA
But there have been some serious negative impacts of Dalai Lama’s ‘Middle Path’ on the Tibetan side too. This ‘less than freedom’ policy has not only confused the Tibetan masses and their international supporters, it has also pushed in an element of demoralisation among them. Having directly suffered traumatically at the hands of Chinese, the older generation of refugees finds itself split between their unending dreams of free Tibet and the new idea of accepting China’s sovereignty over their occupied motherland. A good section of the new generation, perpetually used to singing songs of freedom and shouting slogans for ‘Ranzen’ since their nursery days in refugee schools, feels lost and abandoned. This, no doubt, has made its own contribution towards splitting the energies of this already microscopic community in two different directions. This dilemma has also impacted the morale of the Tibetan people living under occupation. However, the Tibetans’ unquestionable faith in Dalai Lama still remains the inspiration and binding force that has kept the community united and focussed. Luckily for the Tibetan movement, a six-year long run up to the Beijing Olympics during the talks period helped Tibetans and their international supporters in overcoming this confusion because opposition to Beijing as the Olympics venue proved to be the most effective binding glue in the movement’s recent history.

WHAT NEXT?
This sudden breaking up of the dialogue process has its own implications for both sides. Having already put all his bargaining chips on the table, Dalai Lama is left with no further climb down options. By declaring his stand for ‘Choka-Sum’ as the real Tibet, he has no more choice of making any major change because he cannot afford losing support of either Khampa Tibetans or of the Amdo Tibetans. He also can not afford to abandon his concept of ‘genuine autonomy’ for Tibetans in lieu of the PRC’s offer of ‘autonomy for nationalities’ which has already seen nationalities like the Manchurians and Mongolians of ‘Inner Mongolia’ and many dozen other nationalities had tasted before vanishing into PRC’s ‘Museum of Nationalities’.
On the other hand, the Beijing leadership may have good reasons to feel confident on the strength of their absolute physical control on Tibet; the PLA and PSB’s Nazi like grip on the Tibetan community; direct control of newly settled Chinese over the economy and other resources of Tibet; and China’s newly acquired financial and political influence on the international scene. But events of March 2008 have proved beyond doubt that despite all such advantages China can not, unlike the gory days of Cultural Revolution, hope to remain insulated from international answerability.

DALAI LAMA IS THE BEST BET
Ever increasing stature of Dalai Lama in the international arena has made him a force to reckon with. Even all Chinese leaders put together can not hope to match his international charisma. In view of increasing age of Dalai Lama (he is 73 plus today) a section of Chinese leadership might be nursing hopes of seeing the Tibetan problem vanishing away with his death. They should have understood by now that despite a gigantic propaganda machinery and resources at their command they have failed miserably in getting their own ‘Panchen Lama’ accepted by their Tibetan colonial subjects. They even failed to hold on to Karma Pa who enjoyed Beijing’s patronage and Tibetan people’s faith. (he escaped to exile in 2000 to join Dalai Lama). On the strength of a fake Panchen Lama in hand and the real one somewhere in house arrest, their dream of installing a puppet baby ‘Dalai Lama’ after present Dalai Lama’s death has too little chances.

Rather than hoping to play a gamble of manipulating things after the death of current Dalai Lama, it may be more sensible for Beijing leaders to make best use of his popularity among China’s Tibetan subjects and his credibility at international levels. With his given faith in peace and coexistence, and his total command on Tibetan minds, this ‘Living Buddha’ may prove a far more precious asset to PRC than a fake reincarnate baby of a dead Dalai Lama in a confusing situation which is bound to be dominated by a set of unpredictable Tibetan leaders who are liable to be pushed around by conflicting international interest groups.

Shri Vijay Kranti is a senior journalist, who passionately supported the Tibetan cause for more than 3 decades. He is the editor of Tibbat Desh, hindi monthly newsmagazine.

China Can’t Have It Both Ways

2009-04-29T14:52:00.001+05:30

Editorial
April 26, 2009
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/opinion/27iht-edchina.html?hpw

The Chinese government issued two statements last Thursday. Both were only briefly, and separately, noted in the press. They make for a curious contrast.

In one, China denounced Japan’s Prime Minister Taro Aso for making an offering to the Yasukuni shrine. This is the shrine that honors 2.5 million Japanese war dead, including 14 top war criminals from World War II, when Japan committed terrible atrocities in China.

China was furious when the then-prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, visited Yasukuni in 2005, and the next two prime ministers stayed clear.

But Mr. Aso, a pugnacious nationalist, revived the controversy on Tuesday by offering the Shinto shrine a potted plant. Mr. Aso’s spokesmen insisted that this was not the same as a visit, and in any case would not affect his scheduled visit to China next week.

China was furious, telling the Japanese that “the question of history is highly sensitive.”

In the other statement, China demanded that the United States cancel a visit by the Dalai Lama (he arrived on Friday for a two-week tour). The Buddhist religious leader, a recipient of the Nobel peace prize who is respected around the world, says he is seeking only autonomy for his homeland, Tibet. China vilifies him as a separatist and regularly lambastes countries and leaders who receive him.

“We oppose the Dalai Lama going to any country to engage in splittist activities under any pretext,” said Jiang Yu, the same Foreign Ministry spokeswoman who had earlier found history to be so sensitive.

Mr. Aso’s offering to Yasukuni was blatantly provocative and offensive, even if all he offered was a potted sakaki evergreen, and his explanation — that he was just expressing “appreciation and respect” to Japanese who gave their all — was disingenuous.

We understand China’s frustration. But it only makes Beijing’s repression of Tibet and its attacks on the Dalai Lama all the more hypocritical.

As it carves out an ever greater role in the world, Beijing will have to learn that it cannot have it both ways. China cannot be the aggrieved victim in the morning and the bully in the afternoon.